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ACUTE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALIZATION OF THE
MENTALLY ILL IN THE METROPOLIS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
GEORGE E. DIX*
Nonvoluntary hospitalization of those believed to be mentally in
has been a frequent source of legal, medical, and lay controversy." At
the core of most discussions have been two principal issues: who should
be subject to nonvoluntary psychiatric hospitalization, and when, if
ever, should hospitalization be effected without a prior judicial deter-
mination of the justification for the action. Proponents of a broad
substantive criteria for defining those subject to nonvoluntary hos-
0 The author would like to express his appreciation to the staff of Malcolm Bliss
Mental Health Center, who tolerated his presence and questions during the research for
this article. Special thanks are also due Dr. Kathleen Smith, Superintendent of Malcolm
Bliss, and Professor Frank W. Miller of Washington University Law School, who made
preliminary suggestions regarding the project, read early drafts of the article, and made
helpful comments regarding the presentation of the research.
1. See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DIsABr.m AND THE LAW 15-
43 (F. Lindman & D. McIntyre eds. 1961); Kadish, A Case Study in the Significance of Due
Process-Institutionalizing the Mentally Ill, 9 W. POL. Q. 93 (1956); Ross, Hospitalizing
the Mentally Ill-Emergency and Temporary Commitments, in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE
LEGISLATION 1955-56 459 (1957). Among the general literature in this field, see M. Gtrrr-
MACHER and H. WEIHOFFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 288-322 (1952); Curran, Hospitaliza-
tion of the Mentally ill, 31 N. CAR. L. ,rv. 274 (1953); Ross, Commitment of the Mentally
Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 945 (1959); Tao, Some Problems Relat-
ing to Compulsory Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 44 J. URBAN L. 459 (1967); Note,
Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerations in Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 56
YALE L.J. 1178 (1947). The earlier pieces are of little practical help, however, as most
were written prior to the recent dramatic changes in hospital environments and proce-
dures caused by increased use of drugs. Immediately before publication, the results of the
American Bar Foundation's extensive study of hospitalization procedures became avail-
able. R. RoCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MEN-
TALLY ILL (1968). For the author's reaction to this study, see Dix, Book Review (to be
published in 1969 LAw & THE SoCIAL. ORDER).
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pitalization emphasize the discomfort experienced by mentally ill per-
sons, the burdens they impose on their families and the community,
and the advances in psychiatric knowledge and treatment opportuni-
ties. Opponents of liberal criteria emphasize the right of each indi-
vidual to choose for himself whether to participate in treatment
programs and argue that this right should be respected even in those
cases where the person's refusal to submit to treatment places a burden
on others. Proponents of judicial participation in the decision to hos-
pitalize urge that judicial proceedings constitute an essential safeguard
against unjustified hospitalization of "sane" individuals. Opponents
counter that judicial proceedings delay treatment, distress mentally
ill persons, humiliate their families, and serve no constructive purpose
because the need for hospitalization is a medical determination best
left to experts who can be relied upon to hospitalize only when
necessary.2
Much of the discussion, however, has been built around widely
publicized cases which, when viewed with the improved vision of hind-
sight, can be seen to have involved either hospitalization unnecessary
under any reasonable criteria or delay of hospitalization which would
clearly have benefited the person or prevented some disastrous event,
While the need for protection against even infrequent abuses of the
hospitalization power must not be minimized, the available literature
is significantly deficient, since it lacks any detailed discussion of the
everyday operations of well developed hospitalization systems and the
relationship of this routine to the legal framework within which the
systems operate. Such an examination of one system, the acute psy-
chiatric hospitalization system in St. Louis, Missouri, is the purpose of
this paper. From this study, perhaps it will be possible to draw some
general conclusions concerning the dynamics of the system, the neces-
sity of outside supervision, and the potential for effective supervision of
the system by inserting at some point a judicial officer with the task of
enforcing legally-proscribed criteria for nonvoluntary hospitalization.
Part I describes the development of the "legal framework." Part II
is a description of how the purportedly regulated system actually works,
2. E.g., Editorial Comment, Law's Labor Lost, 40 PsycmrATRuc Q. 150, 150-51 (1966).
3. See, e.g., Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw.
U.L. REv. 383 (1962), building on the unfortunate case of Michael Duzynski, a Polish
immigrant who hanged himself in the State Hospital after being placed there by the
Chicago police upon the complaint of Duzynski's building manager that he was insane.
Cf. Arens, Due Process and the Rights of the Mentally Ill: The Strange Case of Fredricl
Lynch, 13 CA'H. U. oF Am. L. REv. 3 (1964).
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with emphasis upon the role of the court and the substantive criteria
applied at various points in the process. While the discussion is struc-
tured as a description of the steps from the community to full-time
hospitalization, the descriptions and the illustrative examples should
present a fairly complete picture of the variety of situations with which
a metropolitan public acute psychiatric hospitalization service is called
upon to deal. Part III is a discussion of one central legal issue, the role
of the judiciary in the hospitalization process, in light of the conclu-
sions reached in Parts I and II.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Prior to 1945,4 control over admission of St. Louis' mentally ill to
full time public hospitalization was exercised by the administrative
officials of the city's health facilities. Essentially a certification proce-
dure seems to have been used.5 Less emphasis was placed on assuring
that the proposed patient actually needed hospitalization than on ac-
4. Early in the history of the state, the violent "insane" were restrained under deplor-
able conditions, sometimes in jails, cellars, garrets or log pens. The nonviolent insane
were frequently left to roam and fare as best they could. In the late 1830's, the city con-
structed a poorhouse and many of the insane found their way into this institution. The
mental hospital reformer, Dorthea Lynde Dix, visited Missouri in 1846-47 and, responding
at least in part to her efforts, the first State Hospital for the Insane was opened in 1851.
Some of the city's insane were placed in this institution, but it was dearly inadequate to
fulfill the need. In 1869, the city opened its own facility, the St. Louis County Insane
Asylum. This served as the primary public source of care and treatment for mental illness
until 1939, when Malcolm Bliss Hospital was opened. See generally R. Glickman, Develop-
ment of Public Care of the Insane in St. Louis with Special Reference to the City Sani-
tarium, Chapter II, pp. 6-14 (1933) (unpublished M.S. dissertation on file in Olin Library,
Washington University). Ownership of these facilities has since been transferred to the
state, but they both continue to serve patients from the city.
5. The 1887 Ordinances, for example, set up a detailed procedure for the admission of
an indigent person to the city's mental hospital. A person applying for the admission of
another was required to obtain the certificate of one physician "that said party is insane
and destitute of means; and that the natural guardians of said party are unable to sup-
port said insane person .. " ST. Louis, Mo., REv. ORDINANCES § 321 (1887). An examina-
tion was to be conducted by a physician of the health department. Id. at § 329. The
Board of Health was then to examine the proposed patient and pass on his sanity, resi-
dence and financial condition. Id. at § 330. Provision was also made for "pay patients,"
but apparently they were to be admitted (by the Board of Health) only if their estate
was inadequate to provide for their care in a private facility. Id. at § 339. The provisions
had not changed significantly in 1936. See ST. Louis, Mo., R.v. CODE § 4205 (196) (pro-
viding for admission to the psychopathic ward at City Hospital) and § 4207 (providing
for transfer from City Hospital to the sanitarium on the certification of two physicians).
The hospital commissioner was directed to make a "full investigation of all cases .
before admission to determine the true state of affairs." Id. at § 4207.
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curately determining whether he was indigent and met residence re-
quirements for public care. 6 In 1945, however, the Missouri legislature
conferred on the city's probate court jurisdiction over proceedings to
determine whether an allegedly insane person was "a fit subject to be
sent to a state hospital."7 If the proposed patient did not have an at-
torney, the court was directed to appoint one to represent him.8 This
jurisdiction was resisted by the city's probate judge on the ground that
the limited task conferred-"to charge the upkeep of the indigent in-
sane ...to ... [the] city"-was ministerial and could not constitu-
tionally be conferred upon a judicial body.9 Arguing that as a matter
of policy as well the legislative action was unwise, he wrote:
For seventy years, no court has exercised jurisdiction over the
commitment or admission of literally thousands of pauper and pay
patients to [the] ... asylums and hospitals, for the insane. During
those long years, that jurisdiction has always been exercised by the
City's Hospital Boards, Commissioners, psychiatric staffs and its
Comptroller ...of course, always subject to a wrongly-omitted
[sic] patient's right to release by habeas corpus ... [T]he transfer
to this court of the City's long control of the admission of its
patients to those institutions would not only be impractical, un-
necessarily expensive, but a violation of Article II of the [Mis-
souri] Constitution.10
6. This distinction between paying and nonpaying patients and the emphasis on pre-
venting patients with means from obtaining free hospitalization under the poor laws
originated in the early English procedures for hospitalization. See Kadish, A Case Study
in the Significance of Procedural Due Process-Institutionalizing the Mentally I11, 9 W.
POL. Q. 93, 105-06 (1956). Although the distinction was condemned in State ex rel. Fuller
v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 866, 269 S.W.2d 72, 77 (1954) on the basis that requiring a
judicial procedure for indigents but not for affluent patients violated Equal Protection,
it is still retained in the statutes. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.863 (3), (4) (1959).
7. Ch. 51, § 9345, 1945 Mo. Laws 912. Despite failure to use criteria more precise than
that in this early statute, definitions of those subject to nonvoluntary hospitalization have
been upheld against constitutional attack based on alleged vagueness. See State ex rel.
Anderson v. United States Veterans Hosp., 268 Minn. 213, 219, 128 N.W.2d 710, 716 (1964),
upholding a statutory criteria phrased in terms of "any person of unsound mind and in
need of treatment, control or care"; this, the court asserted, had "a meaning generally
adequate." Given the complexities of the decision to hospitalize as discussed in Part II,
infra, the constitutional adequacy of such imprecise statutory criteria is certainly open to
question.
8. Ch. 51, § 9338, 1945 Mo. Laws 909-10. Appointment of an attorney had been required
since 1937 in the procedures applicable to the rest of the state. Ch. 46, § 8646, 1937 Mo.
Laws 511.
9. In re Rodell Crawford, Alleged to be Insane and Indigent, No. C.P. 1, Probate Court
of the City of St. Louis, Oct. 28, 1946. The probate court's memorandum opinion is printed
in full in Brief for Relator, pp. 6-13, State ex rel. Kowats v. Arnold, 356 Mo. 661, 204
S.W.2d 254 (1947).
10. Brief for Relator, supra note 9 at 9.
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The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed, however, and in State ex Tel.
Kowatz v. Arnold" held that the commitment power (whatever its
earlier nature) was now judicial and properly conferred on the probate
court. The policy objections raised by the probate judge, it indicated,
were "a question for the General Assembly." The court's comments
indicate that it believed the city's probate judge took too narrow a
view of his function under the newly created jurisdiction: his duty
was not solely to prevent public funds from being squandered on the
affluent insane but also to prevent unjustified hospitalizations before
they had an opportunity to occur:
The exercise of the [commitment] power may deprive the subjects
of precious constitutional rights, liberty and the enjoyment of
property, which cannot be done without due process of law. And
it will not do to say in such a case that relief can be obtained by
habeas corpus.12
No substantial changes in the statutes took place until 1954, when
the legislature enacted (with only minor changes) the Draft Act for
the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill. 13 This provided for a voluntary
admission procedure; any patient admitted pursuant to this procedure
was to be released "forthwith," unless the hospital filed with the pro-
bate court a certification that "release of the patient would be unsafe
for the patient or others" and the court ordered the continued reten-
tion of the patient pending commitment proceedings.' 4 Three proce-
dures for nonvoluntary admissions were established. First, a "standard
nonjudicial procedure" provided for admission upon the certification
of two physicians that the pre-patient was mentally ill and met the
criteria for involuntary hospitalization.' 5 Second, an emergency certi-
fication procedure provided for admission upon the certification of
one physician that the pre-patient was mentally ill and "because of
his illness is likely to injure himself or others if not immediately re-
strained."' 6 An alternative emergency procedure authorized a health
11. 356 Mo. 661,204 SW.2d 254 (1947).
12. Id. at 673, 204 S.W.2d at 260.
13. §1 1-27, 1953 Mo. Laws 647-59. See also National Institute of Mental Health, Fed-
eral Security Agency, A Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill (Public
Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1952). The Act, prepared by the National Institute of Mental
Health and the Office of the General Counsel of the Federal Security Agency, appears as
Appendix A of AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLMr AND THE LAw (F.
Lindman & D. McIntyre eds. 1961).
14. if 2-4, 1953 Mo. Laws 648-49.
15. Id. *6, at 649-50.
16. Id. § 7, at 650.
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or police officer to take a pre-patient to a hospital for admission and
"temporary confinement" if he had reason to believe that the pre-
patient was mentally ill and "because of his illness ... likely to injure
himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty pending examination
and certification by a ...physician."'17 Finally, provision was made
for admission upon court order and detailed procedures were estab-
lished for probate court proceedings.1 8 (These included a requirement
for the court to appoint counsel if an attorney was not retained by
the patient.)19 Another section provided that any patient hospitalized
pursuant to the standard nonjudicial procedure or the emergency
procedures could, upon request, obtain release within 48 hours, unless
the hospital certified that such release would be "unsafe for the patient
or others." In that case the probate court could order the release de-
layed for five days for the purpose of commencing a judicial commit.
ment proceeding.20
Adoption of the Draft Act significantly changed the legal criteria
for identifying those subject to nonvoluntary hospitalization. In the
absence of an emergency situation, an individual could be hospitalized
on a nonvoluntary basis if he were "mentally ill," and either "because
of his illness" was dangerous to himself or others, or was in need of
care or treatment in a mental hospital and lacked "sufficient insight
or capacity to make responsible application" for admission to a mental
hospital.21 Existence of mental illness and a determination that the
pre-patient "because of his illness, is likely to injure himself or others"
justified hospitalization pursuant to not only the judicial procedure
and the standard nonjudicial procedure but also the emergency certi-
fication procedure. 22 A "mentally ill individual" was defined as "an
individual having a psychiatric or other disease which substantially
impairs his mental health."
The new provisions were almost immediately challenged. On Octo-
ber 23, 1953, Mrs. Lillian Fuller presented her daughter Ester Porter
at Fulton State Hospital with certifications by two physicians and de-
manded her admission pursuant to the standard nonjudicial procedure.
The superintendent refused on the ground that he had "been in-
17. Id. § 8, at 650.
18. Id. § 9, at 650-52.
19. Id. § 9(6), at 651.
20. Id. § 17, at 655.
21. Id. § 6(2), at 649; § 9(7), at 650-52.
22. Id. §§ 7(1) & (2), 8, at 650.
23. Id. § 1(1), at 647.
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formed" that the legislation was unconstitutional and therefore void.
The Missouri Supreme Court, in a mandamus action brought by Mrs.
Fuller, agreed. "Both sides," the court began in State ex rel. Fuller v.
Mullinax,24 "recognize that the state, in the exercise of the police
power, may provide for the summary apprenhension of an allegedly
insane person, dangerous to self or others, and his temporary detention
(without notice or hearing) until the truth of the charges can be in-
vestigated. '2 5 No disagreement was registered by the court. But "ad-
mission to a mental hospital under the nonjudicial procedures ...
could always result in indeterminate confinement . . . without the
proposed patient's knowledge that impairment of his mental condition
was even suspected," the court observed, and "for want of subsequent
action (however induced) on the patient's part, or in his behalf ...
such hospitalization might conceivably continue for the remainder of
the patient's life."26 Consequently, concluded the court,
we are clearly of the opinion, and so hold, that for the statute in
operation to thus deprive a person of his liberty without an op-
portunity to be heard in advance of commitment, if he or those
acting for him desire it, would constitute a denial of due process,
and accordingly render the statute, in its present form, unconsti-
tutional. No reason is advanced why appropriate provisions em-
bodying this safeguard cannot be fitted into the present framework
of the act.27
There was no direct authority on which to rely. In 1933, the court
in In re Moynihan2s had declined to disapprove a court order for
emergency detention of a patient prior to hearing on the application
for indeterminate commitment. It had cautioned, however, against
indiscriminate use of this power:
The practice of sending a person to an insane asylum before the
hearing might result in preventing the person claimed to be in-
sane from employing counsel or being present at the hearing. Of
course, there may be circumstances in which such action is advis-
able ... but such action should be taken with caution not to im-
pair the rights of the alleged insane person.2 9
24. 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954).
25. Id. at 865, 269 S.W.2d at 76.
26. Id. at 866, 269 S.W.2d at 76-77.
27. Id. at 866, 269 S.W.2d at 77.
28. 332 Mo. 1022, 62 S.A%.2d 410 (1933).
29. Id. at 1039, 62 S.W.2d at 418. Interestingly, in neither Fuller nor Moynihan did the
court consider its decision in Ex parte Lewis, 328 Mo. 843, 42 S.W.2d 21 (1931), upholding
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The Fuller court did not read Moynihan as inconsistent with earlier
cases cited for the proposition that notice and an opportunity to par-
ticipate actively in a judicial hearing were constitutionally necessary
prerequisites to hospitalization. The cases upon which the Fuller
court relied to reject other case authority that due process require-
ments were satisfied by an opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing
after hospitalization were not strong support for this proposition.
Hunt v. Searcy,30 decided in 1902, was an action for ejectment in which
the plaintiff claimed that defendant's title was defective because a
prior grantor had been declared insane in an earlier wardship pro-
ceeding. Affirming the trial court's exclusion of the evidence of the
guardianship proceeding on the basis that the record of that proceed-
ing did not affirmatively show prior notice to the potential ward, the
court commented, "[W]hat if the person was not really insane at all,
and without notice was adjudicated insane and confined in an asy-
lum?" 31 This, the court indicated, was more than a theoretical possi-
bility, and pointed to the 1885 case of In the Matter of Marquis.8 2 In
Marquis, the probate court, on a petition filed by a son, had found
Washington Marquis of unsound mind and had appointed a guardian
of the person and the estate. No notice had been given to the senior
Marquis of the proceeding and the probate court, "upon proof that
he is not in condition of mind and body to be brought into court,"
ordered that he not be present. At the next term of court, however,
Washington Marquis appeared and moved to set aside the judgment.
He successfully maintained that he was not-and had not been-of
unsound mind and should have been given notice. Hunt was followed
in 1918 by Shanklin v. Boyce,83 an action by a former ward to set aside
the sale of his property by his former guardian. Affirming judgment
for the plaintiff, the court held, relying on Hunt, that since the guard-
ianship proceedings had been conducted without notice to the pro-
spective ward they were without effect, and the guardian was conse-
quently without authority to affect the ward's rights in his property.
Hunt, then, which provided the basic case support for the result in
Fuller, not only involved different subject matter, but the issue had
come to the court in a context in which the pressure undoubtedly felt
administrative detention and quarantine of those believed to have infectious venereal
disease. See note 104 infra.
30. 167 Mo. 158, 67 S.W. 206 (1902).
31. Id. at 183, 67 S.W. at 214.
32. 85 Mo. 615 (1885).
33. 275 Mo. 5, 204 S.W. 187 (1918).
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by the court to uphold a completed real property transaction may well
have influenced the result. In Shanklin (where the pressure went in
the opposite direction) the court dearly felt bound by Hunt. But most
important, the only factual information before the court in Fuller re-
garding the psychiatric hospitalization system was a single appellate
decision from the court's own reports ambiguously suggesting that a
single unjustified appointment of a guardian of the estate had occurred
long before.
The legislature was not slow to respond to the court's suggestion in
Fuller that the defects in the statutory procedure could be corrected.
The following year two major changes were made in the statutory
framework.34 First, the standard nonjudicial procedure was amended
to provide that copies of the application and supporting certificates
be filed with the County Welfare Department. This department was
then ordered to inform the pre-patient, both orally and by service of
a written notice, that unless he made known to the welfare department
within five days that he desired a judicial hearing, he would be subject
to hospitalization without judicial action. In the event that the indi-
vidual mailed a signed request for a hearing to the welfare department
"or otherwise notified the department," a full judicial hearing was to
be held.35
The second revision dealt with the emergency admission procedure.
An admitting hospital was required to notify the probate court of the
admission of a patient under either emergency procedure within five
days after the admission. (This was changed to ten days in 1957.) 36
Unless proceedings for hospitalization under the court order proce-
dure were initiated within five days from receipt of this notice, the
probate court was to order release of the patient. If such proceedings
were instituted, the court was directed to hold a hearing within ten
days and to render its judgment within five days after the end of this
hearing. Until the judgment was rendered temporary confinement of
the patient could be authorized by the court.3 7
There has been no substantial change in the statutes since 1955.
Although there has been no judicial test of the amended statutes, the
Attorney General's office has taken the position that the 1955 amend-
34. §§ 1-28, 1955 Mo. Laws 656-68.
35, § 4(3). 1955 Mo. Laws 650-60.
36. § 1, 1957 Mo. Laws 72-73.
37. § 7, 1955 Mo. Laws 661-62.
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ments met the Supreme Court's objections and that the prescribed
procedure is constitutionally valid.83
In Missouri, then, as in all states, the system of providing care for
the mentally ill operates within a detailed legal framework. Unlike
many other states, however, Missouri's framework has been signifi-
cantly affected by judicial decisions based on constitutional consider-
ations. The development of this framework reveals that little attention
has been given to the practical problems of the operation of a public
psychiatric hospitalization system and the feasibility of changing its
operation by legal fiat. Prior to 1945, nonvoluntary admission was re-
garded as a "medical" matter to be determined by the system's ad-
ministrators and their delegates. Hospitalization in public facilities
was regarded as the last resort for individuals who lacked financial
resources for any alternative; and while the legal framework did pre-
scribe certain procedures with which the medical personnel were ex-
pected to comply, the apparent purpose-and clearly the emphasis-of
these procedures was not to prevent the unjustified hospitalization of
a "sane" individual, but rather to avoid the public cost of hospitalizing
a nonindigent "insane" person. The 1945 legislation attempted a
wholesale conversion of the procedure to one of commitment by court
order after a judicial investigation of the justification for hospitaliza-
tion; if the Missouri Supreme Court was correct, this change was at
least in part intended to establish a safeguard against improper hos-
pitalizations. The 1954 legislation, in addition to redefining those
subject to nonvoluntary hospitalization, backtracked to the extent of
making available a procedure whereby judicial involvement was de-
layed until after hospitalization and was required only if expressly
requested by the patient. This alternative was struck down in reliance
upon case precedent developed in contexts far different from the con-
temporary systems of public psychiatric hospitalization; apparently the
court saw in the 1883 surreptitious appointment of Washington Mar-
quis' guardian sufficient danger of abuse of contemporary hospitaliza-
tion to override the objections to judicial participation in the process
raised before the court several years before. After curative revision by
the legislature, the statutory framework provided that in the absence
of dangerousness, each proposed patient was to be given an oppor-
tunity to obtain a judicial hearing prior to hospitalization. If danger-
ousness existed (and this procedure thereby became unworkable),
38. Opinion Letter from John M. Dalton, Attorney General of Missouri, to Honorable
Gordon R. Boyer, September 29, 1955.
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immediate hospitalization was available, but care was taken to impose
upon the probate court the duty to see that such emergency hospital-
ization did not exceed a specified short period.
Several basic factual assumptions underly this statutory structure,
as well as most other legal frameworks within which psychiatric hos-
pitalization systems presently operate. First, it was assumed that ma-
nipulation of the legal framework would have a direct and predictable
effect on the regulated system. By imposing a legal directive that all
prospective patients be extended an effective opportunity to obtain a
judicial hearing for the resolution of any doubt as to the justification
for their hospitalization, it was assumed that the system would be
forced to extend such an opportunity. By directing that only a limited
category of the mentally ill be subjected to nonvoluntary hospitaliza-
tion, it was assumed that the system would be forced to reject those
not within this category. Second, it was assumed that the "need" for
psychiatric hospitalization was dependent upon characteristics of the
mentally ill person himself-existence of mental illness plus symptoms
which either created a danger to the proposed patient or others or so
disrupted his ability to function intellectually that he could not make
a reasoned choice as to his own need for treatment. Third, it was as-
sumed that uncertainty as to the existence of these factors could be
resolved by a judicial body. Fourth, it was assumed that use of adver-
sary court proceedings would result in the presentation of these matters
in such a way that the court would have available sufficient informa-
tion on which to resolve the uncertainty. Finally, it was assumed that
only occasionally would situations be presented in which the continued
liberty of the prospective patient would create an intolerable burden
for the family or community. In those cases, there was to be no judicial
involvement in the initial decision to hospitalize. But in the majority
of cases, actual hospitalization was to be postponed until the prospec-
tive patient was afforded an opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing
on the validity of the proposed hospitalization.
II. THE SYSTEM IN ACTION: AcU=E PSYCHIATRIC
HOSPITALIZATION IN ST. Louis
Whether the assumptions made during the development of the legal
framework were then, or are now, correct cannot be discussed without
detailed reference to the everyday operations of the system that the
legal framework purports to regulate. This section is devoted to a de-
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scription and analysis of the public acute hospitalization process in
metropolitan St. Louis for the purpose of testing the validity of these
assumptions. Although the scope of the study is somewhat arbitrarily
limited, it does encompass the problems encountered in the adminis-
tration of a system that services the majority of a large city's publicly
treated mentally ill. 39
A. The Basic System
There are two public facilities available to the mentally ill of St.
Louis. One, the Acute Facility, provides twenty-four hour emergency
room service as well as short term full time hospitalization and out-
patient services; the average length of stay for a patient in the Acute
Facility's full time psychiatric service in 1966-67 was 32 days. The
other, the State Hospital, provides primarily longer term hospitaliza-
tion as well as out-patient and followup service. 40
The treatment approach of the Acute Facility does not emphasize
"cure" as that term is used in regard to physical illness. In part, this
is because of the general lack of agreement as to the nature of the
affliction with which the system deals as well as upon appropriate
methods of treatment. The nature of the psychopathology of the so-
called "functional mental illnesses" 41-psychoses, neuroses, and behavior
39. As Part I indicated, the hospitalization system in St. Louis developed separately from
that of the rest of the state; not until 1945 was the legal framework applicable to the rest
of the state extended to the city. Nevertheless, the city is the source of a large portion of
the state's public psychiatric care problem; although (according to the 1960 census figures)
the city contains about 17 per cent of the state's population, in 1967 it accounted for
about 26 per cent of the total population of the state's State Hospital population.
Although the patient population of the Acute Facility is far smaller than that of the
State Hospital that serves the city, the rapid turnover of patients in the Acute Facility
means that over a period of time it services far more paients than does the State Hospital.
In 1966-67, for example, the State Hospital had an average patient population of 2,999
but only 68 "first admissions" and 153 admissions who were transferred from other public
psychiatric facilities. The Acute Facility, on the other hand, had an average patient popu-
lation of 152 but had 1917 admissions.
40. The difference in function between the two facilities is evident from a comparison
of discharges. In 1966-67, although 67 per cent of patients leaving from the State Hospital
were discharged back into the community, 31 per cent of this total were patients who had
died in the hospital. Eighty-four per cent of patients discharged from the Acute Facility
were discharged back to the community, less than one per cent died in the hospital, and
about fourteen per cent were transferred to other hospitals. (Many of these were sent to
the State Hospital.) Those hospitalized in the Acute Facility, then, were most frequently
released back to the community after short-term treatment; if they did not respond, they
were transferred elsewhere for longer term care. A significant portion of those cared for in
the State Hospital, on the other hand, remained in that facility until their death.
41. There are certain mental disorders about which medical authorities are in wide-
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disorders-is far from clear.42 The most widely accepted view, how-
spread agreement as to the existence of a biological "cause." One example is General
Paresis, a result of brain damage caused by the syphilis agent, treponema pallidum;
another consists of those disorders traceable to reduction of the blood supply to the brain
caused by cerebral arteriosclerosis. See generally R. WHITE, THE ABNOnIAL PF.RSONALUTY
483-512 (1964). The "functional" mental illnesses are so named because of uncertainty as
to their cause; all that is agreed is that they interfere with the functioning of the afflicted
individual.
The functional disorders are generally divided into three categories: psychoses, neuroses,
and conduct or behavior disorders. A psychotic individual is considered to have lost
contact with reality, in theory because he has been unable to develop methods of coping
with subconscious anxiety which consequently overwhelms him. He develops a fantasy
world in which he lives-and in which his needs are met. Two basic types are generally
distinguished: the affective psychosis (including manic depressive reaction) in which the
basic upset is one of emotions or moods; and schizophrenia, a term used to cover a wide
variety of symptom syndromes which all are considered to involve a breakdown of
integrated thinking and adoptive behavior. See A. CRowcRoFr, THE PSYCHOTIC, ch. 1 (1967);
R. WHITE, supra, at 515-16. In neurosis, the individual has developed "defense mechanisms"
which have to some extent enabled him to avoid being overwhelmed by his anxieties; the
symptoms arising from these include anxiety states (in which the individual consciously
experiences his anxiety), obsessions and hysteria (a physical reaction such as paralysis).
R. WHITE, supra, 266-304. While the neurotic generally conforms in outward ways to social
expectations, individuals afflicted with personality or conduct disorders combat internal
anxiety by "acting out," frequently in antisocial ways. Categories of personality disorders
include psychopathic personality (failure to have internalized parental and social standards),
sexual deviation, alcoholism and similar patterns of "antisocial" behavior. R. WHITE,
supra, 382-417. The generality of the symptom syndromes, of course, makes for uncer-
tainty in diagnosis; in this paper, however, the diagnostic categories will be used as set out
in this note.
42. For an extensive discussion of the various theoretical explanations of the phenomena
called "mental illness," see T. MILLON, TiroREs oF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY (1967). Four basic
alternative approaches are suggested: (1) "biophysical theories," which assume that bio-
physical defects in anatomy, physiology and biochemistry are responsible for the symptoms;
(2) "intrapsychic theories," which suggest that repressed childhood anxieties persist in the
adult individual and what are designated symptoms of mental illness are manifestations
of the unconscious adaptive processes which the personality uses to prevent the resurgence
of these anxieties; (3) "phenomenological theories," stressing the assertion that each
individual reacts to reality only as he perceives that reality [Early in his life a child
develops a need to obtain self-regard from experience; later, insofar as experience does not
provide this self-regard, it is denied or perceived in a distorted manner and the individual
reacts accordingly]; (4) "behavioral theories," which assert that what is regarded as be-
havior symptomatic of mental illness is not essentially different from any other human
behavior and can be explained (if sufficient investigation is done) by the same scientific
principles of learned behavior as are used to explain so-called "normal" behavior. Cf.
T. ScHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL (1966), who suggests that the culture develops a "model"
of mental illness which all individuals learn about and to which some resort when unable
to otherwise cope with stresses of life.
In addition to "depth" or "insight" therapy, designed to eliminate or make unnecessary
unsatisfactory defenses, there are a variety of procedures designed to operate in a less
drastic manner. Sometimes called "surface" or "symptom-oriented" therapies, these tech-
niques are designed to strengthen existing defenses or to simply suppress symptoms. E.
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ever, has been that inappropriate behavior and malfunction of the
thought process or inability accurately to perceive reality (regarded
as symptoms of "mental illness") are manifestations of attempts by the
defective personality to deal with subconscious tensions caused by his
attempts to meet the problems of living. Each individual must inter-
act with his environment in such a way that his basic needs are ful-
filled. Failure to satisfy these needs results in subconscious tension or
anxiety; the personality struggles to avoid anxiety or to relieve it. A
"normal" individual is one whose needs are fulfilled by "normal"
activity-employment, recreation, family and social life, etc. An "ab-
normal," or "mentally ill" individual, because of his personality struc-
ture, cannot fulfill-his needs by "normal" activity, and must therefore
develop ways of responding to his environment that enable his needs
to be met, i.e., ways which relieve or avoid "anxiety." This inability
to react "normally" without creating anxiety may be general or spe-
cific, depending on the number of situations that cannot be met "nor-
mally." "Mental illness," then, is the result of an individual with an
abnormally developed personality coming into contact with a stress
situation that his personality cannot handle; bizarre behavior or other
"symptoms of mental illness" are manifestations of his desperate at-
tempt to meet the stress situation in such a way that his basic needs
continue to be filled and "anxiety" avoided. According to this view,
the underlying psychopathology-the defective personality structure-
can only be corrected by psychotherapy, which involves either recon-
structing or making corrective changes in the personality itself. Al-
though in theory the same result could be achieved by arranging for
the individual to avoid those stress situations which he cannot meet
in a "normal" manner, it is usually felt that this would require him
to give up any attempt to lead a normal life. Only by "curing" this
underlying psychopathology can the occurrence of the symptoms be
permanently prevented, although short term relief can be obtained by
means of medication or shock therapy, both of which temporarily re-
press the symptoms but have no effect upon their cause.
The Acute Facility places primary emphasis upon the repression of
symptoms by means of drug and electroshock therapy.43 Almost no
ROSEN & I. GREGORY, ABNORIAL PSYCHOLOGY 199-200 (1966). The behavioral theorists have,
in addition to attacking the theoretical model of mental illness, offered a significantly
different approach to treatment. Ullmann & Krasner, Introduction to CASE STUDIES IN
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 29-59 (L. Ullmann & L. Krasner eds. 1965); J. WOLPE & A. LAzA us,
BEHAVIOR THERAPY TECHNIQUES (1966). Cf. W. GLASSER, REALITY THERAPY (1965).
43. These so-called "physical treatments" are relatively new. Electroshock was first used
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"insight" therapy or psychotherapy is used. In part, this is because of
time and personnel shortages; psychotherapy requires a relatively high
commitment of manpower over an extensive period of time, and the
Acute Facility frequently has neither sufficient manpower nor assur-
ance of extended contact with the patient. Moreover, even assuming
that the view summarized above does accurately reflect the nature of
mental illness, it may nevertheless be true that those aspects of the
general problem of community mental illness with which the acute
public treatment facilities must deal are not susceptible to "cure" as
that term was used above. The function of the Acute Facility is in
large part "crisis treatment" of lower socioeconomic class individuals;
these basic characteristics of the system may determine the type of
treatment it can feasibly provide. In 1966-67, 38 per cent of the admis-
sions to the Acute Facility were psychotics and 37 per cent were per-
sonality or behavioral disorders.44 These types of psychiatric disorders
are those most likely to cause a "crisis" which creates a strong demand
for hospitalization. But those in an acute psychotic state are, by reason
of their loss of contact with reality, not susceptible to insight therapy;
and personality disorders, although a theoretically lesser gradation of
psychopathology, are considered poor subjects for psychotherapy.45
Only 3 per cent of admissions were neurotics, the type of patient for
whom psychotherapy has traditionally been most widely used.
during the 1930's and use of drug therapy did not begin until about 1952. Widespread early
optimism as to the potential value of drug therapy has since given way to a more restrained
view. Especially on a long term basis, successful administration of the drugs has proven
to be less simple than was at first supposed. R. KOEGLER & N. BRILL, TEATZrENT O
PSYCHIATRIC OUrPATIENrS 1-12 (1967).
Medical experts frankly acknowledge that the means by which electroshock and drugs
produce improvements in a patient's symptoms are not understood. P. PoLArsN, A GUIDE
TO TREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRY 122, 151 (1966). For a discussion of several theories of the
dynamics of electroshock therapy, see Dies, Electroconvulsive Therapy: A Social Learning
Theory lnterpetation, 146 J. NERvous AND MENTAL DIsAsEs 334 (1968). There is, however,
a respectable school of thought that drugs and electroshock are properly used only as a
temporary means of making the patient susceptible to psychotherapy:
Mhe chief use of... [drugs] is to permit communication and consequently establish
a therapeutic relationship between patient and physician .... When . . . [drugs] are
introduced into treatment as a substitute for communication, they are being incor-
rectly utilized.
A. ENELOW & M. WEXTER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 211 (1966).
44. MALCOLM BLIss MENTAL HEALTH CENTER, ANNUAL REPORT (July 1, 1966 through
June 30, 1967) (mimeographed unpaginated report).
45. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AssoCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, MENTAL
DisoRnDEs 35 (1952) comments under personality disorders, personality pattern disturbance:
"These are more or less cardinal personality types, which can rarely if ever be altered
in their inherent structure by any form of therapy."
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In addition to the nature of the psychopathology encountered in
public acute psychiatric treatment, the fact that the patients are almost
exclusively of the lower socioeconomic class contributes to the diffi-
culty of making effective use of psychotherapy. Psychotherapists are
almost inevitably middle class individuals, and the gap between their
cultural background and that of lower class patients may be too large
to permit the development of the type of personal relationship essen-
tial to successful psychotherapy.46 Moreover, the relatively low degree
of psychiatric sophistication among lower class individuals causes them
to be easily discouraged by the time and effort required for successful
psychotherapy; consequently, they often fail to keep appointments or
in other ways fail to maintain an active interest in a long term program
of psychotherapy 47
In addition to these somewhat mechanical difficulties of providing
insight therapy to the clientele of public acute psychiatric treatment
facilities, there is a substantial question whether effective psycho-
therapy, if it could be provided, would prove ultimately helpful for
the recipients. It has been asserted that the mental health movement
is "middle class oriented" and has adopted as the model of "mental
health" what are essentially middle class values that cannot be instilled
in a lower class individual without adverse results. For example, a
lower class individual who accepts as a result of therapy "healthy"
middle class attitudes towards employment, sex, drugs and similar
matters may find himself alienated from his friends and family and
ultimately in a worse condition than before "therapy." Until tech-
niques and contents of lower class oriented psychotherapy are devel-
oped, then, the clientele of the acute psychiatric facilities of the large
cities may be beyond the reach of therapy designed to "cure" under-
lying psychopathology.
46. See Spiegel, Some Cultural Aspects of Transference and Countertranference, in
MENTAL HEALTH OF THE POOR 303 (F. Riessman, J. Cohen & A. Pearl eds. 1964), discussing
the difficulties of the formation of a patient-therapist relationship when the two partici-
pants have different cultural backgrounds. The effects of this show up in treatment situa-
tions. For example, even in situations where ability to pay is of no importance, lower class
patients tend to be less frequently found to be "proper subjects" for insight therapy than
their higher class counterparts. Brill & Storrow, Social Class and Psychiatric Treatment, in
MENTAL HEALTH OF THE POOR, supra, at 68.
47. See Overall & Aronson, Expectations of Psychotherapy in Patients of Lower Socio-
economic Class, in MENTAL HEALTH OF THE POOR, supra note 46, at 76, reporting that lower
class patients tend to become easily disenchanted with therapy and frequently fail to
return for additional sessions in part, at least, because the sessions do not correspond to
their idea of how a "sick" person should be "treated."
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Whatever the justification, the program of the acute facilities is
oriented towards obtaining as long-lasting a repression of symptoms
as is possible within a minimum period of time. The need to make
maximum use of available facilities and the current recognition that
hospitalization is not therapeutically helpful 4s (and in fact may be
harmful)4 9 make it desirable for the process to be quick. Prolonged
hospitalization may reduce a patient's motivation to return to the com-
munity. He may find that he derives gratification from his dependent
position in the hospital. In addition, long absences from those prob-
lems of everyday living with which the patient must learn to deal-
family and employment situations, for example-make readjustment
more difficult both for the patient and for those to whom he returns.
Despite the emphasis upon repression of symptoms rather than
"cure," however, short-term intensive treatment provided by facilities
such as the Acute Facility studied here, when compared to results
achieved by traditional programs of public psychiatric hospitalization,
probably works to the overall benefit of patients. A 1958 study con-
cluded that patients admitted to the acute facilities not only had a
significantly shorter length of hospitalization than comparable patients
admitted to traditional state hospitals, but also were able upon release
to avoid rehospitalization for a longer time.50 In explanation, the study
offered:
The difference in the entire atmosphere of the two types of hos-
pitals probably account [sic] in large measure for the tremendous
difference in their effectiveness. . . . It is only logical that more
rapid recovery correlates highly with such factors as doctor-patient
ratio, nurse-patient ratio, staff attitudes, patient attitudes, the atti-
tudes of the patient's family, friends and community,... desirable
attitudinal influence of patients on each other-in short, the
milieu of the total therapeutic environment. 51
48, A study of 2,926 patients released from a psychiatric facility revealed that ability to
function outside of the hospital (judged by whether and how soon each patient returned
for rehospitalization) did not vary with the number of days spent in the facility prior to
release. Mendel, Effect of Length of Hospitalization on Rate and Quality of Remission
from Acute Psychotic Episodes, 143 J. NERvous AND MENTAL DISEASES 226, 230-31 (1966).
49. R. BARTON, INsTITUTIONAL NEUROSIS 53 (1959) characterized the effect of hospitalization
upon patients as "a disorder separate from the one which brought the patient into the
hospital." This "disorder," which he named "institutional neurosis," was described as "a
disease characterized by apathy, lack of initiative, loss of interest . . . submissiveness,
apparent inability to make plans for the future, lack of individuality, and sometimes a
characteristic posture or gait."
50. Ulett, Hardwicke, Cravens, & Masterman, Intensive Psychiatric Treatment Hospitals
and Missouri's State Mental Hospitals, 59 Mo. MEDICINE 867 (1962).
51. Id. at 874. But cf. Editorial Comment, Law's Labor Lost, 40 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 150
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One other fact becomes immediately apparent from a brief overview
of the system-the limited opportunity for judicial participation. In
1967, for example, about 30 per cent of the 1,917 admissions to the
Acute Facility were nonvoluntary; yet during a comparable period,
the probate court held far less than 575 hearings. In a large portion of
nonvoluntary admissions, then, there was no formal procedural oppor-
tunity for judicial participation. This will be discussed in more detail
later. Here, it is important insofar as it indicates that any study of the
hospitalization procedure that concentrates on those patients that ap-
pear before the court will necessarily deal with only a small portion
of those subjected to nonvoluntary hospitalization.
A more appropriate method of structuring an examination of the
system is to consider several potential decision-making points along
the route that patients take from the community to full-time hospital-
ization, to examine from empirical observation whether or not sig-
nificant decisions are actually made at these points, and if so, to
determine on what basis they are made. Three such points deserve
discussion:
1. the decision made in the community to seek psychiatric attention
for an individual and to present him for such attention, and
2. the decision made at the Acute Facility to admit the individual
to full time hospitalization, and
3. the decision by the probate court to authorize further hospital-
ization of the patient.
B. The Decision to Present an Individual to a Mental Facility2
A study conducted in Baltimore concluded that approximately one-
tenth of the nonhospitalized population exhibited "obvious mental
illness." 53 There is no reason to believe that the incidence of mental
(1966) which criticizes what it calls the "in-and-out" policy of short term treatment fre-
quently followed by readmission. Many patients released under such a system, it argues,
could benefit from further hospitalization and should be treated on a longer term basis.
Moreover, it argues that if patients not "well" are released, they disrupt their families with
the result that mental illness tends to develop in their children.
52. The basic approach in this section relies heavily upon Mechanic, Some Factors in
Identifying and Defining Mental Illness, 46 MinrrAL HYGIENE 66 (1962), reprinted in
MENTAL ILLNESS AND Sow . PRocEssEs (T. Scheff ed. 1967).
53. Pasamanick, Roberts, Lemkau & Kruger, A Survey of Mental Disease in an Urban
Population: Prevalance by Race and Income, in MENTAL HEALTH OF THE PooR, supra 46,
at 39, 48. Even more startling conclusions were reached in a study of the Manhattan popu-
lation. Only 18.5 per cent were designated as "well." 58.1 per cent were considered mildly
or moderately impaired by mental illness; despite significant symptoms, they were perform-
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disorder is significantly lower in St. Louis, yet only a few of those ex-
hibiting symptoms are presented to psychiatric facilities. Obviously, a
very selective process operates in the community itself to choose those
who are to be brought to the attention of persons in a position to
offer and effect institutional treatment. The following comments con-
cerning this selective process are based on a study of 45 randomly se-
lected admissions to the Acute Facility. Heavy reliance was placed on
medical records, but in numerous cases this was supplemented by in-
terviews with the admitting resident.
1. Community Selection in St. Louis
Table 1 contains a basic breakdown of the admissions, categorized
by the class of persons accompanying the patient when he appeared at
the Acute Facility. In about one fifth of the cases the individual pre-
sented himself. In about four fifths someone other than the patient
accompanied him to the Acute Facility and probably assisted in de-
termining that he should be presented to a psychiatric facility. In one
third of the total presentations, one or more members of the family
(and no one else) accompanied the patient. In one fifth, the police
alone presented him. In another fifth, both the police and a family
member (or some other close associate) were involved.
Table I also suggests that the dynamics of admission varied signifi-
cantly with the type of presentation involved. Self-Presentations, for
example, constituted 22 per cent of total, but none of the nonvoluntary
admissions. Family-Police Presentations, on the other hand, constituted
only 18 per cent of total, but over 40 per cent of all nonvoluntary
admissions. In fact, the most striking variation is the extensive partici-
pation by the police in the presentation of those patients who become
nonvoluntary admissions: in over 60 per cent of the nonvoluntary ad-
missions the police played a role, but they were involved in only about
25 per cent of the voluntary admissions. Since the dynamics of the
process depended at least in part upon who was involved, a detailed
examination of the several types of presentation listed in Table 1 is
necessary.
a. Self-Presentation. The Self-Presentations were composed almost
entirely of individuals who had observed in themselves what they in-
ing their everyday responsibilities satisfactorily. 23.4 per cent, however, were considered
significantly impaired in their everyday lives by symptoms of mental illness. L. SROLE, T.
LANGNER, S. MicHAEL, M. OPLFR & T. RENNIE, MENTAL HEALTH IN THE METmrous 138-39
(1962).
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TABLE I
PRESENTATION To ACUTE FACIL=Y BY THOSE ACCOMPANYING PATIENT AND TYPE OF
SUBSEQUENT ADMISSION
Voluntary Nonvoluntary
All Admissions Admissions Admissions
Examined Only Only
No. % No. % No.
Self 10 22 10 36 0 0
Police Only 9 20 5 18 4 24
Family Only 15 33 10 36 5 29
Family and Police 8 18 1 3.3 7 41
Friend and Police 1 2 1 3.3 0 0
Family and
Ambulance 2 5 1 3.3 1 6
Total 45 100 28 99.9 17 100
terpreted as symptoms of illness, most often depression, anxiety, or
hallucinations.
ILLUSTRATION 1.
The patient, a 32 year old woman, worked as a stenographer in a
law office. On the day of admission she had experienced difficulty
in concentrating on her work and had made numerous mistakes.
At noon she left to return home but instead checked into a hotel.
She reported hearing the sounds of a train depot and the voices
of old friends. Later in the afternoon, she presented herself to
the Acute Facility.
None of the Self-Presentations became nonvoluntary patients, prob-
ably because underlying each Self-Presentation was a belief on the part
of the individual that he was "ill" and a concomitant willingness to
submit to whatever "treatment" was suggested.
b. Police Presentations. Situations that appeared to have precipitated
the presentation of those patients accompanied by police officers to
the Acute Facility are summarized in Table 2. "Police Only Presen-
tations" were those where only police officers accompanied the patient
at the time of his presentation. Only one of these presentations was
stimulated by events occurring within the patient's family; the others
were about equally divided between situations in which officers came
upon the patient during the performance of relatively routine police
duties and those in which the patient was called to police attention by
a complaining member of the community.
"Police-Family Presentations," those in which both a police officer
and a member of the family accompanied the patient to the facility,
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TABLE 2
SITUATIONS PREcIPrrATING PRESENTATION: PoLIcE AND POLICE-FAdImy PRESENTATIONS
Police
Only
Presen-
Total tations Police-Family Presentations
Initial Initial
Contact Initial Contact
With Family With
Patient Decision Police
by Police to Present by Patient
Events Within Patient's
Family Unit
suicide attempt
assaultive behavior
bizarre behavior
Events Outside Patient's
Family Unit
suicide attempt
bizarre behavior
observed by police
during routine
police activity
complaint to police
by member of the
community
based on patient's
assaultive conduct
based on patient's
bizarre conduct
Total
1 1 0 0 0
5 4 1 0 0
2 2 0 0 0
are broken down in Table 2 according to whether or not the police
made contact with the patient before or after the family had probably
made the decision to present the patient. "Initial Contact with Patient
by Police" were cases in which the patient came to the attention of
the police by means other than the efforts of the family; in each, how-
ever, the family was subsequently contacted, the decision to present
was made, and at least one member of the family accompanied the
patient and the police to the Acute Facility. "Initial Family Decision
to Present" were those cases in which the police were called to assist
in implementing the family's decision to present the patient; these,
as would be expected, were stimulated entirely by events within the
family. (In one case, the patient himself called police to report' that
his spouse had attempted to kill him; responding officers found no
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evidence of this, contacted the spouse and assisted in presenting the
patient.) The family's decision to present is discussed in the next sec-
tion; the concern here is with those cases in which the police were
active in making the decision to present, i.e., "Police Only" and "Ini-
tial Contact with Patient by Police" presentations.
What appears to be the only study of the police decision to present
a patient suggests that there are five situations in which a police officer
is likely to take a person encountered to a psychiatric facility: (1) when
the person has attempted suicide, (2) when symptoms of serious mental
disorder are accompanied by distortions of normal physical appearance
such as seizures or extreme dirtiness, (3) when symptoms are of a highly
agitated form and are accompanied by actual violence or an indication
of a danger of such violence, (4) when the person appears seriously
disoriented, and (5) when the person by acting incongruously has
created a nuisance in a public place. 54 The cases observed in this study
generally confirm this analysis.
In five cases, police contact with the patient came during relatively
routine police activity. In two of these, the patient had been the driver
of an automobile that had been involved in an accident; investigating
officers either observed or received reports that the patient in each
case had been acting abnormally. (One patient had in fact been under
the influence of drugs and the other had been responding to visual
hallucinations.) In the third, the patient had been stopped by police
officers pursuant to what was apparently a routine traffic stop; he was
obviously psychotic and the officers found an Acute Facility outpatient
appointment card in his wallet. In the remaining two cases, the patient
came to police attention because of serious disorientation.
ILLUSTRATION 2.
The patient was observed by police wandering on the street
wearing hospital pajamas and a surgical cap. He did not respond
to attempts to elicit information from him. Several hospitals in
the vicinity were contacted but reported that they were not miss-
ing any patients. The patient was then taken to the Acute Facility.
In the single case in which a Police Only Presentation was stimu-
lated by events within the family unit, the police had been called by
the patient's stepmother who reported that the patient had slapped
her. Upon arrival, the police observed that the patient was disoriented
54. Bittner, Police Discretion in Emergency Apprehension of Mentally Ill Persons, 14
Soc. PROB. 278, 283-286 (1967).
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and that she spoke loudly but in a rambling manner. Her clothing and
hair were extremely dirty.
Similar observations may be made with regard to those patients en-
countered by the police in the investigation of complaints made by
members of the community. In one, the patient was obviously dis-
oriented; in another the patient's loud screaming disturbed neighbors
and investigating officers found that she had lost contact with reality
in several ways. The two remaining cases were situations in which the
patient had inflicted violence on others or had indicated a definite in-
tention to do so.
ILLUSTRATION 3.
A neighbor of the patient called police and reported that the
patient had chased her with a hatchet. The patient, when ap-
proached, stated, "This is the hatchet Mr. Robinson used to kill
me. I died once. I do not know how I came back into this world."
When the police officers were able to contact a relative or friend of
an apparently "mentally ill" person, the responsibility for the indi-
vidual was readily transferred to this person. Note in Table 2 the few
presentations resulting from situations in which the police came into
initial contact with the patient but were then able to locate the family.
If the family insisted, however, the officers did assist in presentation.
ILLUSTRATION 4.
The patient, a middle aged woman who lived alone, was observed
walking nude in the street late at night. Officers contacted her
brother who requested that they take him and the patient to the
Acute Facility. They did so.
In these cases, however, the family and not the police made the de-
cision to present.
The position has been argued that police are frequently too selective
in determining who will be presented to mental health facilities. A
recent study of Negro male admissions to a Baltimore psychiatric fa-
cility, for example, reported that a large number of the patients had
exhibited symptoms of serious disorder long before presentation and,
while exhibiting these symptoms, had numerous contacts with the
police which did not result in presentation.55 In part, the study sug-
gested this may have been due to general police attitudes towards
lower class Negroes:
55. Brody, Derbyshire & Schleifer, How the Young Adult Baltimore Negro Male Becomes
a Maryland Mental Hospital Statistic, PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PSYCHIATRIC EPIDLMOLOGY AND MENTAL HEALTH PLANNING (1967).
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The apparent tolerance of the urban policeman to psychiatrically
disturbed behavior in lower class Negro men may ... be coupled
with a tendency to view it as the naturally expected consequence
of the "lack of responsibility" of members of a simple or inferior
race. It is plausible to suggest that these.., expectations ... con-
tribute to the development of a social role for the lower class
Negro man which includes patterns of irresponsible aggressive
* . . behavior.56
Because this study relied only upon information already available to
the Acute Facility, the dynamics of the police decision cannot be dis-
cussed in any detail. Clearly more work needs to be done in this area.
But one case was observed which supported the Baltimore study's con-
clusion that police may fail to present even seriously ill individuals.
ILLUSTRATION 5.
The patient believed that he was an F.B.I. agent, and he carried
at least one weapon. He had accused his wife of being a "spy" and
his mother-in-law of poisoning him. Three weeks before presen-
tation he had been arrested for carrying a concealed weapon.
Although it is extremely likely that he was exhibiting these symp-
toms at that time, he was not presented until several days before
his preliminary hearing, when his wife called police and asked
that they assist in presentation.
In interesting contrast to this general reluctance to present individuals
encountered, however, was one admission which suggested that psy-
chiatric hospitalization was being used by police to keep an individual
believed dangerous "off the streets" when no other method was con-
veniently available.
ILLUSTRATION 6.
The patient reportedly drank one pint of whiskey and, becoming
irritated at a group of children, shook one of them. Police were
called and the child was taken to a hospital where it was deter-
mined that she had suffered no significant harm. The officers then
took the patient to the Acute Facility and told the resident that
if the patient were not admitted he would be released, as there
were no charges against him. The patient exhibited no symptoms
of present mental illness. When the decision to admit was made,
one officer called his superior and reported in a relieved tone,
"They'll take him."
The police decision to present, then, usually followed situations in
which grossly bizarre behavior by the patient was observed. In addi-
tion to this symptomatic behavior, however, there was usually some
56. Id. at 215-16.
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indication that the patient either endangered others or was unable to
function in the community. Unlike the family decision to present
(which will be discussed in the next section), the police decision to
present apparently represented adherence to a "dangerousness" cri-
teria. Although this meant that police agencies did probably forego
opportunities to refer many mentally ill persons to psychiatric facili-
ties, it conformed to the legal criteria set out in the statutory frame-
work much more closely than did the family actions.
One other aspect of police presentations requires comment. The
fact of police presentation created a strong pressure for admission
without regard to the proposed patient's willingness to undergo hos-
pitalization, since the Acute Facility recognized that the police seldom
presented an individual unless he was a serious disruptive influence
in the community and other resources had been exhausted. Neverthe-
less, as Table 1 shows, five of the nine police presentations admitted
themselves on a voluntary basis. One was presented after a suicide at-
tempt; it is probable that he recognized his "need" for treatment. In
the other four cases, however, it is unlikely that the admission was
voluntary in a realistic sense. In two cases, it was clear that the patients
regarded hospitalization as the only alternative to jail. In the other
two, the Acute Facility would have admitted the patients on a non-
voluntary basis had they not admitted themselves. It is likely that if
the patients did not believe that jail was the only alternative to ad-
mission, they were aware that they had no real choice to make and
acted in response to this knowledge.
c. Family (and Police-Family) Presentations. In over half of the
total number of admissions studied, the family was involved in the
presentation. In 33 per cent of the total admissions, the presentation
had been made by the family alone. When other categories are com-
pared, it appears that the family was influential in the presentation
of over half of the 46 patients whose admissions were examined.
Table 3 breaks down the 26 admissions in which the family par-
ticipated in the presentation. In eight (slightly less than one third),
presentation was apparently stimulated by the family's observation of
what it interpreted as "symptoms" of an "illness" for which the pa-
tient needed "treatment." In those remaining, however, there was
strong evidence that presentation was stimulated by something other
than a simple conclusion on the part of the family that the patient was
"sick" and "needed treatment."
In 13 cases presentation was stimulated by the patient's behavior
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TABLE 3
SITUATIONS PRECITATING PRESENTATION: POLICE-FAMILY
AND FAMILY ONLY PRESENTATIONS (BY TYPE OF ADMISSION)
Police-Family Family Only
Presentations Presentations*
Nonvol- Volun- Nonvol- Volun-
untary tary untary tary
Admis- Admis- Admis- Admis-
Total sions sions sions sions
Situations Within
Family Unit (21)
suicide attempt I 1 0 0 0
violent conduct 1 1 0 0 0
family fear of
suicide 1 0 0 0 1
family fear of
violent conduct 4 2 0 2 0
family disruption
caused by patient's
behavior 6 2 0 2 2
family observation of
"symptoms of illness"
depression 3 0 0 0 3
bizarre behavior 5 0 1 0 4
Situations Extending
Beyond Family Unit (5)
wandering 2 0 1 1 0
boisterous and
disorderly behavior 1 1 0 0 0
other 2 1 1 0 0
Total (26) 26 8 3 5 10
* For purposes of this table, Police-Family Presentations includes those cases designated
in Table 1 as "Friend and Police" and "Family and Ambulance" Presentations.
within the family. In about half of these, there was evidence that the
behavior was simply disruptive of family life and that this stimulated
presentation.
ILLUSTRATION 7.
The family reported that for the last two months the patient had
been sleeping poorly and his general level of activity had in-
creased. He spent money freely and the family was consequently
forced into debt. Recently he had attempted to open several new
charge accounts. The family also complained of the patient's ar-
gumentativeness and "resentfulness" at home and repeated com-
plaints of his irritability at work.
In only two of the 26 cases was there a specific act which indicated a
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direct and serious danger of physical harm to the patient or others;
in both of these cases the police assisted in presentation and the patient
refused to admit himself. In five of the 26 cases, however, the family's
fear of assaultive or suicidal actions appeared to have stimulated pre-
sentation.
In about one fifth of the 26 cases, the patient's symptomatic be-
havior became "public" in the sense that it could be observed by
people other than the patient's immediate family and it appeared that
the impact of this behavior on those outside the family unit was in-
fluential in stimulating admission. In these cases, the dynamics of the
decision to present often differed significantly from those in which the
entire matter was an internal family affair. In some of the "public
behavior" cases those outside the family who were exposed to the
patient's condition put strong pressure on the family to present the
patient.
ILLUSTRATION 8.
A woman who had been discharged from psychiatric hospitaliza-
tion during which she had been diagnosed as paranoid schizo-
phrenic began to exhibit symptoms again. She was "abusive,"
paraded around her home in the nude in front of her children
and charged her husband with drugging her and inviting neigh-
bors to have sexual relations with her. She also accused her neigh-
bors of "wanting to get rid of her." She was not presented to the
Acute Facility, however, until the landlord, in response to com-
plaints made by the neighbors, threatened to evict the family un-
ess she was rehospitalized.
In other cases, the decision to present was made and effectuated in part
at least by those nonfamily members who came into contact with the
patient.
ILLUSTRATION 9.
The patient, a nineteen year old youth, had dropped out of high
school because of a "nervous condition." He had been employed
in a bakery but his employer called the family to take him home
because he had been "acting strangely." The patient then became
withdrawn and frequently paced the floor all night. Occasionally
he would strike his brothers and sisters. Two days before presenta-
tion he swung at his mother with an iron bar and attempted to
strangle his sister. No outside help was sought, however. On the
day of presentation, he barricaded himself in the cellar and cov-
ered himself with soot and cobwebs. No attempt was made to
obtain help until he left the cellar and ran out of the house. At
this point, the police were called and the patient was apprehended
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and presented by the mother and police officers to the Acute Facil-
ity.
In four of the five cases where the patient's symptomatic behavior was
public, the police were involved in presentation. In only two of the
five did the patient admit himself.
Most of the work that has been done on the dynamics of the decision
to present has concerned the family decision to seek psychiatric help
for one of its members.5 1 These studies tend to agree with the results
arrived at here. Polack, in his extensive examination of what he char-
acterizes as the "crisis of admission"5' 8 suggests that the situation precip-
itating admission is frequently only the most recent in a series of crises
involving the patient and his family. The series, he argues, is generally
made up of common situations that confront most individuals and
families in the course of life, such as separation, physical illness and
death. Those families in which the crisis series is interrupted by the
psychiatric hospitalization of one of the members have dealt with prior
crises by simply denying the reality of the facts of the crisis, failing to
use potential sources of help (sometimes because of reluctance to do so
but frequently because the community has failed to make such re-
sources readily available), and by failing to express negative feelings
appropriate to the crisis. Hospitalization occurs when, during one of
these crises, the family, frequently after exhausting other means of
resolving the situation, attempts to relieve the crisis by labeling one of
the members as "mentally ill" to secure this member's removal from
the family.
[P]atients were admitted to the psychiatric hospital not primarily
because they had the signs and symptoms of psychiatric illness,
but usually because their behavior could no longer be tolerated
by the people with whom they lived. ... Most commonly... hos-
pitalization became necessary either because the patient's behavior
had changed in a direction which the members of his living group
found more difficult to tolerate, or because the structure of the
living group changed so that its members were less able to tolerate
57. See, e.g., Yarrow, Schwartz, Murphy & Deasy, The Psychological Meaning of Mental
Illness in the Family, 11 J. Soc. IssuEs 12 (1955). See also Sampson, Messinger, Towne, Ross,
Livson, Bowers, Cohen & Dorit, The Mental Hospital and Marital Family Ties, 9 Soc.
PRoB. 141 (1961). Cf. Blackwell, Upper Middle Class Expectations About Entering the Sick
Role for Physical and Psychiatric Dysfunctions, 8 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 83 (1967).
For a general study of the process of identifying those "needing" hospitalization in
England and some procedural implications, see A. LAWsON, THE RECOGNITION OF MENTAL
ILLNEsS N LONDON (1966).
58. Polak, The Crisis of Admission, 2 Soc. Psyc xAm Y 150 (1967).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1968/iss4/1
HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL
his behavior. This behavior may or may not have been related to
the patient's psychiatric symptoms .... We agree with a number
of other workers who have observed that the member of the family
who is labeled the patient is not necessarily the individual with
the greatest problem.59
This is not to say, however, that hospitalization which results from
family rejection or inability to tolerate the patient's behavior does not
serve a function other than removal of the patient from the crisis situ-
ation. Frequently hospitalization provides an opportunity for "crisis
remission," in which the family regroups itself and, sometimes with
outside help, becomes able to again tolerate the patient. A recent study
of married women psychiatric patients documented this function of
the hospitalization process:
[A]n important if explicit function of mental hospitalization is to
preserve and reinforce the patient's ties to a personal community.
. .[. T]he immediate effect of hospitalization ... is to define the
wife as mentally ill and remove her from the family. These radical
procedures initiate a personal and social moratorium. During
the moratorium, the wife's role obligations are suspended without
being abrogated; past and present expressions of alienation may
be reinterpreted, isolated, and forgotten by the patient and her
intimates; and critical relationships may be negotiated, modified,
and resumed under conditions of limited contact and experimental
tentativeness. 60
One half of those patients whose family was influential in the deci-
sion to present were admitted on a nonvoluntary basis. A significantly
higher percentage of Police-Family presentations were nonvoluntary,
probably reflecting a continuation of the patient's resistance that
caused the family to summon the police to assist in presentation. But
the fact that one third of the Family Only presentations were nonvol-
untary suggests that even when informal family pressure was sufficient
to cause an individual not to resist presentation, it was nevertheless
sometimes not sufficient to cause him to admit himself. It is also clear
that the patient's willingness to admit himself differed with the nature
of the event precipitating presentation. Acts of violence within the
family generally led the family to call for police assistance in presenta-
tion and ended with nonvoluntary admission; observations which the
family interpreted simply as symptomatic of illness, however, were
almost never followed by police participation in presentation and with-
59. Id. at 151, 153.
60. Sampson, et. al., supra note 57, at 154-55.
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out exception ended in voluntary admissions. To the extent, then, that
the family sought to use the psychiatric facility as a means of protection
or of relieving itself of a disruptive influence, presentation and admis-
sion were likely to be nonvoluntary. When, on the other hand, the
family invoked the psychiatric system to "help" an "ill" member, the
patient almost invariably cooperated in presentation aiid admission.0'
2. Analysis
a. The Dynamics of Community Selection. The observations de-
scribed above make clear that there are two general types of partici-
pants in the community selection process. The first, the patient's pri-
mary group, is the family or those with whom the patient is in close
everyday association. In some cases (about one-third, according to Table
3), the primary group's decision to seek medical help for one member
follows the traditional model: behavior is observed which is inter-
preted as symptomatic of "mental illness," and when it progresses to a
point where the individual is regarded as seriously in need of help,
he is presented by the concerned family to a psychiatric facility. But
in many cases the process is much more complex. The primary group is
willing to tolerate extremely serious behavior until something-a "pre-
cipitating event"-makes it no longer feasible to tolerate the situation.
This "precipitating event" is frequently fortuitous in the sense that it
is not related to either progression of symptoms or seriousness of the
patient's psychopathology.
ILLUSTRATION 10.
The patient had been depressed for a period of time and had
considered attempting suicide for two weeks. He had specifically
threatened to kill himself, but no attempt was made to present
him to the Acute Facility until his wife happened to notice an
apparatus apparently designed by the patient to hang himself.
61. For one of the only studies dealing with factors stimulating presentation of patients
to acute psychiatric treatment facilities, see Smith, Pumphrey & Hall, The "Last Straw":
The Decisive Incident Resulting in the Request for Hospitalization in 100 Schizophrenic
Patients, 120 Am. J. PsycHiATRY 228 (1963). After concluding that the family's fear of the
patient and the patient's "general unmanageability" were more frequently factors stimulat-
ing presentation than the patient's actual assaultiveness, the study commented, "Nine types
of events had been tolerated frequently [by the patient's family] without a request for
hospitalization: suicidal threats, threats of harm to family members, destructiveness, shout-
ing, obscene words, irrational talk, inexplicable behavior, wandering, and refusing to come
out of a room. Suicidal attempts and actual harm to others were not tolerated." Id. at 230.
For an excellent general discussion of the family and community aspects of acute psy.
chiatric hospitalization as well as criticism of the manner in which the decision to hos-
pitalize is made, see Knight, Social and Medical Aspects of the Psychiatric Emergency, in
CIUME, LAw AND Com.crioNS (R. Slovenko ed. 1966).
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Sometimes the precipitating event is one that makes the patient's be-
havior apparent to those outside the family unit, thereby involving
"secondary groups" in the decision to present. As Illustrations 8 and 9.
indicate, the family is sometimes willing to tolerate even seriously
dangerous behavior until the behavior extends outside the family. The
"secondary group" may include the police and the neighbors; they may
take direct action themselves to secure presentation or they may pres-
sure the family into effecting presentation. This does not mean, how-
ever, that groups other than the patient's primary group demand pres-
entation at the first sign of behavior symptomatic of "mental illness."
If the behavior is not violent or otherwise seriously disruptive of every-
day community life, the community is frequently willing to ignore
even extremely bizarre symptomatic behavior. If the offensiveness be-
comes focused on one member of the community, however, his efforts
are often enough to cause presentation.
ILLUSTRATION 1I.
The patient had been observed by police officers for three weeks.
He wandered through the downtown area with a picture of Christ
around his neck and carried a wooden staff. No pressure to present
existed, however, until the patient walked into a store, selected a
suit of clothing, identified himself as Jesus Christ and asked that
the clothing be charged to God. The store owner complained to
police, who presented the patient to the Acute Facility.
Thus, the most significant characteristic of the community selection
process is that it does not consistently operate on the basis of present-
ing to psychiatric facilities those whose illness has reached a given point
on a continuum of increasingly serious psychopathology or sympto-
matic behavior. Rather, it frequently selects for presentation those
whose symptomatic behavior becomes anti-social for reasons unrelated
to the illness itself. The result is twofold. First, individuals are pre-
sented to the Acute Facility, sometimes under formal or informal coer-
cion, who may not meet the criterion of "dangerousness." They may,
as in Illustrations 7 and 8, have disrupted the lives of their families;
or, as the patient in Illustration 11, they may have offended an influ-
ential member of the community; but as is discussed below, it is ex-
tremely doubtful whether these individuals can be regarded as danger-
ous. Second, even if an individual has exhibited behavior or symptoms
that might arguably bring him within the "dangerous" criterion, this
single characteristic may not have been the cause of his presentation.
As Illustration 9 shows the most immediate factor in the process, and
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the one stimulating presentation, may have no direct relationship to
the symptoms that made the patient "dangerous."
b. Legal Significance of Community Selection. The only aspect of
the community selection process that has received attention from the
legal framework has been the criteria for the use of force to carry out
the decision to present. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, the emer-
gency detention power is, as a matter of formal law, limited to those
situations where the individual constitutes a danger to himself or to
others. But there is little case law helpful in determining what consti-
tutes sufficient factual grounds for invoking the authority. Where the
detention power has been flagrantly abused, damages have been
awarded to the aggrieved party with little discussion. 2 But in those
situations in which the abuse is not obvious, the differences and incon-
sistencies in case analysis graphically reflect the difficulty in assessing
whether "dangerousness" existed or whether there was sufficient basis
to believe it did. 3
Some decisions reflect a willingness to construe the emergency power
broadly, sometimes with the ultimate effect of deleting any effective
requirement of "dangerousness" and other times apparently relieving
the person invoking the power of any duty to evaluate the information
which was received to indicate "dangerousness." The Supreme Court
of Washington, over strong dissent, held that police officers had author-
ity forcibly to enter an individual's home and seize him when his
seventy-eight year old father reported to a police desk sergeant that
the son "had" two guns and had threatened to kill the father. The
officers, upon responding, observed the son sitting in the kitchen of the
home wearing a beard, exhibiting disheveled hair and staring straight
62. E.g., Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305, 151 N.E. 911 (1926), where the court reversed
judgment for defendant and remanded for a new trial on the basis of evidence that the
plaintiff had been detained in a private hospital for two weeks apparently because she
had a fainting spell after caring for her physically ill husband over a long period of time.
See generally Annot. 92 A.L.R.2d 570 (1963) regarding authority to detain a person believed
to be mentally ill.
63. One of the reasons for lack of case law, of course, is the procedural difficulty of
placing the issue before a court whose opinions are published. By the time the issue is
reached, the matter of preliminary detention has frequently become moot. see, e.g., In re
Perry, 269 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1967) (denying a motion to dismiss a commitment proceed-
ing on the ground that the respondent had been detained under emergency detention
authority for longer than the statute authorized). Cf. Application of Hoffman, 281 P.2d
96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (invalidating a commitment because the patient had been im.
properly detained under the emergency detention authority and as a result had been
denied adequate notice and opportunity to consult with her attorney in regard to the
subsequent commitment proceeding).
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ahead. The subject refused to respond when officers knocked and
called to him.6 4
The California judiciary responded with equal sympathy to attempts
to deal with self-appointed reformer Clarence E. Whaley.6 5 Whaley
was observed by police officers carrying a placard protesting denial of
his driver's license, alleging corruption of public officials and "wanton
sexual activity" of a woman employee of the Department of Motor
Vehicles reporting that she had become infected with "a loathsome
venereal disease"), and urging the local citizenry to take appropriate
action. The officers, after talking with Whaley, forcibly took him to
the psychiatric ward of a local hospital. Upon arrival at the facility,
Whaley attempted to escape and struck the officer who restrained him.
He was subsequently diagnosed as "paranoid condition," committed
and retained for seven months. A year and a half after his release, he
was again observed "campaigning," this time going from door to door
outlining his grievances against public officials and asking residents to
donate the use of their homes for neighborhood informational lectures.
He also carried a variety of literature, among it a piece with the title,
"A MOST APPALLING CONDITION, KIDNAPPED AND RAILROADED TO THE
BUG HouSE." He was arrested for vagrancy but taken again to a psychi-
atric facility. Within a week he was discharged (apparently no commit-
ment proceedings were begun) and soon brought actions against nu-
merous local officials for false arrest and false imprisonment. In affirm-
ing the trial court's dismissal of the complaints, the Court of Appeals
held without detailed explanation that on both occasions the officers
and the hospital officials had reasonable cause to believe that Whaley
was "mentally ill" and dangerous to himself or others.
Other decisions have been less favorable to the exercise of the
"emergency" power. In an action for wrongful death the New York
Court of Claims held that there had been no justification for attempt-
ing to take one Marvin Titcomb into custody for purposes of observa-
tion and examination under the following facts: A police officer re-
sponded to complaints by a construction crew concerning broken wind-
shields on parked cars. Titcomb's mother's home, which was near the
site of the construction activity, had been condemned to make way for
the project. His mother and brother, when questioned, denied knowl-
64. Plancich v. Williamson, 57 Wash. 2d 367, 357 P.2d 693 (1960).
65. Whaley v. Kirby, 208 Cal. App. 2d 232, 25 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 856 (1963); Whaley v. Jansen, 208 Cal. App. 2d 222, 25 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Ct. App.
1962).
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edge of the broken windshields but suggested that the subject might
know something about them. Titcomb, however, refused to leave his
room and talk with the officer, and his mother reported that he had
been upset over the loss of the home and a newspaper route, had been
locking himself in his room for hours at a time, refused to shave or
have a haircut, and had tended to keep entirely to himself.10
The New York Court of Appeals also held that a health officer was
not justified in using summary detention powers when the patient's
wife reported that her husband had been argumentative and irritable,
believed his wife's hands "were poison," and felt that it was necessary
to lock the doors against "thieves." 67 Responding to the suggestion that
these symptoms evidenced an illness which might have caused the pa-
tient to become violent, the court stated:
Perhaps to one trained in psychiatry, the facts ... might indicate
that ... Warner suffered from a paranoid condition .... It is un-
disputed that... the patient had committed no overt act forecast-
ing danger to himself or others. ... While a paranoid condition
may sometimes erupt suddenly in some dangerous act, it may, on
the other hand, slumber indefinitely; one who suffers from it may
conduct himself for years, throughout life even, peaceably and
quietly, with no symptoms other than a belief that he is being
persecuted. [citing authorities]. There is a great difference between
a case ... where the condition may, at some future time, flare up
... and one wherein there is imminent and immediate danger of
harm unless the patient is summarily restrained. 8
The appellate case law, however, only reflects the frequent problems
raised by strict application of the "dangerousness" criterion in the ex-
ercise of the emergency detention power for purposes of presentation.
To what extent, for example, does the commission of acts of violence
justify nonvoluntary presentation? Is it sufficient if the acts have been
performed in response to what would be regarded by a "reasonable
man" as insufficient provocation? Does knowledge of a prior history of
"mental illness" justify presentation in such cases? To what extent
must the reliability of informants be assessed? Is evidence of paranoid
delusions sufficient to justify presentation? Is evidence of hallucina-
tions? If not, what "overt acts" must be performed in response to these
distortions of reality before presentation is justified? Nowhere does the
66. Titcomb v. State, 30 Misc. 2d 902, 22 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
67. Warner v. State, 297 N.Y. 395, 79 N.E.2d 459 (1948).
68. Id. at 402, 79 N.E.2d at 463.
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law answer these questions which cannot be ignored in the day-to-day
administration of the emergency detention power for purposes of
presentation.69
Apart from this attempt to regulate the use of coercion to effectuate
the decision, the legal framework has ignored the community decision-
making process. Arguably there is little reason why the law need be
concerned with this. If the public psychiatric hospitalization system is
to treat or control designated persons, the motivation of those bringing
such persons to official attention should have no effect on the way in
which the system handles such persons. It can also be argued that the
decision to present is beyond the effective power of the law to control.
The family, for example, is frequently influential in stimulating a
demand for presentation. That the family considers the individual
presented as "sick" and "in need of hospitalization" rather than "bad"
and "deserving of punishment" or simply as a burden to be tolerated
is the result of a variety of factors: the concept of "mental illness" held
by the family's socioeconomic group, the attitude and economic situa-
tion of the family, the availability and anticipated effectiveness of al-
ternative ways of dealing with the crisis, and the anticipated willing-
ness and ability of the psychiatric facility to help alleviate the situation.
It is true that many of these are probably beyond the power of the legal
framework to control; they depend upon such diverse factors as the
image of the "typical crazy man" presented by public communications
media,70 mental health information programs, ability and willingness
of the police to invoke criminal procedures and availability of social
service agencies to assist with such matters as school difficulties of chil-
dren and obtaining public welfare payments. Some aspects, however,
may be subject to influence by the legal framework. To the extent that
the framework can control admission policies, it can affect the ultimate
availability of the psychiatric facilities to deal with certain types of
crises. To the extent that it can control police activity, it can limit the
69. Insofar as the dangerous criterion is offered to justify nonvoluntary presentation
in the family crisis situation, it may ignore the actual dynamics of the decision to present.
This is discussed in connection with the decision to admit; see text preceding note 85
infra. What is said there is equally applicable to the use of the criteria in the presentation
situation.
70. See Nunnally, What the Mass Media Present, in POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF MENTAL
HEALTH (1961), reprinted in MENTAL ILLNESS AND SOCIAL PROCESSES 60 (T. Scheff ed. 1967),
concluding that "the causes, symptoms, methods of treatment, prognoses, and social effects
of mental illness portrayed by the . . . [mass communications] media are far removed
from what the experts advocate."
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availability of the police to assist in effectuating the decision to present
and thereby limit the number of situations in which that decision is a
satisfactory way of dealing with the crisis.
Moreover, even if the legal framework cannot control the commu-
nity decision to present, it nevertheless cannot ignore it. The decision
to present is a primary factor in shaping later aspects of the hospitaliza-
tion process that are perhaps more susceptible to such control. The pub-
lic psychiatric treatment system, unlike other systems of social control
such as the criminal justice system and programs of health and safety
standards, has no field staff to seek out those properly included within
the control of the system. It remains essentially passive and simply
accepts or rejects those presented to it by individuals or agencies which
have no formal relationship to the system itself. More than the other
systems, then, the public psychiatric treatment system is molded by the
attitudes and practices of the community. Some studies, in fact, have
concluded that the decision to present is, as a practical matter, the
controlling decision in the hospitalization process. As Scheff expresses
it, the fact that hospitalization is sought raises a "presumption of ill-
ness" that is uncritically accepted by medical personnel and commit-
ment courts7 1 But even if the medical examination and the judicial
hearing are not as nonfunctional as these studies suggest, the fact that
an individual is regarded as in need of hospitalization by his family,
neighbors, or other aspects of the community is nevertheless a signifi-
cant factor in the decisions to hospitalize and commit. In view of its
tremendous impact on the entire system of decision to present, this
factor dearly cannot be ignored in fashioning a legal framework for
the system.
C. The Decision to Admit to Hospitalization
Since only about one-third of those presented at the Acute Facility
were admitted to full time hospitalization, it is clear that the admission
procedure constituted a significantly selective decision-making pro-
cess. 72 The admission decision was made by a resident physician in the
71. Scheff, The Societal Reaction to Deviance: Ascriptive Elements in the Psychiatric
Screening of Mental Patients in a Midwestern State, 11 SoC. PRoB. 401 (1964).
72. Other studies have concluded that the admission procedure is not selective. Scheff,
supra note 71, at 403-04. See also Mechanic, Some Factors in Identifying and Defining
Mental Illness, 46 MENTAL HYGIENE 66, 70 (1962):
In the two mental hospitals studied over a period of three months . . . all persons
who appeared at the hospital were absorbed into the patient population regardless of
their ability to function adequately outside the hospital.
It is almost certain, however, that these studies report results observed in traditional
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Acute Facility's Emergency Room after about four minutes of observa-
tion and examination. Dissection of the decision is difficult because,
like many clinical decisions, it is essentially a gestalt situation: the
result of admission is the vector of numerous contributing forces and
to designate one or two as determinative is often misleading. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to isolate at least some of the specific factors that
enter into the decision.
1. Factors Influencing the Decision to Admit
a. Patient's Desire. Analysis of the admission decision is complicated
by the fact that the formal designation of an admission as voluntary
may not mean that the patient's entry was a free choice on his part.
When the patient was presented by the police, for example, he may
have believed or have been told that admission was the alternative to
jail; this may or may not have been true.
ILLUSTRATION 12.
Police officers presented a 36 year old man to the Acute Facility
and reported that he had become irritated at a group of children
and had shaken a small girl. A medical examination of the girl re-
vealed no significant harm, and the officers reported that they had
no charges against the pre-patient. The resident, who wanted to
admit the pre-patient because of the potential for violence on his
part, indicated that the patient signed a voluntary admission be-
cause he believed this was the only alternative to jail.
A patient was sometimes advised by the admitting physician that if he
did not sign a voluntary application he would be successfully "com-
mitted," that he should not "make things difficult." Family pressures
also influenced some patients to admit themselves although they did
not believe they needed hospitalization.
But it is also true that a patient hostile to hospitalization sometimes
voluntarily admitted himself for reasons that were obscure and difficult
to determine.
"State Hospital" systems rather than in the metropolitan acute treatment system with which
this study is concerned. Other examinations of the admission stage of acute psychiatric
hospitalization have established the selectivity of the process. Baxter, Chodorkoff &
Underhill, Psychiatric Emergencies: Dispositional Determinants and the Validity of the
Decision to Admit, 124 Amt. J. PSYCHIATRY 1542 (1968) (which also attempts to isolate those
factors influencing the decision to admit); Ungerleider, The Psychiatric Emergency, 3
ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 593 (1960).
In part, at least, the selectivity of the facility studied here was caused by space shortages.
The impression was inescapable that the facility would have preferred to admit more
patients and retain many for longer periods of time but was prevented from both by lack
of space.
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ILLUSTRATION 13.
A woman diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic was referred to
the Acute Facility from another hospital. She was actively hostile
but admitted herself. The resident believed that this was because
the patient's sister was already hospitalized in the Acute Facility
and the patient wanted to be near her and felt the facility was
beneficial for her sister and therefore would also be for her.
In most cases, however, the decision to admit was made without regard
to the patient's desire, and identical criteria were applied to voluntary
and involuntary admissions. An interesting exception to this was the
depressed patient who was not considered a suicidal risk; he was some-
times hospitalized only if he specifically requested it. But this attitude
on the part of the Acute Facility seemed to be the exception rather
than the rule.
b. Danger to Self. The decision to admit was influenced by a variety
of factors which can be grouped together under danger to self. The
most obvious was the admitting resident's conclusion that there was a
substantial danger that the proposed patient would attempt to take his
own life.
ILLUSTRATION 14.
A 24 year old unemployed musician presented himself at the
Acute Facility. He reported that he had been depressed for a week,
had experienced crying spells, and had observed an impairment in
his ability to concentrate. He admitted having had suicidal
thoughts and having specifically considered the use of sleeping
pills as a means of taking his life. The resident admitted him.
"Dangerousness" to self in this sense is quite clearly not a readily
identifiable clinical "symptom." The medical literature contains a
number of studies of suicide potential, but all emphasize the variety of
factors which must be considered and the ambiguity of each.73 An im-
73. E.g., C. LEONARD, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING SUIcIDE (1967); Litman & Farberow,
Emergency Evaluation of Self-destructive Potentiality, in THE CRY FOR HELP 48 (N.
Farberow & E. Shneidman eds. 1961); Tabachnick & Farberow, The Assessment of Self-
destructive Potentiality, in THE CRY FOR HELPa supra at 60; Tuckman & Youngman,
Assessment of Suicide Risk in Attempted Suicides, in SUICIDAL BEHAVIORS (H.L.P.) Resnik
ed. 1968). Cf. Lessee, Apparent Remissions in Depressed Suicidal Patients, 144 J. NERvous
AND MENTAL DIsEAsEs 291 (1967).
The case law is equally ambigioug when invoked to determine what facts justify deten-
tion on grounds of danger of suicide. In Jillson v. Caprio, 181 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1950)
the court reversed a directed verdict for defendant physician who had told police officers
that he would not be responsible for what happened if the plaintiff (whom he described
as "homicidal and suicidal') were not taken into immediate custody. Although the deci-
sion apparently rested on the failure to comply with a statutory requirement that the
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portant problem, especially given the shortage of space in the facilities,
is that of separating serious attempts to commit suicide which have a
substantial likelihood of success from suicidal gestures which are in-
tended only to cause someone else to respond in a desired way. The
matter is complicated by the fact that the "intent" to perform only a
"gesture" rather than to complete the action may not be conscious or
the possibility that a gesture not intended to result in actual death may,
for reasons not anticipated by the individual, be successful. In addition,
it is established that an individual with suicidal intentions will fre-
quently communicate these intentions to others before acting upon
them, or at least will attempt to do so. But statements and actions
which are subsequently identified as attempts to communicate suicidal
intentions were often ambigious at the time they were made even if
the entire situation was understood, and if the individual's overall sit-
uation was not known the actions or statements would in many cases
have been of no predictive value at all. 74 The literature also emphasizes
the necessity for extensive knowledge of the individual's situation for
other aspects of evaluating suicide potential. Some factors which have
been established as relevant to suicidal potential, such as age and sex,
are readily observable in the clinical context. Others, such as the nature
of the fantasies the patient experiences and his impulsiveness and flex-
ibility in adjusting to situations, require a more extensive clinical eval-
uation than is possible in the emergency room situation. Some cannot
be evaluated without a detailed knowledge of the individual's social
history; these include, for example, the patient's cultural and religious
attitudes towards death, the availability of supporting resources in the
community such as family members, friends, or coworkers and any
recent decline in the patient's communication with others. It is not
certificates of two physicians be obtained before an insane person who was not in a
public place could be taken into custody, the case was later distinguished by the same
court on the ground that under the facts "there was no eminent danger." Orvis v. Brick-
man, 196 F.2d 762, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1952). In Orvis the court held that a police officer was
justified in procuring the hospitalization of a woman who had cut an artery in her wrist,
was bleeding profusely, and had refused medical help. Although she informed the officer
that she had cut her wrist accidentally while removing a call from her foot, the officer
could see no callus. Id. at 766-68.
74. Yessler, Gibbs & Becker, On the Communication of Suicidal Ideas, 3 ARCHIVES OF
GENFRAL PSYCHiATRY 612, 616 (1960) concluded that 30 per cent of successful suicides
(and 25 per cent of those making unsuccessful attempts) had attempted to communicate
their intention to others before acting. But included as an attempt to communicate were
such statements as, "Some day I will have guts enough to kill myself" and, in the context
of a conversation concerning the individual's approaching court martial, "I would rather
be dead than restricted." Id. at 615.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
difficult to see why the reliability of evaluations of suicide potential
remains largely untested.7 5 The matter is complicated further by the
fact that, even if there is a significant danger of suicide, psychiatric
hospitalization may be neither legally permissible nor medically desir-
able. Not all who attempt suicide are "mentally ill";7 6 thus a potential
suicide may not meet the basic criteria for psychiatric hospitalization.
Moreover, while some individuals who have attempted suicide will
welcome hospitalization, others will resist it,7 and psychiatric hospital-
ization may, from the therapeutic point of view, aggravate those factors
that gave rise to the suicidal desire.78 In short, there is little scientific
75. For a recent study attempting to assess the effectiveness of such evaluations, see
Cohen, Motto & Sieden, An Instrument for Evaluating Suicide Potential: A Preliminary
Study, 122 Amr. J. PSYCHIATRY 886 (1966). Using the traditional methods which attempt to
classify those who have made attempts on the basis of the seriousness of their intentions,
the study concluded that the resulting categories were of no predictive value whatsoever.
The questionnaire developed by the authors, however, enabled them to divide those who
had attempted suicide into three groups which were later established to contain suicidal
and nonsuicidal individuals in the following ratios: 1 to 21, 1 to 2 and I to 1.
Piotrowski, Psychological Test Prediction of Suicide, in SuicDAL BEHAVIOR 198 (H.L.P,
Resnick ed. 1968) summarizes the success of the Rorschach inkblot and other psychological
tests, and concludes that "There are no valid psychological test indicators capable of
predicting with any degree of accuracy whether an individual will commit suicide in the
forseeable future." Id. at 198. Some studies have reported that at least eighty per cent of
patients classified as "suicidal" (defined as "having suicidal trends') or as "nonsuicidal"
were subsequently confirmed to have been correctly diagnosed. Id. at 199-200. But the
defect in the research, Piotrowski argues, is that emphasis has been placed on discovering
presently existing suicidal "intent" or "trends" rather than on predicting future specific
behavior. Little attempt has been made to isolate signs which when present would reliably
predict a suicide or an attempt. Id. at 202. Such signs would be invaluable for determining
those for whom a serious risk of self-destructive behavior could be said to have been
factually established, although the absence of the signs could not be said to affirmatively
indicate the absence of any significant risk of self destruction. This characteristic of the
research substantiates the difference in emphasis between legal and medical decisionmakers
discussed in the text at note 137 infra; medical research has been concerned with establish-
ing the potential need for treatment rather than with accurately predicting the probability
that nontreatment will have specific adverse results.
76. C. LEONARD, UNDEMrANDING AND PREVENTING SuIcIDE 273 (1967) concludes that about
35 per cent of suicides were "clearly mentally ill."
77. See C. LEONARD, supra note 76, at 23, 72, 135 (1967).
78. StBCOMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERvICEs, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY INTERIM
CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE DILNMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENT IN CALIFORNIA
152-53 (1966) concluded that danger to self should not be a basis for nonvoluntary
hospitalization:
There is good evidence that to assume responsibility for preserving the life of a
suicidal person may be the worst possible therapy. Dr. Willard A. E. Larson
explains:
- . . orthodox suicidal precautions communicate to the patient that he is untrust-
worthy, indeed prone to overwhelming self destructive urges, and we give him our
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support for the existence of a precise and reliable clinical ability to
predict suicidal actions with any degree of accuracy, and the relation-
ship among "mental illness," suicidal intention and the appropriate-
ness of psychiatric hospitalization is far from settled.
But "dangerousness" to self, as the criteria was administered in the
decision to admit, included more than the probability of self-inflicted
violence. Danger of physical harm from sources other than the patient's
own hand was also an important consideration in the decision to admit
in some cases. For example, the patient's decreased ability to function
normally in the community may have made him particularly suscep-
tible to a danger that is regularly borne by many members of the com-
munity.
ILLUSTRATION 15.
The patient, a 44 year old woman, was brought to the Acute
Facility by her husband who was 85 years old. He reported that
she suffered from insomnia and sometimes locked herself in the
bathroom. During the interview with the resident, the patient
talked to the empty emergency room. Among the factors influenc-
ing the decision to admit her on an involuntary basis was the
resident's observation that in her neighborhood "people were rob-
bing and raping all the time" and that she would be particularly
subject to such attacks.
c. Danger to Others. In some situations, the existence of serious
mental disorder and danger to others was relatively simple and deter-
minative; the patient in Illustration 3, for example, was admitted pri-
marily because of her obvious loss of contact with reality and her assault
upon the neighbor. But in other cases the information upon which a
decision as to "dangerousness" had to be made depended on relatively
vague reports from informants of untested reliability, and the inference
of actual "dangerousness" was far from a necessary one given the truth
of the factual assertions made by the informant.
ILLUSTRATION 16.
The patient, a 32 year old woman, was seen in the emergency
on the 6th. She was given medication and the social service staff
began to assist her in challenging the actions of the welfare office
in terminating her AFDC payments. On the 23rd, the patient was
returned to the facility by her sister. The sister reported that the
sanction to shed accountability for his own behavior in that we ... are now ready
to carry the full social burden of preventing his harming himself.
Cf. Harris & Myers, Hospital Management of the Suicidal Patient, in SuICmAL BEHAVIOR,
supra note 73, at 297 who argue the traditional position that treatment of a suicidal
patient can be best provided in a psychiatric hospital.
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patient had been depressed but had not taken her medication, had
stated that she wished her children were dead and had given the
children some unidentified medicine. The sister evidenced a great
deal of concern over the safety of the children. The patient was
admitted on a nonvoluntary basis; the admissions note stated that
she could not be treated "safely" on an outpatient basis, princi-
pally because there was no adult member of the family to see that
she took her medication and returned periodically to the clinic.
Moreover, a patient was sometimes admitted following violent con-
duct despite the absence of any "symptoms of mental abnormality" at
the time of admission. The patient in Illustration 6, for example, was
admitted despite the absence of any present symptoms of psychopathol-
ogy because, according to the resident, "he should not be loose." The
causal relationship between the demonstrated dangerousness and any
mental illness was, of course, extremely tenuous in such cases.
In a few cases an important factor was not a fear on the part of the
admitting resident that the patient would become violent, but the exis-
tence of such fear in others.
ILLUSTRATION 17.
The patient had been given a ride by a truck driver who found
him hitchhiking along a highway. When the truck driver noticed
that the patient had a gun, he took him to the police station. The
police brought him to the Acute Facility where he refused to
divulge anything other than the pronunciation of his name. He
was admitted on a nonvoluntary basis.
One patient was admitted not because of a fear on the part of the ad-
mitting resident that the patient would actually engage in assaultive
behavior, but rather because in the extremely unlikely event that the
patient would cause harm to others, the facility would be placed in an
awkward "public relations" position.
ILLUSTRATION 18.
A young man who had broken up with his girl friend became in-
toxicated and threatened to kill her. This threat was communi-
cated to the police. The young man presented himself to the Acute
Facility after release from jail on a peace disturbance charge. The
resident indicated that he did not believe the patient had the
"guts" to harm anyone but that he admitted him because the
threats which the patient had made had been so widely dispersed.
"Dangerousness," then, cannot in any sense be regarded as a clin-
ically observable symptom of a proposed patient. It is a complex eval-
uation of how the patient will react to what is anticipated will be his
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future situation. In part, this turns upon conclusions drawn from clin-
ically observable symptoms. But even this aspect of evaluating danger-
ousness is clouded with uncertainty; studies have shown that psychia-
trists not only do not agree on the significance of given clinical observa-
tions, but that differences in interviewing techniques and skill result
in widely different clinical observations.79 Moreover, at least as im-
portant as clinical factors in evaluating dangerousness is the task of
predicting whether the patient will encounter situations that might
stimulate aggressive behavior.80 In short, psychiatric predictions of
"dangerousness" to others are at least as tenuous as predictions of seri-
ous self destructive tendencies. As one study of patients who had com-
mitted homicide concluded:
[I]n extremely few cases was there anything that would enable the
psychiatrist to predict accurately the subsequent . . . offense . . .
[T]he discipline of psychiatry has not yet developed valid criteria
of sufficient degree of predictive reliability to justify hard and fast
distinctions before the act between the ... [mentally ill] individ-
ual who is likely to commit.., violence, such as rape or homicide,
and the one who will not translate his emotional conflicts into
aggressive, destructive behavior.
[M]entally ill people who have committed violent and serious
offenses against society are not a group apart from other mentally
ill persons who have not translated their emotional conflicts into
overt assaults upon others. The psychotic patients who have com-
mitted homicide run the gamut of psychiatric disorders, and...
are not clinically distinct from psychiatric patients in general.
Some "mentally ill" patients who exhibit the most acutely dis-
79. Rosenzweig, Vandenberg, Moore & Dukay, A Study of the Reliability of the Mental
Status Examination, 117 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1102 (1961). This study noted that there was
"poor consistency" between examinations in regard to such matters as the patient's
delusions, his use of the projection defense mechanism and even his orientation; these
would normally be expected to remain fairly constant, which led to the conclusion that
"different interviewers may tend to bring out different manifestations of psychopathology
in the patient ..... Id. at 1108. In regard to the evaluation of observations the study
noted that "some concepts in common clinical usage, which are usually taken for granted
as being universally understood, are in fact unclear. This may be true for items ... dealing
with memory impairment, systematization of delusions, autistic vs. realistic concepts,
symbolic thinking and autistic fantasy." Id. at 1107. See also Stoller & Geertsma, The
Consistency of Psychiatrist' Clinical Judgments, 137 J NERvoUs AND MENTAL DISEASES 58
(1963).
80. Bychowski, Dynamics and Predictability of Dangerous Psychotic Behavior, in
CLINICAL EVALUATION OF TnE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL (J. Rappeport ed.
1967) discusses the clinical aspects of such predictions. The inadequacy of a purely clinical
approach is clear from the discussion.
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turbed and destructive behavior have never demonstrated suffi-
ciently directed and organized aggression to kill another, while
others who are quite meek and inoffensive have on occasion killed
suddenly.8'
d. Degree of Illness. Another major consideration in the decision to
admit was the degree of psychopathology which was diagnosed. In this
context, psychopathology means the seriousness of the illness as deter-
mined by clinical symptoms such as hallucinations, disruption of
thought process, loosening of association, etc. For example, a patient
was frequently asked, "Name the last four presidents," "Start with the
number one hundred and subtract seven, and then continue to sub-
tract seven from each answer you get," or "Tell me why an apple is
like a pear." Inability to recall matters regarded as common knowledge,
to do simple mathematical calculations or to generalize (as by suggest-
ing that an apple is like a pear because both are fruit) was regarded as
symptomatic of impairment of mental facilities.
As Illustration 15 shows, serious psychopathology may have indicated
danger to the patient or other situations which tended to encourage
admission, but the degree of illness also operated as a pressure to admit,
independent of its relationship to such other factors.
ILLUSTRATION 19.
A 26 year old woman had reportedly been "imagining things"
since her marriage six months before presentation. She had ac-
cused her husband of spying on other men in public washrooms
81. Cruvant & Waldrop, The Murderer in the Mental Institution, 284 ANNALS 35, 36
(1952), reprinted in STUDIES IN HOMICIDE 167 (M. Wolfgang ed. 1967). See also M. Gutt-
macher, A Review of Cases Seen by a Court Psychiatrist in THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF
TmE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 17, 27 (J. Rappeport ed. 1967), who concludes,
after a presentation of case studies of five patients who committed homicide, ". . . I am
unable to decipher in these cases any symptoms which they presented in common that
might act as warning signs of impending disaster. In large measure this is due to the
fact that one cannot anticipate with accuracy social situations which the ... patient will
have to meet."
There appears to be growing recognition within psychiatry that dangerousness is too
often being used as a basis for nonvoluntary hospitalization. See Mendell, Brief Hospital.
ization Techniques, 6 CUmRmNT PSYCHITRIC THERAPIES 310, 314 (1966): "[The need to
protect the patient from self destruction and from harming others] is too readily invoked.
There are many and much better solutions to preventing a patient from committing
suicide or inflicting harm on others than simply placing him in a hospital. The potential
danger to others is frequently overestimated." Cf. Baxter, Chodorkoff & Underhill, Psychi-
atric Emergencies: Dispositional Determinants and the Validity of the Decision to Admit,
124 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1542 (1968), suggesting that admitting physicians tend to overesti-
mate dangerousness and that this tendency was more pronounced in regard to patients of
lower socioeconomic class and intellectual ability and those who had greater difficulty
communicating with the physician.
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and believed that he had holes in the wall of their home through
which he spied on her. She was presented at the facility by her
husband and police officers after she called police and reported
that her husband, in an attempt to kill her, had filled the apart-
ment with gas. When police arrived they observed no gas and
found the husband asleep. When the patient returned to her
home, she was taken to the Acute Facility. In explaining her non-
voluntary admission, the resident emphasized her symptoms of
psychosis.
e. Lack of Insight. The conclusion that a patient lacked "insight" is
difficult to discuss in general terms, but such conclusions undoubtedly
entered into the decision to admit. Insight, as used here, differs with
the diagnosed psychopathology. If the patient was diagnosed as only
neurotic or suffering from a personality disorder, insight was used by
some medical personnel to refer to an understanding of the underlying
psychic conflict that is viewed as causing the symptoms. But in other
cases--especially when the patient was diagnosed as psychotic-insight
was used to refer to an awareness that the symptoms were in fact symp-
toms of an illness. Thus a psycotic patient who exhibited disassociation
of ideas or hallucinations but refused to acknowledge that he was
"sick" was defined as lacking insight. Any substantial disagreement by
the patient with the facility's diagnosis and plan of treatment was con-
sidered strong evidence of lack of insight. The ambiguity of this
criterion is evident from the following illustration, which indicates
that insight and judgment may for all practical purposes be defined in
terms of the patient's willingness to accept moral, legal, or social
norms.
ILLUSTRATION 20.
A medical report submitted to the probate court contained the
following assertion offered to support the conclusion that the pa-
tient's judgment and insight were "poor": "He still sees no harm
in the fact that he lived with a sixteen year old girl as husband
and wife... [H]is reasoning at the present time is that his wife
was not satisfactory at that time so why not have the girl ... "
f. Control for Treatment Purposes. It is doubtful whether hospital-
ization was ever effected for "pure" treatment purposes in the sense
that the "therapy" indicated required full time hospitalization.8 2
82. Hospitalization on a short term basis may be used to remove an individual from a
stressful situation that is believed to have "caused" his acute episode. Mendel, Brief
Hospitalization Techniques, 6 CuRRENT PSYCHIATRIC THERAiEs 310, 315 (1966). And, in
theory, full time hospitalization can be "therapeutic" in the sense that forced contact
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Neither medication nor electroshock can be administered only during
hospitalization. But there were frequently factors of a quasi-therapeutic
nature that influenced the decision to admit. The resident's judgment
as to whether the patient would faithfully take medication prescribed
on an outpatient basis and return periodically to the outpatient clinic
was an important determinative; the patient in Illustration 16 was
admitted in part because of the anticipation that she would not take
medication on an outpatient basis. Moreover, there is a significant
period of time before medication actually alleviates symptoms;83 dur-
ing this period, hospitalization was sometimes used simply to control
the patient while the medication took effect. Electroshock treatments
are considered to have a somewhat longer lasting effect than a period
of intensive drug therapy, but they must be administered over a sig-
nificant period of time. The choice of a therapeutic program, especially
the choice between drug therapy and electroshock treatments, was
sometimes a difficult one dependent upon a variety of nonmedical
factors, and the choice may have had a significant effect upon the ex-
tent to which the patient's liberty was restricted.
ILLUSTRATION 21.
The patient was presented to the Acute Facility after he had
caused an auto accident while responding to hallucinations. He
was diagnosed as a schizophrenic, paranoid type. The staff con-
cluded on the basis of their experience with him after earlier
hospitalizations that he would not continue to take medication
after his release. The alternative course of treatment was seen as
retaining him for about a week while a series of electroshock
treatments were administered. But the staff also concluded that if
his employei discovered that this was the reason for his absence
from his job, he would be discharged. The tentative decision was
with people in an institutional setting can encourage a withdrawn patient to. "reach out"
and reestablish interpersonal contacts. Thus it may be theoretically beneficial for schizo-
phrenics who frequently withdraw severely. A. CHAPMAN, TExTBooK OF CLINICAL PSY-
CHiATRY 237-38 (1967). Insofar as such instutionalization constitutes therapy, the treatment
is in fact administered primarily by aids and others with extended daily contact with the
patients. Programs relying heavily on such personnel (rather than trained therapists) have
offered encouraging results. See N. CoLARELu & S. SMGAL, WARDI H. (1966). But in the
acute system, the process is too rushed for this to be an important part of the program,
although specific attempts are made to keep patients active and to encourage personal
interaction.
83. The time required for "drug therapy" to become effective varies. For example, when
phenothiazine is used to treat a schizophrenic, improvement may occur within a few days
but "it usually requires from ten days to a few weeks for decisive improvement to be
evident." A. CHAPMAN, TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 239 (1967). The variations in
time are about the same when the drug is an antidepressant. Id. at 405.08.
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to retain him in the facility but to give him a daily gate pass to
go to his job; medication would be administered during this time
and its effectiveness would be later evaluated.
In a few cases, hospitalization was used for therapeutic purposes not
directly related to the psychiatric illness of the patient.
ILLUSTRATION 22.
An 18 year old youth was admitted after being in an auto acci-
dent while under the influence of a drug. He denied taking am-
phetamines in addition to the drug which he had taken prior to
the accident, but the staff psychiatrist indicated that he would be
retained, involuntarily if necessary, for a week, because it was
believed that he was in fact taking amphetamines and the psy-
chiatrist expected withdrawal symptoms to develop.
g. Observation for Diagnostic Purposes. The limited period of time
available during the emergency room procedure was sometimes con-
sidered to provide inadequate opportunity for diagnosis, and an accu-
rate diagnosis was seen as important for purposes of prescribing a
treatment program. Thus the need to observe the patient in a less
pressured situation and over a longer period of time influenced the
decision to admit.
ILLUSTRATION 23.
The patient, a 32 year old woman, was presented by her husband
because he had returned after a week away to find that she had
wandered to the home of an occasional acquaintance six miles
away. The husband also reported that the patient had not been
eating or sleeping properly and had gone to taverns alone the past
three weekends. The patient reportedly told her husband that she
had relations with another man and informed the resident that
she was under the spell of a "wise old man." The resident indi-
cated that a major factor in his decision to admit her as an in-
voluntary patient was the fact that this was her first psychotic
episode and that he desired an opportunity to diagnose her
psychopathology.
h. Community Disruption. The decision to admit was sometimes
strongly influenced by the fact that the patient's symptomatic behavior
offended or irritated a portion of the community.
ILLUSTRATION 24.
The patient, a 61 year old woman, lived alone. She had a his-
tory of persecutory delusions extending back over fifteen years.
On a number of previous occasions, she had screamed at the
neighbors; they finally responded by calling the police. On the
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occasion preceding her presentation, the neighbors specifically
demanded that the police secure the patient's hospitalization.
When examined at the Acute Facility, the patient indicated that
she believed spirits came to her home and attempted to have
"spiritual sex" with her. The resident, who admitted her on a
nonvoluntary basis, indicated that a major factor in his decision
was that he was not certain "how much the neighbors could
take."
Patients were sometimes admitted because they disrupted the emer-
gency room of the Acute Facility by repeated appearances there. As
a rule of thumb, the Acute Facility admitted patients who appeared
at the emergency room three times within a period of two weeks.
Sometimes, however, the sequence of events was more complex.
ILLUSTRATION 25.
The patient, a 33 year old man, had a history of amphetamine
abuse and for two years had exhibited paranoid ideas. He had
reportedly made certain threats, but his family did not believe he
was capable of carrying them out. He had been seen several times
in the emergency room and an administrative official of the Acute
Facility suggested that the next time he was seen in the emergency
room he be admitted. Subsequently, the patient's car was stopped
by police and he was discovered to be driving without a license.
The officers found an out-patient clinic card in the patient's
wallet, and they then called the Acute Facility. They were in-
structed to bring him to the emergency room; upon arrival, he
represented himself as an Internal Revenue Agent and showed
significant thought disorder. He was admitted.
i. Family Disruption or Rejection. When there was available a
family which was considered able and willing to care for the patient
despite his symptomatic behavior, he would frequently be released
despite the existence of symptoms that would otherwise result in hos-
pitalization. The opposite was also true, however; a patient was hos-
pitalized when he exhibited relatively minor symptoms but there was
no family able or willing to assume responsibility for him. Ambiguity
of available information concerning the family situation was itself
influential in the decision to admit.
ILLUSTRATION 26.
The patient, a 53 year old woman, was brought to the Acute
Facility as a referral from another facility. She exhibited signifi-
cant thought disassociation, a classical symptom of schizophrenia.
The admitting resident indicated she had no insight at all, citing
her statement, "If you take a drive in the city, you'll find lots of
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people crazier than I am." Curiously, the patient had functioned
in her employment up to the time of admission. Little informa-
mation was available as to the patient's home situation. The pa-
tient maintained that she had to return home to take care of her
daughters, but the admitting resident believed that three of her
daughters were married and the fourth was engaged. She was ad-
mitted despite her objections. The resident indicated that he felt
she might well have been able to remain in the community if
some supporting person had been available, but he had concluded
that no one was available.
Supporting resources, such as this patient lacked, may have been
available in the community; but the patient may nevertheless have
been admitted because these resources were disrupted or disturbed-
in some cases by the patient's symptomatic behavior, although in others
the relationship between the patient's illness and the disruption of the
family was much less direct.
ILLUSTRATION 27.
The patient was a 38 year old woman who had been having severe
marital difficulties. After receiving unexpected doctor bills, she
took an overdose of sleeping medication and immediately in-
formed her husband of what she had done. When, at the emer-
gency room of a general hospital, she became abusive, she was
taken to the Acute Facility. The resident, after determining that
the dosage taken was not enough to be dangerous, was about to
release her to "sleep it off." He indicated that he hospitalized her
because the family was disrupted by the patient's insistence that
she was unhappy with her marriage and desired to terminate it,
and had been particularly shaken by the events of the evening.
One son, the resident related, had been reported at home hiding
in the bathroom from fright.
In these cases hospitalization of the patient was essentially a means of
"treating" the family. The objective sought was not so much improve-
ment of the patient's psychopathology as giving the family an oppor-
tunity to resolve as far as possible the temporary crisis that preceded
the patient's presentation and to regroup itself in preparation for
taking the patient back.
2. The Decision to Retain
Although the initial decision to admit was made by a resident in
the emergency room, each patient's case was reviewed by an experi-
enced staff psychiatrist within several days of admission. This process
-the "staffing"-involved a discussion of the patient by the staff
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psychiatrist, the ward social worker, a clinical psychologist, and fre-
quently the admitting resident. The patient was usually interviewed
during the staffing, which lasted up to two hours per patient. In no
observed case84 did the staffing result in a determination that the pa-
tient had been erroneously admitted. In fact, in no observed case was
any consideration given to the facility's legal right to admit or retain
the patient; sole emphasis was placed on determining the appropriate
program of treatment (which, of course, influenced the duration of
full-time hospitalization).
ILLUSTRATION 27 (continued).
The patient whose admission was discussed in Illustration 27
was staffed the morning following her admission. During the staff-
ing she was belligerent but revealed no thought disorganization
or loss of contact with reality. She maintained that she was un-
happy with her husband and wanted to leave him but that he
would not "let her go." She avoided responding to questions di-
rected at determining why she did not simply leave. The staff
concluded that her actions in taking the pills had not been a
serious attempt to end her life; the fact that she called her hus-
band's attention to her actions immediately after taking the pills
suggested that she was using this as a weapon against him. No
significant depression was observed, and it was agreed that the
action was impulsive rather than symptomatic of serious depres-
sion. She was diagnosed as having "personality disorder" and it
was decided to retain her for about eight days and then reevaluate
her situation. During this time, she was to be given no medication
but would be seen by the staff psychologist and an attempt to
smooth out her marital discord would be made. It was also agreed
that the possibility of a divorce would be raised.
3. Analysis
It is difficult to generalize concerning the decisions to admit and
retain because psychiatric hospitalization serves a number of different
functions and the criteria applied at admission differ with the function
to be performed. As a result, the relationship between admission prac-
tice and the legal framework presents an especially difficult problem.
All initial nonvoluntary admissions were made pursuant to the
emergency certification authority which required that the admitting
physician certify that the proposed patient was dangerous to himself
or others. The ambiguity of "dangerousness" is no less apparent here
84. No attempt was made to observe staflings of all patients whose admissions were
examined. This comment is based on a relatively small number of randomly selected
staffings.
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than it is in the presentation situation. But in some ways the issue be-
comes more sharply focused here; nonvoluntary admission is inevitably
an easily isolated legal step, whereas nonvoluntary presentation is fre-
quently so informally accomplished that it is difficult to isolate the
point at which the criteria should be applied.
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the admission decision is
the use of emergency psychiatric hospitalization for purposes of re-
solving temporary family crises. As this study indicated, a family fre-
quently tolerates a "mentally ill" member until a crisis develops; this
crisis is often caused by fortuitous factors which may or may not be
related to the "mentally ill" person or his affliction. At this point the
family demands immediate removal of the patient to the psychiatric
facility. In many cases there is no indication that failure on the part
of the facility to accept the patient would create a physical danger to
any member of the family. In a number of cases, however, it can be
argued that failure to remove the patient would result in severe dis-
comfort for the other family members and might affect their ability
to cope with the other problems presented by their situation. Illus-
tration 27 is an excellent example. Insofar as postponing hospitaliza-
tion would result in decreasing the ability of the system to perform
the function sought to be performed, it is clear in the family crisis
situation that if action is appropriate, there is a need for immediate
action. But it is not clear whether nonvoluntary hospitalization is
justified at all. There is, of course, a substantial question whether the
"danger" against which the legal framework offers protection extends
as far as disruption of the family unit. In addition, is it proper when
a family is disrupted by the total impact of a number of factors, many
of longstanding duration, to single out the apparent psychopathology
of one member and designate this as "the cause" of the threat to the
family and then to use this as justification for confining that member
to a psychiatric facility?"'
85. Knight, Social and Medical Aspects of the Psychiatric Emergency, in CUiME, LAw AND
CORPCTIONs 497-98 (R. Slovenko ed. 1966) suggests:
Properly speaking a family crisis situation should be considered psychiatric only
when an individual's illness is the major evocative influence. Other situations of
family or social crisis are not essentially eligible for, or liable to, the peculiar and
unique prerogatives of medical intervention. Therefore the special immunities and
extreme measures allowable in handling medical emergencies will not be necessary in
matters of routine treatment or preventative health measures. The critical pressures
and stresses that threaten a geographically or economically dislocated family may
require precautionary mental health measures but not medical advice.
This criteria-whether the proposed patient's psychiatric ilness is "the major evocative
influence" in the family crisis-is far from easy of application. Consider, for example, the
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While the problem occurs most frequently in the family context,
as Illustration 24 shows, community disruption also may serve as a
basis for admission. It is likely that community and family demand
hospitalization for reasons more far-reaching than those contemplated
by the legal framework. If so, it is clear that the hospitalization system
is under a strong pressure to meet these demands. This study suggests
that one such system does in fact respond by admitting on a nonvolun-
tary basis even those patients who do not meet the relatively narrow
legal criteria.
There are other problems. For example, the legal framework con-
tains little guidance as to the scope of the facility's duty to assess the
reliability of the information it receives and on which it bases the
decision to admit. There is a hint in the case law that, although the
community members are subject to the same criteria for nonvoluntary
presentation as the facility must apply for admission purposes, the
community members have more leeway in determining whether that
criteria have been met.8 6 But the decisions do not carry this distinction
through. The Whaley cases,87 for example, contain no indication that
what might have been an adequate factual basis for the police to take
Whaley to a psychiatric facility might not have been sufficient to jus-
tify his retention by that facility. Nor did the New York court con-
sider the possibility that facts indicating a "paranoid condition" might
justify a wife in presenting her husband to a psychiatric facility, but
would not, without more, justify the facility in retaining him.88 In
woman in Illustration 27. Assuming that she was "mentally ill" and that this was causally
related to her actions in taking the medication, the immediate cause of the family crisis
existing at the time of her presentation, can it be said in light of her longstanding
dissatisfaction with her marriage that her mental illness was "the major evocative influence"
in the crisis?
86. See Babb v. Carson, 116 Kan. 690, 693, 229 P. 76, 77-78 (1924):
An insane person is liable to become dangerous at any moment. Must a sheriff who
sees an insane person, before taking him into custody, wait until that person shows
dangerous tendencies by attacking another? .... The law has a higher regard for the
protection of the insane person and of all others. Such a person may be taken into
custody until it is known that he is not dangerous ....
87. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 67 and 68 supra. But cf. Brecka v. State, 179 N.Y.S.2d
469 (Ct. Cl. 1958). Brecka had been admitted to a psychiatric facility pursuant to an
emergency procedure authorizing admission upon the certification of a local health officer.
The health officer, in response to the question on the form asking what characterized the
attack, wrote, "arson--excitement-is tractive." There was a factual showing that Brecka
had been taken into custody while she had been burning old lumber on her own property.
In dismissing the action, the court held that because the certificate was valid on its face
the state incurred no liability by reason of the action of the facility. This suggests that the
facility itself had no duty to investigate the reliability of the factual assertions underlying
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any case, the time pressures of the admission decision in the emergency
room of a metropolitan acute facility are so intense that no real assess-
ment of offered information could be made. This does not mean,
however, that at the first opportunity the facility need not consider
whether the legal criteria for nonvoluntary hospitalization have been
met by reliable information.
In practice, then, it appeared that the legal criteria had almost no
effect in limiting those who were admitted on a nonvoluntary basis.
Although a patient who was considered a threat to himself or others
may have been admitted for that reason, no attempt was made to limit
nonvoluntary admissions to such situations. As Illustrations 19 and 24
show, patients who cannot be considered to meet the "dangerousness"
criteria (under any reasonable definition of the meaning of that cri-
teria) were nevertheless admitted. As Illustrations 23 and 27 demon-
strate, even where an argument that the patient is within the criteria
could have been made, it was frequently true that the reason for ad-
mission was not that the patient may have met the criteria.
D. The Decision to Commit
For a relatively small number of individuals, public psychiatric
hospitalization also involved a decision by the probate court as to the
justification for hospitalization. Procedurally, there are three ways in
which an individual may come before the probate court: (1) having
entered a hospital as a voluntary patient, he may give notice of intent
to leave and the facility may then apply for his commitment as a non-
voluntary patient; (2) he may, after having been served with the notice
required by the Missouri version of the standard nonjudicial proce-
dure, request a judicial hearing; or, (3) direct application may simply
have been made to the probate court for his commitment.
Table 4 shows the frequency with which the various procedural
routes have been used since 1954. 89 The standard nonjudicial proce-
a certification. But where, as in certifications by resident physicians of the facility itself,
the certifying ph)sidan is an agent of the facility, it seems impossible to separate his duty
and that of the facility.
89. Because of the method of filing in the probate court, these tables do not accurately
indicate the exact number of hearings held in each year. If an application is filed in regard
to a patient who had been before the court in an earlier case, the newly filed case is
placed with the earlier proceeding file. For this study only those files under the years
indicated were examined; those files for nonexamined years, then, contained some cases
that were in fact heard during the years studied. Of the 185 cases examined for 1967, for
example, nine were found in files under the years 1955, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1963 and 1965.
There is no reason to believe that the cases not considered were other than randomly
di,tributed throughout the categories.
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TABLE 4
JUDICIAL HEARINGS BY YEAR AND TYPE OF PROCEDURE
Patient Request Application
-Standard to Retain
Direct Nonjudicial Voluntary
Total Applications Procedure Patient
Year Hearings No. % No. % No. 1o
1955 71 70 99 1 1 0 0
1957 180 173 96 2 1 5 3
1959 328 315 95 5 2 8 3
1961 382 871 97 3 1 8 2
1963 410 397 97 2 1 10 2
1965 232 225 97 4 2 2 1
1967 185 168 91 1 .5 16 8.5
dure, it appears, has been a relatively minor part of the process. 0 The
most common procedural route to the court has been the direct appli-
cation. But this designation is misleading insofar as it implies that it
is a judicial proceeding brought to hospitalize an individual who is at
the time in the community. Table 5 breaks down direct applications
for the years studied by location of the respondents at the time notice
of the proceeding was served. Never more than 2.7 per cent of the
proceedings were begun before the patient had been hospitalized;91
the overwhelming majority had already been hospitalized in the Acute
Facility.
The primary function of the probate court, then, has been to au-
90. Extensive records were not available, but figures obtained from the Welfare Depart-
ment indicated that in 1967 notices were served pursuant to the standard nonjudicial
procedure in 104 cases. The location of the respondents at the time they were served was as
follows:
public acute facility 73
private hospitals 24
State Hospital 6
at patient's home I
Total 104
Apparently the general policy of the Acute Facility is to use the standard nonjudicial
procedure only for those patients initially admitted on a voluntary basis but for whom
longer term care is desired with a right to retain if necessary. Careful screening results in
the use of this procedure only for those patients who are almost certain not to request a
judicial hearing.
. It is significant that, as the above figures show, even in the use of this procedure legal
steps towards securing nonvoluntary hospitalization are almost never taken until hospital-
ization has already been effected. This strongly suggests that the basic dynamics of the
process do not differ with the procedural route chosen to effectuate the decisions.
91. Most of those cases where legal action was taken before the individual was hospital-
ized involved either children living at home or elderly relatives.
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thorize continued retention of patients hospitalized pursuant to the
emergency detention power. This function, moreover, has not been
performed until after a significant period of hospitalization has already
elapsed. Usually the hearing was held about three weeks after the pa-
tient's admission to the Acute Facility, although continuances (some-
times at the request of the Acute Facility itself, but more often on the
motion of the court when witnesses failed to appear for a scheduled
hearing) frequently lengthened this period.
Because of this time lapse between admission and hearing, the op-
portunity for a judicial hearing was as a practical matter extended to
only about one-half of all patients admitted on a nonvoluntary basis.
In 1967, there were approximately 500 patients admitted on a non-
voluntary basis. (This excludes those committed for pretrial study by
criminal courts.) Yet, as Table 5 shows, hearings on applications sub-
mitted by the Acute Facility for commitment of patients already de-
tained in the hospital amounted to less than half this number.
Table 5 also indicates that the number of cases in which applications
for commitment have been filed has decreased from a peak of 397 in
1963 to 168 in 1967. This probably represents an increased emphasis
on initial voluntary admissions as well as a more rapid turnover of
patients stimulated by space pressures as well as a desire to minimize
duration of hospitalization for therapeutic purposes.
In extremely few cases did the court dismiss applications on their
merits. Only two of the 1,700 cases examined resulted in the patient's
release. This suggests that further examination of the court proceed-
ings may be fruitless. If applications for indeterminate commitment
submitted by the Acute Facility were granted simply as a matter of
course, the judicial hearing process was essentially nonfunctional. But
observation of a number of hearings revealed that their form was much
less perfunctory than the hearing observed in some other studiesP2 and
less than would be expected if the hearing was regarded by all con-
cerned as merely a matter of form. This contrast between the form
92. Scheff, Social Conditions for Rationality: How Urban and Rural Courts Deal with
the Mentally Ill, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 21 (1964), in MENTAL ILLNESS AND SOCIAL PnocEsSES
(T. Scheff ed. 1967), studied four urban courts in an unidentified state. Even in the one
court in which Scheff felt some attempt was made during the hearing to ascertain the
circumstances of the patient, he concluded that the court did not use the information
gathered to make a meaningful decision as to disposition. This was based largely on his
observation that in all 43 cases observed in this court (including some where there seemed
to be a significant question whether the legal criteria was met) the court ordered hos-
pitalization. Cf. Miller & Schwartz, County Lunacy Commission Hearings: Some Observa-
tions of Commitments to a State Mental Hospital, 14 Soc. PROB. 26 (1966).
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of the hearing and its apparently minimal role in the overall process
justifies a more detailed examination of the judicial hearing step, if
only for the purpose of explaining this apparent discrepancy.
The following discussion is based on first hand observation of seven-
teen hearings. The basic observations are summarized in Table 6. The
first column breaks the hearings down according to the source and
nature of the principal demand for hospitalization. A case was char-
acterized as "Family Demand Based on Desire for Treatment" if it
appeared that the family desired the patient's hospitalization, had
acted on that desire and the desire was based primarily upon a sincere
concern for the patient's welfare. A case was characterized as "Family
Demand Based on Rejection of Patient" if it appeared that the family
had actively sought hospitalization of the patient primarily as a means
of relieving itself of a disruptive influence. "Acute Facility Demand
for Hospitalization" was used where no family had been actively in-
volved in the hospitalization process, and consequently the primary
demand for continued hospitalization came from the Acute Facility.
This breakdown suggests that families played a smaller role (quan-
titatively speaking) in obtaining long term hospitalization than they
did in obtaining short term institutionalization. The family was in-
fluential in the presentation of about 75 per cent of the nonvoluntary
admissions studied. Table 6, however, suggests that they were influen-
tial in only about 50 per cent of commitments. This can be explained
in part at least by the successful performance of the "crisis solving"
function by the Acute Facility; during a short period of hospitalization,
the crisis situation that caused the family to seek the hospitalization
of one of its members can often be resolved, thereby dissipating the
demand for continued hospitalization. It is not surprising, therefore,
that those patients for whom longer periods of hospitalization were
sought were more frequently patients without a family group who
could reabsorb them and for whom the demand for removal from the
community came from "official" community agencies, initially the
police in many cases and subsequently the Acute Facility.
Only about one-third of the patients actively appeared and protested
their continued hospitalization. In most of these "resisters" cases the
demand for hospitalization was made by the Acute Facility. This in-
dicates that where a patient was a member of a family group and the
family actively sought his hospitalization (either from concern for his
welfare or for their own convenience), the patient frequently did not
actively resist continued hospitalization, although he may have refused
initially to admit himself on a voluntary basis.
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Almost half of the patients were diagnosed as psychotic; all were
either schizophrenic or manic depressive affective reaction. The psy-
chotics tended to be patients where the demand for hospitalization
was made by the Acute Facility. Where a family group was actively
involved, this suggests, the demand for hospitalization was likely to
arise from factors other than the degree of psychopathology; where,
however, the decision was left largely to medical personnel, degree of
psychopathology apparently played a more important role.
As both the court files and the firsthand observations indicated, dis-
missals were extremely rare. No meaningful statistical comparison can
be made, therefore, between those cases resulting in commitment and
those resulting in dismissals. But it is feasible to discuss in some detail
the mechanics of the hearing procedure and the basic dispositional
alternatives for the purposes of analyzing existing practice and investi-
gating the potential for more active judicial involvement.
1. The Hearing Mechanics
The hearings were held in the probate court's regular courtroom on
Monday and Thursday. Court was not convened until 10:00 a.m., but
the patients usually arrived (accompanied by hospital attendants)
about 9:30 a.m. Patients were not required to attend; they were noti-
fied by formal service at the hospital and on the morning of the hear-
ing they were asked whether they desired to attend. Although in six
out of the seventeen observed cases the patient did not attend, in only
one case was any inquiry made into the reason for the patient's non-
attendance. 3
Also present prior to the opening of court was a local practicing
attorney who by agreement with the court was assigned as counsel for
all patients who did not have a privately retained attorney. He received
ten dollars per case which was added to court costs. In only one ob-
served case was a privately retained attorney present. 4 The repre-
95. In this case the inquiry was stimulated by the judge's recollection that when the
patient had appeared in court a week earlier (at which time his hearing had been
continued because a witness had failed to appear) he had indicated a desire to protest
hospitalization. The inquiry revealed that the patient had not appeared because the Acute
Facility, unaware of the continuance, had assumed that the patient had been committed
and had not offered him the opportunity to leave the facility and appear in court.
94. This case provided no basis for confidence that involvement of privately retained
counsel would make the judicial process more meaningful. The patient involved is
described in Illustration 30, infra; whether she met the legal criteria is an extremely dose
question. At the first hearing date, counsel appeared but the case was continued because
the patient's father did not appear. At the second hearing date (at which the father was
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sentative of the city attorney's office, who presented the "case" for
hospitalization, arrived about the same time. He brought with him the
medical report, which was given to defense counsel for examination.
The report was in the form of a deposition typed in a mimeographed
form. On the front was a blank for the attorney for the patient to sign
a waiver of personal appearance by the physician; in all cases it was
routinely signed.
Between 9:30 and 10:00 the appointed attorney interviewed the
patients. He generally asked them about events leading to their hos-
pitalization and whether they desired to testify. When asked-and
sometimes when no inquiry was made-he advised them that the court
was unlikely to release them and that little good would probably be
done by their testimony. There were usually two to five hearings per
session; the attorney-patient interviews took about five minutes each.
Sometimes the attorney would speak with family or friends who were
present in the courtroom; the city attorney's representative almost
always did.
At ten o'clock court was formally opened and the judge entered. He
sat at the bench but did not wear a robe. As each case was called, the
city attorney's representative called his witness. = When, as sometimes
happened, a witness failed to respond to the subpoena the case was
continued and the city attorney's representative directed to secure the
witness's presence. During the continuance, of course, the patients re-
mained hospitalized.
The witness, after being formally sworn by the judge, was initially
questioned by the city attorney's representative. Questions were usu-
ally asked about the patient's life, his residence, events leading to his
hospitalization and factual matters alluded to in the medical report
(such as violent conduct by the patient). Frequently the witness was
asked if he believed the patient needed further treatment or if he was
willing for the patient to remain in the hospital. Counsel for the pa-
tient had an opportunity to cross-examine but this was seldom done.
The court itself also usually questioned the witness; in many cases,
present), counsel did not appear and the case was again continued. At the third date, both
counsel and the patient's father appeared. Counsel was shown the medical report (which
he had not seen before) and spent about five minutes reading it. During the testimony he
asked a few questions of no significance. This was the extent of his participation.
95. The court usually required one witness in each case. If the patient had a local
family or close friend, a member of the family or the friend was usually called. If the
patient was a transient, a member of the fadlity staff (usually a sodal worker) was called.
A shorthand transcript of the proceeding was always taken.
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most of the detailed information was elicited by the court rather than
by counsel. The same procedure was used by defense counsel in call-
ing the patient. In none of the observed cases was any witness other
than the patient himself called on the patient's behalf, nor was any
other evidence submitted in support of the patient's case. The hear-
ings lasted from ten to forty minutes.
At the end of the hearings, the judge took one of three steps: he
indicated to the patient that he would order him discharged; he in-
dicated that he would enter an order committing the patient; or, he
took the case under submission, indicating that he would seek further
information from the hospital. Each of these deserves special ex-
amination.
2. Results of Hearings
a. Commitment. Sixteen of the seventeen observed cases resulted
in indeterminate commitment of the patient. According to the statu-
tory criteria, such a disposition required factual showings of mental
illness and that by reason of this illness the patient was dangerous to
himself or others or lacked the insight or capacity to make responsible
decisions with respect to his hospitalization. In the cases observed,
however, these did not appear to be the governing factors.
Relatively little attention was directed towards dangerousness. As
Table 6 shows, in only one case was there any indication of potential
for self-inflicted violence; in this case, the patient's mother had found
him almost entirely out of an eleventh story window. Six cases con-
tained some indication that there was a danger of assaultive conduct;
in all six, this was based upon the past acts or threats of the patient.
There was, however, little detailed investigation of the factual alle-
gations. In one case, for example, the medical report contained the
mere assertion that the patient had "threatened hospital personnel";
the patient did not appear at the hearing and no investigation as to
the truth of the assertion or its seriousness was made. In another case,
the minimal factual investigation revealed a significant dispute as to
the factual basis for the allegation of dangerousness.
ILLUSTRATION 28.
The medical report asserted that the patient had "jumped on
his sister's son with intention to do great bodily harm." The pa-
tient's mother (who agreed that her son was sick and needed hos-
pitalization) denied that the patient had ever assaulted or even
threatened her grandchild. (The medical report also stated, "He
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remains withdrawn, suspicious, guarded, antisocial, hostile, de-
fiant and it seems he is dangerous to himself or others.")
It is doubtful whether past acts of an assaultive nature or threats of
such actions were controlling in the decision to commit even in those
cases in which they existed. In some, the assaultive actions seemed to
be more disruptive of family harmony than such as to create a danger
of serious physical injury.
ILLUSTRATION 29.
The patient, who lived with her sister's family, reportedly
threatened the members of the family. On the morning of her
presentation to the Acute Facility, she threw a cup of hot coffee
on her sister; this stimulated her presentation.
The relatively minor impact of assaultive tendencies which have not
had serious results can be easily seen in the following illustration. Al-
though both acts of violence and threats had occurred, they played
only a minimal role in the patient's presentation, admission, and
commitment.
ILLUSTRA TON 30.
The patient was a young woman who had voluntarily entered
the Acute Facility but subsequently demanded her release. The
medical report stated:
The patient came to the emergency room ... and was diag-
nosed as Anxiety Reaction. The patient went to New York
... and lived there for three years. Her father went after her
because he stated the patient had a nervous breakdown. No
other factors are known. The patient was [previously] in ...
[a local private hospital] and received shock treatments. After
her discharge she refused to go to the clinic and returned to
New York. She called her father for money to pay her hotel
bills while in New York .... [S]he came back to St. Louis but
did not work. She made trips to Chicago and Detroit and
kept calling her father for money. She lived in [an apartment
hotel] . . . and when asked to pay the rent would cry. The
patient had threatened to kill her sister and her brother-in-
law. She had been moody, having nightmares, will sit and
stare, will not talk and says she hates everybody.
The patient ... refused to answer any questions and showed
poor insight into her problems. Her affect was shallow but
there was no evidence of hallucinations and no evidence of
delusions could be brought out . . . . The patient remains
hostile, unfriendly and uncooperative.
At the hearing the patient's father testified. He indicated obvious
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concern over the inconvenience and expense of getting the patient
back to St. Louis after her trips. He also testified that he "had
been told" that the patient had threatened to take her brother-in-
law's gun and shoot his family (with whom she lived at the time)
and to burn their house down. He also stated that she had once
violently resisted the family's attempts to force her into a car to
go to a psychiatric outpatient clinic. The patient's employment
history was irregular; the father testified that he had been told
that there were few hospitals in New York City where the patient
had not worked.
The patient herself testified that she felt that she did not need
further full time hospitalization and that she could-and would-
take outpatient treatment. She emphatically indicated that she
did not want additional electroshock treatments. When asked
about her plans regarding what she would do if released, she was
vague. She was not asked about the alleged threats to her brother-
in-law's family, nor was any inquiry into her employment history
made. The court ordered her committed.
In three of the six cases, the patient had at least once left the family
and subsequently requested help when difficulties arose; the patient
in Illustration 30 was one example. All three were cases where the
family had rejected the patient; the "wandering" tendency was un-
doubtedly a factor in the rejection. This graphically illustrates the
extent to which the "need" for hospitalization depended on factors
external to the patient: the tendency to wander can be realistically
said to create a danger only if the family is or becomes unwilling to
lend assistance.
In five of the sixteen cases in which commitment was ordered, there
was no specific indication of "dangerousness" within any reasonable
definition of that criteria. Some contained evidence of serious psycho-
pathology which might have so distorted the patients' mental processes
as to bring them within the category of those lacking sufficient insight
or capacity to make responsible decisions with regard to hospitalization.
ILLUSTRATION 31.
The patient, diagnosed as manic depressive (depressed type) had
exhibited auditory hallucinations and was treated on an out-
patient basis. The medical report indicated that on her last ap-
pointment it was decided to hospitalize her "in an effort to speed
her recovery"; no details or explanation were given. The "voices"
spoke against hospitalization and the patient refused to admit
herself. She was admitted on a nonvoluntary basis. At the staff-
ing, three days after admission, it was concluded that she had lost
her insight. (She at that time believed she was another Christ risen
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from the dead.) But at the time of the application for commit-
ment, the report indicated, she had "begun to develop insight
again." The patient's sister testified that she did not believe the
patient needed hospitalization. The patient herself (who was clas-
sified as a "resister") testified that she went to the clinic because
she was sick and wanted to get well but she felt she received no
real treatment in the hospital. She indicated that she considered
herself ready to go home and, if this were permitted, would take
medication on an outpatient basis.
There was, therefore, at the time of the hearing no indication that
the patient did not acknowledge that she was "sick" and that she would
faithfully make use of outpatient facilities. (This, of course, was strong
evidence of "insight.") On the other hand, it seemed clear that she
had made a rational decision to accept treatment only on an outpatient
basis and there was no proof that this would be either unsuccessful
(or even less successful than hospitalization) or dangerous to the pa-
tient or others. No effort was made at the hearing to resolve these
problems.
In some cases commitment was ordered where there was neither
evidence of dangerousness nor a diagnosis of serious psychopathology.
Apparently the basis for commitment was that even the minor degree
of psychopathology diagnosed had caused the patient significant diffi-
culty in adjustment to the inevitable problems of everyday living.
ILLUSTRATION 32.
The patient, a woman in her early thirties, had been deserted
by her husband and left without support for herself and her
eleven year old child. She had, however, been receiving welfare
payments. About three and one-half years ago, according to the
medical report, she "became ill in a major way as she became in-
creasingly suspicious, interrupted her employer, lived a life of a
recluse and severed all family contacts." Admitted at this time to
the Acute Facility, she was given electroshock treatments and
discharged.
The present crisis occurred when the patient went to see her
son's teacher and "something happened." The patient testified
that because of her recent shock treatment she could not remem-
ber the event; apparently neither the family nor hospital person-
nel had investigated. The patient's mother testified that following
the "event" school authorities took the child and gave it to the
father, while the patient's sisters took the patient to a local private
hospital. (The medical report, however, stated that she was ad-
mitted to the private hospital because "she was given to wander-
ing, neglecting her child and relating to her family in a very
markedly paranoid way.") Her legal status at the private hospital
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was unclear; she was, however, given electroshock treatments
there. Because of the cost of the private facility, she was trans-
ferred to State Hospital. She refused to sign an application for
voluntary admission "on the ground that she was not sick." The
State Hospital applied for her commitment.
The medical report diagnosed her as "personality pattern dis-
turbance, paranoid personality" and noted a history of psycho-
pathology in her mother's family. The report concluded, "All of
the facilities of the hospital were used in order to rehabilitate her,
but it became evident that the patient was not going to be mobi-
lized in a short period of time." A social history report filed with
the court indicated that the patient's husband had left her to live
with another woman and that the patient's attitude towards her
family arose from the fact that the patient resented the fact that
she was illegitimate and feared that this would be disclosed.
The testimony of the patient's mother added little. She sug-
gested that the prior admission to the Acute Facility followed a
criminal charge of assault which arose out of a dispute the patient
had with neighbors over a clothesline. The patient herself testified
that she felt capable of leaving the hospital and could get along
if she could find a job. She was questioned by the court as to
whether she had many close friends (which she indicated she did
not) and the amounts she had received from welfare payments.
There was no indication of disorientation or disruption of the
patient's mental processes. She was ordered committed.9 6
b. Dismissals. In only one of the observed cases did the court dis-
miss on its merits an application for hospitalization. In this case, it
was clear that the patient had sustained organic brain damage but it
was equally clear that this affected his behavior only to a minimal
extent.
ILLUSTRATION 33.
The patient, according to the medical report, had been brought
to the Acute Facility by the police because "a confusional state
was suspected." While at the Acute Facility he had several seizures
96. Whitmore, Comments on a Draft Act for the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 19
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 512, 522-23 (1951) criticized the Draft Act's criteria on the basis that
patients diagnosed as neurotics would be subject to hospitalization under the "sufficient
insight" criteria. Ross, Committment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57
MICH. L. Rnv. 945, 959 (1959) responded that the "sufficient insight" criteria was meant for
psychotic individuals whose condition had not yet created a danger to the patient or others
but which would in the future; neurotic individuals, he asserted, would be subject to
hospitalization only if they met the dangerousness criteria. This study indicates, however,
that as the Draft Act criteria is applied in St. Louis, individuals suffering from only a
peronality disorder (a lesser degree of psychopathology than neurosis or psychosis) who
do not meet the dangerousness criteria are in fact subjected to nonvoluntary hospitalization.
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and was treated with phenobarbital. Diagnosis was chronic brain
syndrome, "chronic alcoholism (by history)" and "convulsive dis-
order (etiology unknown)." In the medical report the patient was
described as
cooperative and friendly. He has dull facial expression, his
mood was well modulated, with no thought disorder, no de-
lusions, or hallucinations ... He was oriented to place and
person but disoriented to time. His memory for past events
was ... [sic] with marked fluctuation and was fair for recent
events, attention and concentration were poor. Patient was
poor in arithmetic and general information, highly concrete
on proverbs; insight and judgment fair.
At the hearing the patient testified that he lived with his cousin
and his wife. He could not remember being taken to the hospital
but attributed this to one of the "fits" he had experienced. These
"fits," he testified, had not interfered with his work and his car
washing job (which he had held for a number of years) was being
held open for him. The patient admitted an earlier "drinking
problem" but maintained that he had stopped drinking two years
ago because of his health. The other witness was the patient's
cousin's wife who confirmed the patient's work history and indi-
cated that there was no objection to the patient returning to her
home if he were released.
Commenting that "There is no reason to hold this man," the
court indicated that it would order him released.
c. Submissions. In three of the observed cases no disposition was
made at the time of the hearing. Rather, the case was taken "under
submission" and the court took informal steps to secure additional
information. Commitment was ultimately ordered in all three cases.
Nevertheless, all three represented situations where the court recog-
nized that the hearing procedure did not disclose sufficient information
on which to base a disposition and where specific attempts to engage
in further fact-finding were made.
ILLUSTRATION 34.
The patient, an elderly but large man, had been taken to the
Acute Facility by police upon the request of his wife. He was
diagnosed as "highly suspected chronic brain syndrome, mild"
and the medical report indicated:
The patient's wife states that her husband would accuse her
of dating a man and then he would beat her. She stated that
this had been happening for about a year. We are still unable
to determine whether the patient is delusional in regard to
his wife or whether she is really being unfaithful to him.
Social Service is in the process of investigation ....
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At the hearing the patient's wife testified that she knew nothing
about the men that the patient had accused her of dating. She also
reported that the patient had exhibited other abnormal behavior;
he had refused to sleep with the lights off and accused her of leav-
ing the house door open so that "someone" could get in to kill
him so she could collect his insurance and he occasionally "saw
things." The patient testified that he had observed his wife with
other men, had merely left the television lamp on on several occa-
sions and denied any hallucinations. Upon being questioned by
the court, he admitted striking his wife once on each of two occa-
sions; the first, he testified, involved her failure to prepare a meal
for the children and was unrelated to her unfaithfulness. The
court indicated to the patient that unless the hospital had some
evidence that his beliefs were not factually true, release would be
ordered.
The court phoned the Acute Facility resident in charge of the
patient's ward and also spoke with the supervising staff psychia-
trist. Nine days after the hearing, a supplemental medical report
containing the following was filed:
The ministers, neighbors and children were approached by
the facility's social service staff. No definite information could
be obtained that the wife was stepping out of the home with
other men.
The patient could be dangerous to his wife due to the fact
that he responds to his delusions, which are highly system-
atized and fixed. The patient is being treated with Thorazine
and Stelazin... So far there has been no change in the
patient's belief. After a certain period on the drugs, electro-
shock therapy might be considered and if there is no change
there is a possibility of the patient being transferred to State
because the patient will be a risk to his wife's safety and well-
being if released.
Ten days later, according to a note in the case file, the court again
phoned the supervising staff psychiatrist and was assured that "it
is not simply the protection of the wife that motivates them to
retain the patient, but that the patient actually needs custodial
treatment for a mental condition." On that date, an order com-
miting the patient was entered.97
97. A similar informal method of gathering information was condemned in In re Leary's
Appeal, 272 Minn. 34, 136 N.W.2d 552 (1965). After the hearing on an application for
commitment, the superintendent of the facility visited the trial judge in chambers and
related "some information as to the day to day observations of the patient during the
time that she was in the institution." Although it concluded that this was not sufficient
basis to reverse the commitment, the Minnesoa Supreme Court commented that it was
"convinced that it was not proper to consult with ... [the superintendent] in the absence
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3. Analysis
Several general observations can be made regarding the judicial
commitment process. A great deal of emphasis was placed upon forms
of procedural fairness: assignment of counsel, availability of witnesses,
direct and cross examination of witnesses, and even, to a lesser extent,
the rules of evidence. But far from all of those involuntarily hospital-
ized were ever afforded whatever opportunity to avoid hospitalization
this provided. Because of the three week delay between admission and
hearing, many patients had, by the time scheduled for the hearing,
been released. In addition, if a patient was still detained at the time
of the hearing, the judicial procedure offered him little substantive
protection. The criteria applied by the court was not that laboriously
set out in the statute. Commitment was ordered if the court believed,
on the basis of assertions in the medical report, that the Acute Facility
had some basis for concluding that the patient was "mentally ill" (as
the facility chose to define that term) and that as a result of this illness
the patient had experienced some difficulty in living.09 No attempt was
made to resolve many of the factual issues that arose, even where these
appeared to be determinative.
The implications of these observations, when considered in light of
of appellant or her counsel. Appellant had a right to cross examine the doctor on any
information conveyed to the court that might influence his determination." 272 Minn. at
44, 136 N.W.2d at 558. See also Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740 (1965), holding that the trial
court in a commitment proceeding erred in permitting the jury to inspect the court file
which contained a medical report. A statutory provision (adopted from the Draft Act)
relied upon by the appellee provided that the court in a commitment proceeding "shall
not be bound by the rules of evidence"; this was held unconstitutional as a violation of the
judiciary's inherent power to control the course of litigation as well as the appellant's
right to hear and controvert all evidence upon which factual determinations are to be
made. Cf. People v. Dykema, 89 Ill. App. 2d 409, 232 N.E.2d 471 (1967).
98. Cf. the conclusions of Miller & Schwartz, County Lunacy Commission Hearings:
Some Observations of Commitments to a State Mental Hospital, 14 Soc. PROD. 26 (1966).
58 hearings, averaging 4A minutes each, were observed; thirteen resulted in release of
the patient. As to the decisional criteria, the study concluded:
Those persons who were able to approach the judge in a controlled manner, use
proper eye contact, sentence structure, posture, etc., and who presented their stories
without excessive emotional response or blandness and with proper demeanor, were
able to obtain the decision they wanted ... despite any "psychiatric symptomatology."
Id. at 84. Yet, the study suggests, this criteria was not altogeter inappropriate: it can be
argued that those patients who were unable to present the appearance demanded by the
court lacked "social acumen and awareness" and that this (whether or not it was tech-
nically a symptom of their illness) demonstrated that they would encounter difficulty
living in the community. Assuming this to be true, however, neither the criteria applied in
St. Louis nor that apparently applied in the hearings observed in the Miller.Schwartz
study had any relationship to the formal legal criteria for nonvoluntary hospitalization.
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the preceding steps in the hospitalization process, are dear. Although
the statutory framework assumed that the operation of the system
would be controlled by the legal criteria and that the criteria would be
applied by a judicial body, this has not been the case. The criteria
actually used has been much broader than that set out in the statute
and has been applied by the Acute Facility itself (subject to very lim-
ited review by the probate court if the facility decided to retain a
patient longer than three weeks). Despite the strict observance of the
form of effectiveness, the judicial commitment procedure was in reality
practically functionless in the hospitalization process.
E. The Hospitalization Process: An Overall Analysis
This study had demonstrated that nonvoluntary hospitalization in
the St. Louis public Acute Facility is the result of decisions by a series
of decision-makers: the community's decision to present, the facility's
decision to admit, and, in a few cases, the probate court's decision to
commit. Each decision influences the next-the fact of presentation
influences the facility to admit, and the fact of admission influences
the court to commit. The procedural sequence of events is far differ-
ent from that anticipated by the legal framework. In almost none of
the cases is the initial decision to coerce the patient for treatment pur-
poses made by the court. In almost all the initial decision is made in
the community; the next decision is frequently that by the facility to
admit and retain. Only after these decisions have been made and effec-
tuated does the court have the opportunity to decide whether or not
to authorize continued nonvoluntary detention.
But the fact that all (or the most important) decisions are not made
judicially does not mean that they are made in violation of the criteria
set out in the legal framework. Even if the criteria actually applied at
a given stage does not correspond to that in the legal framework, this
does not necessarily mean that the system is at that point exceeding its
theoretical authority. It is possible that from among those who meet
the general criteria of the legal framework, the system, its capacity
limited by facility and personnel shortages, selects only a limited num-
ber for inclusion within its program. This would be the situation if the
criteria actually applied was included within that proscribed by the
framework or if it was applied only to those who also meet the statutory
criteria, i.e., if the actual criteria included the requisites of the statu-
tory criteria or if prior to the application of the actual criteria all those
not meeting the statutory criteria had been screened out. If either is
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the situation, the legal framework could be considered as establishing
an outer boundary defining those who may be subjected to the system.
As among those within this boundary, the system can be considered
free to select for actual inclusion on some basis other than the criteria
set out in the legal framework.
The study, however, suggests that not only does the criteria applied
at all three decision-making points not correspond to that set out in
the legal framework, but also that the criteria actually applied is
broader than that proscribed by the legal framework. Nor is there any
preliminary screening process assuring that this broad criteria is ap-
plied only to those who meet the statutory criteria. The techniques
used in the study are not sufficiently precise to permit a reliable esti-
mate as to the total number of patients presented, admitted or com-
mitted who did not come within the boundary defined by the statutory
criteria. There is no doubt, however, but that on a day-to-day basis the
acute psychiatric treatment system exceeds its legal authority to detain
individuals for treatment purposes. 99
99. A breakdown of admissions by race and sex also permits some interesting speculation.
At the time of the 1960 census the city was 28.8 per cent Negro; as Table A indicates, thc
TABLE A
ADMISSIONS BY TYPE, RACE AND SEX
Race Sex
White Negro Unidentified Male Female
All Admissions 67% 20% 13% 53% 47%
Voluntary Admissions
Only 75 14 11 57 43
Nonvoluntary Admissions
only 53 29 18 47 53
admissions studied were 23 per cent Negro. This provides some-but little-support for
the assertion that public mental health facilities underserve the nonwhite population.
Although female patients tended more than male patients to have been nonvoluntary
admissions, the variation was not large.
A more significant difference is apparent when admissions are considered by type and
race. Voluntary admissions were significantly more often White patients than were non-
voluntary admissions; nonvoluntary admissions contained more than its proportionate share
of Negro patients. Several factors may account for this. The city's Negroes may, as a
group, have less "psychiatric sophistication" than Whites and consequently they may
voluntarily seek help less frequently for what they regard as illness. Or, psychiatric
hospitalization may be more frequently invoked by others as a control device.
Both hypotheses are supported by Table B, which breaks down types of presentations
by race. Identified Negro patients tended more than White patients to have been Police
Presentations. None of the identified Negro patients had presented themselves. This
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Why is the legal framework such a minor determinative of the actual
operations of the system, both in terms of the content of the substantive
criteria and the procedure by which it is applied? The most effective
decision-making point was quite clearly the Acute Facility. Why had
the court such a minor role in the overall process? Cause and effect are
difficult to separate. Several possible explanations are more likely effects
than causes of the minor role of the court. 100 For example, the court was
not presented with a decision as to whether "to treat or not," but
rather whether to authorize continuation of a course of treatment that
has already been administered for several weeks. Thus the alternatives
were unequally weighted. Release, which meant reversing a prior de-
cision by the Acute Facility and discarding the potential value of three
weeks of "therapy," was much less attractive than its alternative, espe-
cially in view of the general shortage of public psychiatric services. But
this does not explain why the court did not attempt to become active
at an earlier point in the process and thus minimize this factor. Con-
sider also the obvious difficulty that the court encountered in obtain-
ing factual information on which to make decisions which might be
offered to explain its role. But this does not explain why the court did
TABLE B
PRESENTATIONS BY TYPE AND RACE
White Negro Unidentified Total
All Admissions 67% 20% 13% 100%
Self Presentations 90 0 10 100
Police Only Presentations 44 44 12 100
Family and Police Presentations 62 25 13 100
Family Only Presentations 60 20 20 100
suggests, then, that Negro patients were not presented because they recognized in them-
selves s)mptoms of illness but rather tended to have been presented under coercion and
following precipitating situations that disrupted either the family or the community.
100. Scheff, Social Conditions for Rationality: How Urban and Rural Courts Deal with
the Mentally 111, 7 AMERICAN BEHAvIORAL SCIENTIsT 21 (1964), MENTAL ILLNEss AND SOciAl.
PROCEssFS (T. Scheff ed. 1967), reported that court commitment procedures tended to be
more functional in rural than in urban courts. He attributed this to several factors: (I)
the high volume of cases in urban courts, (2) stronger "political" pressures on urban judges
to retain persons whom subsequent events might prove should have been retained (as, for
example, newspaper coverage of a crime committed by a released patient), (3) the greater
personal familiarity of the rural judges with the situations brought before them, (4) the
greater psychiatric sophistication of the urban judges, which tended to encourage them to
seek "treatment" and to rely on the facilities to determine "need for treatment," and (5)
the tendency of the rural patient to be more articulate and to have a greater awareness
of his legal rights.
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not take steps to obtain more information, such as requiring personal
appearances of medical personnel in close cases.
Most likely, the distribution of effective decision-making authority
was the result of general acceptance of what might be called a clinical
concept of mental illness and the need for hospitalization. This ap-
proach holds that the "need" for psychiatric hospitalization is based
upon the severity of clinical symptoms; existence of such need, it fol-
lows, is best determined by medical experts. But, as this study has
shown, the clinical approach frequently does not correspond to the
actual dynamics of the process. A symptom's significance lies largely
in how it affects the patient's relationship to his environment. "Dan-
gerousness," for example, is a combination of predictions as to how the
patient will respond to certain situations (based to some extent on
clinical symptoms), the likelihood of those situations arising and such
other factors as the probability that specific persons may be present
when they arise. There is some indication that a judicial decision
maker may even be able to make a more accurate determination as
to the need for hospitalization, even when the "need" is defined in
terms of the patient's ability to live adequately in the community.101
Nevertheless, the court with jurisdiction over the system examined
here seems to have accepted the "clinical approach" and it appears
that this is the most important determinative of the allocation of real
authority in the hospitalization process.
While this may help to explain the failure of the court to take a
more active part in the decision-making process, it does not explain
why the legal criteria was not more closely followed by whoever exer-
cised the actual authority. The answer to this question probably lies
in the wide gap between the role envisioned for the psychiatric hospi-
talization system in the legal framework and that actually demanded of
it by the community. The attempt to impose upon the system the cri-
teria carefully set out in the legal framework constituted an attempt
101. Rappeport, Lassen & Gruenwald, Evaluation and Followup of Hospital Patients
Who Had Sanity Hearings, 118 Ar. J. PSYCHIATRY 1078 (1962), in THE CLINICAL EVALUATION
OF THE DANGEROuSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 81 (J. Rappeport ed. 1967), reports a study
of 73 patients who had court hearings (at their own request) to determine the appropriate-
ness of their continued hospitalization. Twenty-six were released by the court; of the re-
maining 47, ten were later discharged by the hospital and eleven escaped. A followup
study of the 47 patients released by the three methods showed that although 44 per cent
of those discharged by the court had a "satisfactory adjustment" to the community, only
30 per cent of those discharged by the hospital had adjusted satisfactorily. 42 per cent of
the escapees had adjusted satisfactorily. The implication, as the study recognizes, is that
"the hospital is unable to prognosticate significantly better than the court." Id. at 88.
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to define the role that the psychiatric hospitalization system would
perform in the overall business of keeping society in operation. If the
prescribed criteria were effectively implemented, the psychiatric hos-
pitalization system would serve the relatively limited functions of pro-
tecting the community from reasonably imminent physical assaults by
the mentally ill, of protecting the mentally ill from self-inflicted harm
or from situations which, because of their affliction, created a risk to
their physical safety that was greatly in excess of that normally endured
by members of the community, and of making the decision to obtain
treatment for those mentally ill persons whose thought processes had
been severely impaired by their illness. The fundamental error in this
approach, of course, was in making the underlying assumption that
this function could be controlled by legal fiat, i.e., the assumption that
the psychiatric hospitalization system was controlled by the legal frame-
work within which it in theory operated, and consequently that the
operation of the system could be altered by simple manipulation of the
legal framework.
The criminal justice system has been compared to the natural system
of a biological cell; 1 2 the same comparison can be made with regard to
the psychiatric hospitalization system. As is true of a single cell com-
posing one part of a multi-cellular organism, the psychiatric hospital-
ization's internal operation is determined largely by its relationship to
other aspects of the entire social organization of which it is a part.
Specific aspects of the system's internal processes, in other words, are
determined by the system's function as one part of a larger system,
which in turn is determined by demands made upon the system by
other parts of the larger system. In the case of the psychiatric hospital-
ization system, the legal framework is only one of those demands. Other
demands from other sources are often of a more pressing nature in the
day to day operation of the system: disrupted families demand hospital-
ization of one member as a means of "crisis remission"; neighbors de-
mand hospitalization of irritating neighborhood "nuts"; police (and
other participants in the criminal justice system) demand hospitaliza-
tion of those considered dangerous or troublesome but who for some
reason are deemed inappropriate subjects for the criminal system;
physicians demand hospitalization when this is seen as a means of al-
leviating the suffering of an individual or family. Where there is no
readily available alternative means of satisfying these demands, those
upon whom the demands are made will, if possible, use the flexibility
102. D. OAKs & IV. LurmAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYsTEMt AND THE INDIGENT 185-88 (1968).
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in the resources available to them to satisfy the demands as best they
can. Attempted revisions which neither eliminate the flexibility (which
is probably impossible) nor alter the demands are unlikely to have
significant effects. As a recent study of changes in juvenile court pro-
cedure observed, "Formal structure and procedure can be changed...
but ... old ends persist and continue to be satisfied."'1 3 An attempt
to alter the function of a system such as the psychiatric hospitalization
system by simply enacting a restrictive criteria and inserting in the sys-
tem a judicial officer with directions to apply that criteria was destined
in advance to failure.
III. JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE PSYCHIATRIC
HOSPITALIZATION PROCESS
The empirical examination of the operations of a public acute psy-
chiatric hospitalization system in Part II raises a variety of issues, in-
cluding the scope of the substantive criteria for defining those subject
to nonvoluntary treatment, the relationship of the legal framework to
community demands upon the system, the extent to which medical
authorities should or may be granted initial or final authority to deter-
mine whether a specific individual meets the criteria for nonvoluntary
treatment, the necessity for outside supervision or control of medical
authorities, and the ability of a judicial officer to supervise the opera-
tion of the system or to take an active role in the hospitalization pro-
cess. All, however, are interrelated; a discussion of one necessarily in-
volves consideration of all.
To the extent that systems such as that studied here permit depriva-
tion of personal liberty by administrative authorities of the psychiatric
hospitalization system, they raise significant problems under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The purpose of Part III is to discuss
these problems as a vehicle for demonstrating the interrelationship of
the issues raised by the observations reported in Part II.
A. Right to Judicial Participation in the Hospitalization Process
1. Theoretical Framework
Although the system described in Part II may to some extent have
developed in response to factors unique to St. Louis, there are indica-
tions that in other jurisdictions, and especially in urban areas, early
judicial involvement in the hospitalization process is the exception
103. Lemert, Legislating Change in the Juvenile Court, 1967 Wxs. L. REv. 421, 447.
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rather than the rule.104 Despite this, however, there has been a surpris-
ing lack of theoretical development of the constitutionally required
function of the judiciary in this area. This section suggests a basic
approach towards the issue.
When a state acts to deprive a specific individual of his liberty, what-
ever the justification asserted for doing so, the function of determining
whether the action is justified under the general standard has tradi-
tionally been a judicial one. Attempts to transfer this function to ad-
ministrative agencies have been regarded as violations of constitution-
ally required separation of powers and, apparently on the theory that
due process embodies to some extent the requirement of separation of
powers, denials of due process of law. 105 Underlying these holdings has
104. H. GRACE, et al., SCREENING THE MENTALLY ILL BEFORE COURT COMMITMENT, 16 (Cali-
foinia Department of Mental Hygiene 1965) (California); Dix, Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for a Reexamination, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 15 (1967)
(Wisconsin); Note, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Utah: A Practical and Legal
Analss, 1966 UTAH L. Rxv. 223, 229 (Utah).
105. see generally, Note, Constitutionality of Nonjudicial Confinement, 3 STAN. L. REV.
109, 115-17 (1950). As a general rule, separation of powers is required only by state con-
stitutions and, unless due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is thereby violated,
a state is free to distribute governmental functions as it sees fit. Id. at 111. Nevertheless,
the separation of powers policy and the assumptions underlying it have been an important
factor in determining the contents of the due process requirement. See, e.g., the comment
in ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894): "[The Interstate Commerce Commission]
could not, under our system of government, and consistently with due process of law,
be invested with authority to compel obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine or
conviction." See also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (discussed in note
106 infra) in which the decision was apparently based on due process, and Underwood v.
People, 32 Mich. 1 (1875), holding unconstitutional a procedure which provided for a
veto by the hospital superintendent of judicially ordered release of patients committed
to the hospital following a verdict in a criminal trial or not guilty by reason of insanity.
Consider the question whether an individual condemned to death has a right to a judicial
determination of his sanity prior to execution. Ex parte Phyle, 30 Cal. 2d 888, 186 P.2d
134 (1947), cert. granted, 333 U.S. 841, petition for cert. dismissed, 334 U.S. 431 (1948);
Phyle s. Duffy, 34 Cal. 2d 144, 208 P.2d 668, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 895 (1949) (subsequently
oserruled in Caritatiho v. Teets, 47 Cal. 2d 304, 303 P.2d 339 (1956)). Cf. City of Portland
v. Cit) of Bangor, 65 Me. 120 (1876), holding invalid under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment a statute authorizing commitment to the poorhouse by two over-
seers of the poor. "The objection," declared the court, "does not lie in the fact that the
persons named may be restrained of their liberty, but in allowing it to be done without
first having a judicial investigation to ascertain whether the charges made against them
are true." id. at 121.
The question has also been raised in regard to procedures for detention or quarantine
of those believed afflicted with physical disease. In Ex parte Lewis, 328 Mo. 843, 42 S.W.2d
21 (1931) a statute authorizing quarantine of individuals believed by the Division of
Health to be suffering from venereal disease was challenged on the ground that it con-
ferred judicial power upon an administrative officer in violation of the state constitution.
Upholding the statute, the court held that the authority of the health officer to determine
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been a fear that only a judicial tribunal could assure compliance with
those procedural safeguards which the seriousness of the outcome de-
manded. 1 6 As the volume of judicial business has grown, and as the
criminal system has begun serious attempts to effectuate rehabilitation
programs, it has become clear that even in the criminal system non-
judicial authorities must be empowered to make decisions significantly
affecting individual liberty.107 Nevertheless, courts for the most part
whether or not a proposed patient was suffering from a venereal disease in an infectious
stage was administrative and not judicial. See also Huffman v. District of Columbia, 39
A.2d 558 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1944), upholding a similar regulation of the Commissioners
of the District of Columbia on the ground that the function of the health officer was
administrative rather than "penal"; emphasis was also placed on the danger posed by the
situation to the public health. But cf. Wragg v. Griffin, 185 Iowa 234, 170 N.W. 400 (1919),
refusing to interpret a similar statute to authorize administrative detention. Some quar-
antine statutes did provide for judicial involvement in the process; see People v. Johnson,
252 N.Y. 387, 169 N.E. 619 (1930), applying a statute providing an opportunity prior to
the medical examination for a detained person to obtain a judicial determination of the
justification for compelling the examination.
106. 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 2.13 (1958). The issue is generally put
as whether the obligation imposed by the agency is a criminal penalty or a "civil or
remedial" penalty, on the assumption that only pursuant to a judicial proceeding can
a criminal penalty be imposed. The controversy generally is generated by imposition
of a duty to pay money; a restriction of liberty is usually assumed to be beyond the
authority of an administrative agency. Id. The difficult problem comes when the authority
of an agency to impose deprivation of liberty for contempt is questioned. Compare Ex
parte Victor, 220 Cal. 729, 52 P.2d 608 (1934) with People v. Swena, 88 Colo. 337, 296 P.
271 (1931). Cf. Davis v. Britt, 243 Ark. 556, 420 S.W.2d 863 (1967), holding that a statute
delegating to psychiatric hospitalization authorities the power to determine whether a
defendant was "sane" so as to be competent to stand trial was a violation of separation
of powers.
One area where the general rule has been compromised is that of action against aliens.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the federal government may, consistent
with due process of law, entrust exclusion and expulsion of aliens to administrative officials
and may authorize a temporary detention by these officials pursuant to their duty of
exclusion and expulsion. It may not, however, authorize the administrative officials to
impose upon an alien a prison sentence which must be served before he is expelled.
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). And, except when the alien has not
arrived on American soil (and therefore is being excluded rather than expelled), the
administrative procedure must itself comply with basic due process requirements. The
Japanese Immigration Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); ef. Kennedy v. Mendoza.Martinez, 372
U.S. 144 (1963).
Several courts have also held that the authority to issue warrants, admittedly a judicial
function, may be delegated to prosecuting attorneys. State v. Furmage, 250 N.C. 616, 109
S.E.2d 563 (1959); see State ex rel. Sahley, - W. Va. -, 151 S.E.2d 870 (1966). But cf.
State ex rel. White v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N.W.2d 391 (1965).
107. For example, under Sex Offender Acts the judicially imposed sentence may be for
"between one day and life." But correctional authorities have the right to release prior
to the expiration of the sentence. E.g., Trueblood v. Tinsley, 158 Cal. 503, 366 P.2d 655
(1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 929 (1962); Sims v. Rives, 84 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
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have continued to insist that imposing deprivation of liberty upon an
individual remained a judicial function which cannot constitutionally
be assigned elsewhere. Respect for this proposition has led to decisions
whose analysis clearly shows the wide discrepancy between the theoret-
ical requirement and demands of the everyday world, with the result
that the case law contains no realistic criteria for distinguishing "ju-
dicial" from "nonjudicial" functions. 08
As the issue of judicial participation in the public hospitalization
process is now presented it is essentially the same as that traditionally
analyzed under the constitutionally permitted extent of delegation of
authority to administrative agencies. Public psychiatric facilities con-
stitute a well developed administrative organization and the issue is
basically whether (or to what extent) authority can be delegated to
them to determine whether specific individuals meet the criteria for
nonvoluntary psychiatric hospitalization.
This, however, has not been the approach of most of the limited case
law on the subject. Early cases upholding nonjudicial hospitalization
procedures often emphasized the availability of a judicial hearing after
hospitalization had been effected and vaguely referred to the commu-
nity's right to take immediate action to protect its members and the
patient's need for immediate restraint as a justification for postponing
the judicial proceeding. A 1907 Rhode Island case, for example, ex-
plained:
[I]nsanity is a disease, and the state has the right to treat one who
has the misfortune to suffer from it, as it does one who has a con-
tagious malady. The exercise of this right of self-protection must
be regulated by the circumstances of the case. If it is dangerous to
the community that a citizen should go at large, whether because
he is liable to spread contagion, or to commit some act of violence,
public safety demands that he be immediately confined.., and the
extent of his personal right can only be to test by judicial process,
denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936); State ex rel. Volden v. Haas, 264 Wis. 127, 58 N.WV2d 577
(1953).
108. See, e.g., the analysis of the California Supreme Court in upholding an indeter-
minate sentence statute:
Tnhe Adult Authority is empowered to determine as an administrative matter "what
ength of time" a person sentenced to prison shall serve . . . but the actual imposi-
tion of that sentence for the term prescribed by law remains a judicial function which
can be performed only by a court .... The Adult Authority's determination of the
length of term is no part of the imposition of sentence, and "if it were so regarded
it would be the exercise of a judicial function by an executive board, and void under
section 1, article 3, of the Constitution [i.e., guaranteeing the separation of powers].
In re Sandel, 50 Cal. Rptr. 462, 465, 412 P.2d 806, 809 (1966).
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at a time when it may safely be done, the propriety of his re-
straint.109
The language and analysis of the cases were often so terse as to be un-
dear; postponement of judicial participation in the hospitalization
process, however, apparently has been upheld on the ground that when
hospitalization is sought immediate restraint is generally necessary for
the protection of the community and the mentally ill person and this
necessity makes initial judicial involvement impracticable.
Some decisions insisted that nonjudicial restraint be available only
in situations where there was specific evidence of "dangerousness" or
that judicial involvement be postponed only to the extent required
by the danger." 0 Most, however, accepted uncritically the assumption
that existence of "mental illness" necessarily meant a sufficiently high
probability of dangerousness to justify postponing judicial interven-
tion."
109. In re Crosswell's Petition, 28 R.I. 137, 144, 66 A. 55, 58 (1907). Cf. cases upholding
procedures whereby imprisoned convicts were transferred to psychiatric facilities at the
expiration of their sentences without a prior hearing but the opportunity for a later
hearing procedure was held to save the entire procedure: Hiatt v. Soucek, 240 Iowa 200,
86 N.W.2d 432 (1949); In re Le Donne, 173 Mass. 550, 54 N.E. 244 (1899). See also Ham.
mon v. Hill, 228 F. 999 (W.D. Penn. 1915); Payne v. Arkebauer, 190 Ark. 614, 80 S.W.2d
76 (1935); In re Bryant, 214 La. 573, 38 So. 2d 245 (1948); In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387,
47 N.E. 1033 (1897); Ex Parte Dagley, 35 Okla. 180, 128 P. 699 (1912). The court in Moses
v. Tarwater, 257 Ala. 361, 58 So. 2d 757 (1952) declined over strong dissent to reach the
issue.
110. In Appeal of Sleeper, 147 Me. 802, 87 A.2d 115 (1952) a statute permitting thirty-
five days hospitalization upon the certificate of one physician with the endorsement of a
local official was held unconstitutional on the ground that it was neither restricted to
situations where emergency restraint was necessary for the comfort or safety of the
patient or for the safety of the public nor was it ancillary to proceedings for indeter-
minate judicial commitment. Two years later, in In re Opinion of the Justices, 151 Me.
1, 117 A.2d 53 (1955) the court in an advisory opinion indicated that a proposed sub-
stitute, although it was limited to those cases where a certification of dangerousness had
been made, failed to meet constitutional requirements because it had no specific provision
for an individual held pursuant to it to test the validity of his confinement by recourse
to the courts. A proposal with such a provision was approved by the court two weeks
later. Id. at 24, 117 A.2d at 57.
In In re Cornell, 111 Vt. 525, 18 A.2d 304 (1941) the Vermont Supreme Court held
that authorization for nonvoluntary hospitalization could not be permanent without judi-
cial proceedings. And in Petition of Doyle, 16 RI. 537, 18 A. 159 (1889) the court, holding
a certification proceeding unconstitutional, commented, "We are not prepared to say that
. . . the sections would be void, if they were intended simply for temporary detention,
preliminary to or pending a proper judicial inquiry." Id. at 538-39, 18 A. at 160. Cf.
the discussion in Petition of Rohrer, - Mass. -, -, 230 N.E.2d 915, 1919 (1967).
111. See, e.g., the comment of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Ex Parte Dagley, 35
Okla. 180, 183, 128 P. 699, 700 (1912): "For the purpose of [nonjudicial] committal in an
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A broader rationale for nonjudicial hospitalization was accepted by
the New York Court of Appeals in In re Coates,112 decided in 1961.
Upholding a statute that permitted indeterminate hospitalization with-
out judicial proceedings of one certified "mentally ill" and "in need
of care and treatment," the court explained:
[T]he exact meaning and scope of the phrase "due process of law"
cannot be defined with precision ... [but] ...a hearing or an
opportunity to be heard is absolutely essential. . . .Due process
does not, however, "guarantee to the citizen of a state any partic-
ular form or method of state procedure."
[Aimple provision is made in Section 76 for a complete rehearing
and review ab initio .... [T]his provision saves the constitution-
ality of [the statutory procedure].
Appellant contends that Section 76 does not cure the defect...
because the hearing it provides for is after, rather than before, the
order of certification has become final .... [T]he Supreme Court
of the United States, in somewhat analagous situations, has made
it clear that the provisions of an act authorizing the seizure of
property without a prior judicial hearing are "rescued from con-
stitutional invalidity" by provisions affording the claimant a sub-
sequent judicial hearing as to the propriety of the seizure ....
This principle has been extended to commitment cases.., and ex
parte commitment for an indefinite time has been upheld where
the statute made adequate provision for the allegedly mentally ill
person to test the legality of his confinement after his admis-
sion .... 113
Coates, then, stands for the proposition that by reason of a later
opportunity for a judicial proceeding, hospitalization upon certifica-
tion is constitutionally permissible without regard to danger to the
community or need for immediate restraint for therapeutic or protec-
tive purposes, and despite mechanical feasibility of holding judicial
proceedings prior to hospitalization. This is a proposition of doubtful
validity. It arguably has, however, some support in U.S. Supreme Court
cases dealing with property rights. In Anderson National Bank v.
Luckett,' 4 for example, the court upheld a state statute requiring a
asylum, it is not necessary that, in addition to insanity, there should be evidence of dan-
ger to the lunatic or others beyond what is implied in the insanity itself."
112. 9 N.Y.2d 242, 173 N.E2d 797, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74, appeal dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, 368 U.S. 34 (1961).
113. Id. at 249-251, 173 N.E.2d at 801-02, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 79-81 (emphasis in original).
114. 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
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bank to transfer to the state accounts that had been inactive for a num-
ber of years; the depositor (or any other claimant) could subsequently
assert through a judicial proceedings rights in the funds. Holding that
due process requirements were met, the Court declared:
The fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to
be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are adequate to
safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is in-
voked....
For this reason.., it is not an indispensable requirement of due
process that every procedure affecting the ownership and disposi-
tion of property be exclusively by judicial proceedings. Statutory
proceedings affecting property rights, which, by later resort to the
courts, secure to adverse parties an opportunity to be heard, suit-
able to the occasion, do not deny due process. . .The mere fact
that the state or its authorities acquire possession or control of
property as a preliminary step to the judicial determination of
asserted rights in the property is not a denial of due process.11
Despite the broad language of the decisions, however, each contained
facts upon which a strong practical argument could be made for the
necessity of transfer of possession prior to judicial proceedings. In
Anderson, for example, the problems of locating potential claimants
made postponing the transfer until they were available clearly im-
practicable. The cases upholding the Trading with the Enemy Act,"06
specifically relied upon in Coates,117 show that the Supreme Court
regarded the Act (which applies only during a period of war or national
emergency) as an exercise of the emergency war powers and that the
seizure authorized by the Act was upheld on the theory that it gave the
government only a limited right to possession pending a judicial deter-
mination of rights in the property."18 Despite the court's failure to em-
115. Id. at 246-47.
116. 50 U.S.C.A. APP. § 1 (1968).
117. In re Coates, 9 N.Y.2d 242, 251, 173 N.E.2d 797, 802, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1961).
The court specifically cited Socidtd Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
118. Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921). See also Socit4 Inter-
nationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921). The same
is true of Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1943), also relied upon in Coates. In Falbo,
the Court considered the availability of judicial review of a selective service board's
classification of a registrant under the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940. Before
holding that Congress had not intended to make judicial review of classifications avail-
able in criminal prosecutions for failure to report for an assignment to work of national
importance, the Court-without citing authority-commented, "Even if there were as
the petitioner argued, a constitutional requirement that judicial review must be avail-
able to test the validity of the decision of the local board, it is certain that Congress
was not required to provide for judicial intervention before final acceptance of an indi-
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phasize this, the cases upon which Coates relied were cases in which the
postponement of judicial involvement was made necessary by the situ-
ation in which the case arose.
Insofar as Coates rested upon a general rule that a subsequent op-
portunity to obtain a judicial hearing will, even in the absence of any
showing of special necessity for delaying judicial proceedings, justify
administrative action affecting possession of property, it is without im-
pressive support in the case law. Moreover, in view of the current em-
phasis upon personal rights, the use of a rule developed in the context
of rights in property for the purpose of upholding an administrative
procedure affecting liberty of individuals was extremely questionable;
note the court's care in Anderson National Bank to emphasize that the
case was one in which property rights were at issue.
But the most important oversimplification of the Coates analysis was
its restriction of constitutional considerations to general aspects of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process. The
Fourteenth Amendment also makes applicable to the states the Fourth
Amendment's "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." It seems
clear that nonvoluntary detention for purposes of psychiatric hospital-
ization is a "seizure" of the "person" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and it is under this amendment's guarantees that the
right to judicial participation in and supervision over the operation of
agencies of social control has been developed. The case law has large
gaps, but there are several basic principles that can be regarded as
settled in the criminal context. A search, to be reasonable, must (with
the exception of certain emergency situations) be conducted pursuant
to a warrant." 9 The warrant must be issued only upon the determina-
tion of a judicial officer that the situation meets the legal criteria justi-
fying the search.'-O The same is true of a warrant authorizing an arrest
vidual for national service." 320 U.S. at 554. It is not entirely clear whether the Court
equated "final acceptance . . . for national service" with actual deprivation of liberty.
But in any case, it is certain that the Court regarded the Act as an exercise of the general
emergency war power. 320 U.S. at 551, 554-55. In Clark v. Gabriel, 89 S. Ct. 424 (1968),
the Court--citing only Falbo and Esteps v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946)-upheld
Sec. 10(b)(3) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. APP. § 460(b)(3)
(1968), which prohibited any judicial review of a classification except as a defense to a
criminal prosecution following a registrant's refusal to comply with an order based upon
that classification. Cf. Ostereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 11, 89 S. Ct.
414 (1968).
119. E.g., Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364, -, 88 S. Ct. 2120, 2125 (1968) and cases
cited at n.7.
120. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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-it may issue only after a judicial determination that there is justifica-
tion for the arrest.121
The case law does not go further with any degree of clarity. For
example, it is unclear whether arrests without warrants are subject to
the same restrictions as searches without warrants, i.e., whether such
arrests may only be made when use of a warrant procedure is not
feasible. 22 Nor is it clear whether once an arrest without a warrant
has been made it is constitutionally necessary to take the subject before
a judicial officer within a reasonable time so that a disinterested deter-
mination of the justification for his continued retention may be
made.12s If constitutional limitations on police activity are to be log-
ically consistent, the answer to both questions must be affirmative,
although there is as yet little specific case support for such a response.
Nevertheless, the case development of the Fourth Amendment has
tended to interject wherever reasonably feasible a judicial officer be-
tween the administrative police decision to invade personal liberty
and those potentially subject to these invasions. The underlying policy
of this line of decisions was succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Jackson in
Johnson v. United States: 24
The point of the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that it denies
121. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
122. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 314 (1967) (Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting):
"[N]ormally an arrest should be made only on a warrant issued by a magistrate on a
showing of 'probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,' as required by the Fourth
Amendment."
123. The language in the case law indicates that there is no federal constitutional right
to a preliminary hearing. E.g., Butterwood v. United States, 365 F.2d 880, 384 (10th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 886 U.S. 937 (1967). Cf. Rivera v. Virgin Islands, 375 F.2d 988 (3d Cir.
1967). Most cases, however, present the issue as whether denial of a preliminary hearing
will itself vitiate a subsequent conviction. A holding that it will not does not, of course,
necessarily mean that if an individual being held sought to obtain a preliminary hearing
the courts would reach the same result. The same holds true of right to counsel. A
number of federal courts have held that the federal right to counsel does not extend
to state preliminary hearing; these cases, however, are generally those where the issue
is whether failure to provide counsel is sufficient to vitiate a subsequent conviction where
no plea was entered at the preliminary hearing. Atkins v. Kansas, 386 F.2d 819 (10th
Cir. 1967); Allen v. Wilson, 365 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1966). But cf. Pece v. Cox, 354 F.2d
913 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 884 U.S. 1020 (1966); Blue v. United States, 842 F.2d
894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965). The courts have not faced (nor
have most considered in making general statements concerning constitutional require-
ments for the preliminary hearing) the situation where an individual being held on the
basis of police conclusions that he should be detained for trial asserts a federal constitu-
tional right to a judicial determination of that matter and counsel's assistance in pre-
senting his case.
124. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reason-
able men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requir-
ing that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached mag-
istrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.125
Recently the Supreme Court made clear that the Fourth Amendment
protections are not restricted to these invasions of personal liberties
that are part of the criminal justice system. In Camara v. Municipal
Court,t 26 the Court overruled Frank v. Maryland12 7 and held that the
Fourth Amendment required a search warrant be obtained prior to the
search of a private home for the purpose of determining whether local
health regulations had been observed. The holding and the Court's
analysis establish several propositions of importance in the psychiatric
hospitalization context. First, the noncriminal purpose for which a
personal right is invaded does not automatically justify failure to apply
traditionally "criminal" procedural safeguards. 2 8 Second, the general
policy favoring placing a disinterested judicial officer between an ad-
ministrative officer with authority to invade personal rights and the
holder of those rights encompasses noncriminal systems of social con-
trol as well as the criminal system where the policy was developed.
Third, the traditional functions of the disinterested judicial officer
may be modified to meet exigencies encountered when his function is
exercised in noncriminal systems. Finally, in determining whether it
is constitutionally required that the intervention of a disinterested
judicial officer be extended into a noncriminal system it is necessary to
consider (a) the nature and purpose of the system's invasion of personal
liberty, (b) the extent to which the system, without judicial interven-
tion, protects the substantive rights of those potentially subject to de-
125. Id. at 13-14. The procedural right to early judicial involvement in a process in-
fringing on a substantive right has been emphasized where the substantive right is one of
First Amendment nature. See Freedman v. Maryland, 280 U.S. 51, 59 (1965), making clear
that any restraint on the showing of a purportedly obscene film prior to a final judicial
determination of the merits of the restraint must be "limited to preservation of the status
quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution [of the
merits]." See also Wolff v. Selective Service Board No. 16, 572 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
126. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). Both cases
are discussed in La Fave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The
Camara and See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. R-v. I.
127. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See also Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959).
128. In State ex rel. White v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N.W.2d 391 (1965), the Wis-
consin Supreme Court held that a prosecuting attorney could not constitutionally issue
a warrant for the detention of the defendant in a civil paternity suit. Cf. Schmear v.
Gagnon, 276 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Wis. 1967), rev'd, 296 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1968).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
privation of liberty, (c) the effect upon the attainment of the system's
objectives which the insertion of the judicial officer will have, and (d)
the extent to which the judicial officer can act effectively within prac-
tical limits imposed by the everyday operation of the system.
The issue of the constitutionally required extent of judicial partici-
pation in the hospitalization process is closely analagous to the question
presented in Camara; both raise essentially the extent to which a "dis-
interested magistrate" must be interposed between the citizen and an
administrative organization attempting to enforce a social objective.
Certainly the psychiatric hospitalization system presents an equivalent
danger to that underlying the Fourth Amendment cases; the probabil-
ity of inaccurate drawing of inferences on the part of personnel of a
psychiatric facility devoted to providing medical care to those regarded
as "ill" is not likely to be less than similar actions on the part of a
police officer enthusiastically "engaged in . . . ferreting out crime" or a
building inspector in search of nonconformity with health and safety
regulations. Perhaps the most effective way to discuss the problem,
then, is to consider the hospitalization issue in terms of the analysis in
Camara. Such an approach is certain to be more satisfactory than the
"delegation of power-due process" analysis.
2. Fourth-Fourteenth Amendment Analysis
The delegation of power-due process analysis assumes that due
process embodies the basic policy of separation of powers and that it
consequently requires that "judicial" functions be performed only by
a judicial officer. Whether nonjudicial psychiatric hospitalization is
constitutionally valid, therefore, depends upon whether hospitalization
is a "judicial" function. Underlying this has been the assumption that
only a judicial officer can assure compliance with the necessary proce-
dural safeguards. The basic assumption, of course, is subject to chal-
lenge, especially in light of general acceptance of administrative orga-
nizations with broad powers. Moreover, the case law, as the result of
desperate attempts to make the delegation of power doctrine coincide
with reality, has become a completely unsatisfactory basis for distin-
guishing judicial from non-judicial functions. Even if the theoretical
reliability of the analysis is accepted, its application presents an impos-
sible task.
A Fourth-Fourteenth Amendment approach, based on the Camara
analysis, would begin anew with two premises. First, individuals are
entitled to protection against unreasonable seizures of their persons.
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Second, those directly involved in the administration of a system of
social control are likely to be unable to make an impartial evaluation
of the strength of "their" case for depriving a specific individual of his
liberty and consequently there is a strong constitutional policy in favor
of assuring reasonableness by inserting a judicial officer between ad-
ministrative officials seeking to deprive an individual of his liberty and
the right to do so. But whether in any specific noncriminal context a
judicial officer must make the decision depends upon consideration of
four factors.
a. Nature and Extent of Invasion of Liberty. The line between
"criminal" and "noncriminal" systems of social control, once drawn
for the purpose of determining the extent to which traditionally "crim-
inal" procedural requirements applied, is no longer dear, if indeed it
exists at all. Recent Supreme Court decisions concerning these proce-
dural rights have discounted differences between the objective of sys-
tems seeking to invade personal liberty for purposes other than "pun-
ishment" and the criminal system itself. After observing that "the
constitutional basis for [the juvenile] system is-to say the least-
debatable" and that in practice the system has "not been entirely satis-
factory," the Court in In re Gault12 held that the therapeutic objec-
tives of the system did not justify relaxing traditionally criminal
procedural safeguards as much as has been regarded by many as per-
missible. In Specht v. Patterson,30 stringent procedural safeguards
were imposed on Sexual Psychopath systems despite the Court's ac-
knowledgement that the systems were "designed not so much as retribu-
tion as ... to keep individuals from inflicting future harm.'1 31 Neither
120 387 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1967).
130. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
131. Id, at 608-09. This ambiguity is part of a problem that pervades all systems of
social control, in part at least because of the rise of what Allen has called the "rehabilita-
tile ideal." Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. Cruas.
L C. & P.S. 226 (1959). The present system of psychiatric hospitalization, like all systems
that have been effected by recent scientific innovations that purportedly make effective
"therapy" available to those who pass through them, represents the imposition of a
"treatment oriented" program upon the framework of an old system designed almost
exclusively to protect society. Perhaps in part from a sense of guilt over the long years
of emphasis upon control and protection, today's emphasis on treatment tends to detract
from the fact that these systems-induding psychiatric hospitalization-still serve pro-
tectixe functions. More disturbingly, the protective function is frequently clothed in the
language of therapy so that its "non-therapeutic" or control aspects are hidden from
casual view. But, as Allen points out, no complex social institution serves a single func-
tion. Id. at 227. The psychiatric hospitalization system can no more accurately be char-
acterized as entirely "therapeutic" than it can be painted as entirely "protective"; like
the juvenile justice system, it serves both functions.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
therapeutic nor protective objectives, then, are automatic grounds for
exemption of a system from traditionally criminal procedural require-
ment. But the extent to which a system of social control resembles the
criminal system in its objectives and the means adopted to achieve
those objectives probably remains a substantial determinant of the
extent to which the system may relax procedural requirements which
must be strictly observed in the criminal system.
This study suggests that although the acute psychiatric hospitaliza-
tion system is not oriented towards imposing retributive punishment
for its own sake, its objectives and methods resemble in several ways
the corresponding aspects of the criminal system. An important ob-
jective of the psychiatric hospitalization system, for example, is pro-
tection. Protection, moreover, is extended not only against physical
assault upon members of the community but also against community
irritation and inconvenience and family disturbance and disruption.
The analysis of the dynamics of family presentation suggested that
when the primary motive for presentation was the family's desire to
invoke the system for these protective purposes, the likelihood that
the patient's entry into the system would be nonvoluntary was much
greater. Much like the juvenile correctional system, the public acute
psychiatric hospitalization system has "therapeutic" objectives, but
those who are given "therapy" are frequently selected by reason of
their antisocial (and sometimes illegal) behavior.
In addition, however, it is by no means clear that the dynamics of
psychiatric "therapy" is always significantly different than that of the
For the views of a psychiatrist who regards the protective functions as more significant
than the therapeutic functions, see T. SzAsz, LAw, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963). See
also Leifer, Involuntary Psychiatric Hospitalization and Social Control, 13 INT'L J. SOC.
PSYCHIATRY 53 (1967), who argues that classifying psychiatric hospitalization as a "medical"
program rather than as a system of social control enables society to convey the impression
of being governed by laws which are neither harsh nor restrictive. Conveying this im-
pression, he suggests, serves the function of encouraging society to be more respective of
individual liberty in other contexts. But openly recognizing that psychiatric hospitaliza-
tion is in fact a system of social control of deviant behavior
would confront us with the agonizing alternatives of either devising laws to cover
the forms of deviance from which protection is demanded or of increasing our
tolerance for certain varieties of human behavior. In the first case, the gleam of
our free society would be tarnished and in the second case we would be presented
with a challenge for which there is little evidence of our capacity or our willingness
to overcome.
Id. at 58.
For an interesting discussion of the relationship among such factors as views regarding
accountability of mentally ill individuals for their behavior, willingness to invoke the
treatment processes, and social class, see Fletcher, Social Class Variations in Psychiatric
Referral of Withdrawn and Aggressive Case Descriptions, 16 Soc. PRoD. 227 (1968).
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correctionally-oriented imprisonment that society imposes on individ-
uals convicted of antisocial behavior which has been designated as
"criminal." During this study, at least one situation was observed in
which a patient was straightforwardly told that if her behavior did not
change she would be hospitalized on a long-term basis; this action,
obviously designed to deter her from future symptomatic behavior,
was referred to as a "therapeutic threat" by the psychiatrist who had
administered it. Several patients indicated dearly that they regarded
their hospitalization as having been imposed because of their commis-
sion of what they believed was illegal conduct. There is also some
evidence that there may be a substantial similarity between criminal
sanctions and forms of psychiatric treatment that on the surface appear
to be purely "therapeutic." While there is little agreement on the dy-
namics of electroshock therapy, one theoretical explanation holds that
it achieves its results by "punishing" the patient for exhibiting symp-
tomatic behavior and thereby deters him from resorting to such behav-
ior in the future as a means of responding to a stress situation.1 2 Inso-
far as psychiatric "treatment" achieves its results by imposing unpleas-
ant experiences upon patients (or threatening to do so) for purposes of
deterring antisocial behavior, it differs much less from the criminal
justice system's correctional programs than is often supposed.
The extent of the deprivation of liberty might arguably distinguish
the psychiatric hospitalization system from the criminal system. Average
duration of stay in the system studied here was about thirty days;
many patients were discharged after less than ten days of full-time hos-
pitalization. Yet this, as the search in Camara, is not an insignificant
132. Dies, Electroconvulsive Therapy: A Social Learning Theory Interpretation, 146
J. NEROLS AND MENTAL DIsEAsas 334 (1968). Dies subscribes to a theory that holds that
behavior regarded as symptomatic of mental illness is learned behavior little different
in terms of the dynamics of formation than any other learned behavior; see note 42
supra. A hospitalized person, he argues, is clearly informed that electroshock "treatment"
is administered because he has exhibited behavior which is not approved. The fear of
the therapy and the unpleasant aftereffects make his symptomatic behavior a much less
satisfactory way of meeting stress situations. Consequently, the patient is motivated to
develop other responses. In part, Dies indicates, this is an unconscious process, but in
part, he believes, the patient consciously makes efforts to avoid the behavior that experi-
ence has shown will result in the administration of "treatment." There is, however, ex-
perimental evidence tending to show that the convulsion caused by electroshock rather
than the patient's anticipation of the unpleasant experience is responsible for the ob-
served improvement in symptoms. Ulett, Smith 9- Gleser, Evaluation of Convulsive and
Subconvulsive Shock Therapies Utilizing a Control Group, 112 Am. J. PsY HIATRY 795
(195. See also Crumpton, Brill, Eidusion & Geller, The Role of Fear in Electroconvulsive
Treatment, 136 J. N.Rvous AND MarxxL DisrsFs 29 (1963).
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deprivation of liberty, and without judicial participation in the process
the choice between overnight hospitalization and much longer deten-
tion is entirely within the control of the system itself. Moreover, as
additional facilities become available, duration of hospitalization may
increase, although some jurisdictions report success with much shorter
periods of time.133
An opportunity for judicial "review" of the administrative decision
to detain affects the extent of nonjudicial detention. If the patient is
presented before a judicial officer soon after presentation, perhaps the
short nonjudicial detention is within constitutionally acceptable limits.
But it is necessary to distinguish between presentation which is in fact
"soon after" admission and the delayed review observed in this study.
Delayed review not only removes many patients from whatever pro-
tection judicial proceedings provide, but also tends to diminish the
court's willingness to overturn the facility's decision to admit and
retain, thereby minimizing the protection afforded by the judicial
process in those cases where it is invoked. The constitutionality of pre-
hearing judicial hospitalization depends not only on its duration but
also upon the effectiveness of the subsequent judicial proceeding as a
meaningful decision-making process.
b. Protection of Substantive Rights Without Judicial Participation.
The basic argument made here underlies the validity of most admin-
istrative action affecting the rights of individuals: notice and oppor-
tunity to protest invasions of liberty can be effectively afforded by the
hospitalization system itself with less disruption to the system, the pa-
tient, and the family than a judicial procedure involves. 3 4 To equate
"due process" with "judicial process," the argument goes, is to adopt a
naive approach towards protection of substantive rightsa 35
133. See Guido & Payne, 72 Hour Psychiatric Detention, 16 ARcHIvES oF GENERAL PSY-
cHiATY 233 (1967) describing a study of the use of 72 hour emergency detention in Cali-
fornia. This short period, the study concluded, was sufficient in 76 per cent of the over
8,000 admissions to permit relieving the patient's immediate distress with medication,
"personality reintegration" of the patient, "family reorganization" and planning for the
future. Often, the study asserted, the 72 hour period was better than sixty to ninety day
short term treatment because it avoided the dependency reaction to institutionalization
that might occur even during relatively short periods of hospitalization.
134. See generally 1 K. DAvis, ADMINisTRATm LAw § 1.07 (1958).
135. In two recent decisions dealing with the mental health field, the United States
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of procedural rights. In Baxtrom v.
Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) New York's procedure for administratively committing to
psychiatric facilities prison inmates whose sentences expire was held to violate the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because, in contrast to the general pro-
cedure for civil commitment of those not under prison sentence, it extended no right to
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The validity of this position, however, turns to a large extent upon
the factual conclusion as to whether the administrative process does
protect the substantive rights of those who pass through the system.
Little attempt was made in the internal administration of the hospital
system which was the subject of this study to apply the legal criteria
to those offered for admission or those retained. In part, this was un-
doubtedly because of the wide gap between the legal criteria and the
demands upon the system; the experience reported here may not be
a reliable indicator of how the system would operate if the criteria
coincided more closely with general community demands. But it is
clear that under existing practice, the patient is accorded no real op-
portunity to present a "case" to hospital authorities for nonhospital-
ization and almost no attempt is made to protect legally defined sub-
stantive rights of those processed through the system. 136
It has also been suggested that the basic orientation of medically
trained persons is such that they are less likely to effectively administer
procedural devices designed to protect legal substantive rights. When
the need for "treatment" is in doubt, the medical tendency is to assume
the need exists, on the premise that no chance should be taken with
the patient's well being. Although a somewhat different matter is
involved when "treatment" means "detention,"'137 it is likely that the
a jury or court determination that the criteria for commitment was met. And in Specht
v. Patteison, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) the Court held that before a convicted defendant could
be sentenced under a Sexual Psychopath program he must receive reasonable notice and
a variety of procedural rights, including a hearing, the right to be present at that hearing,
and to confront and cross examine witnesses. In neither case did the Court hold specifically
that the procedure was constitutionally required to be a judicial one; but the language
of the decisions leaves little doubt that the Court had a judicial procedure in mind.
136. The right to counsel may have some effect upon the constitutionality of some pro-
cedures. Several recent decisions suggest that respondent in a commitment may have a
constitutional right to counsel. People ex rel. Rodgers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217
N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966); People ex rel. Woodall v. Bigelow, 20 N.Y.2d 852,
231 N.E.2d 777 (1967). Cf. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (hold-
ing that a right to counsel existed in a proceeding to commit an individual to an
institution for the mentally deficient, and applying the rule retroactively). See generally
Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEXAS
L. Rn,. 424 (1966); Note, 40 Tsm-p. L.Q. 381 (1967). If the respondent has a right to
counsel, does he have a concommitant right to a procedure whereby counsel can effec-
tively resist hospitalization, i.e., a judicial proceeding? But, on the other hand, could not
the right to counsel be defined so as to attach only if the individual indicated a desire
to actively oppose hospitalization, i.e., if he demanded a judicial hearing? Moreover, does
this argument not involve a naive view of counsel's role? Might not, for example, counsel
function effectively in a system of administrative hospitalization (as lawyers have in other
administrative environments)?
137. See S. HATLrCK, PsycHIATRY AND THE D.LimAS or CRum, 230-32 (1967).
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treatment-orientation of medical decision-makers carries through into
this context. The legal orientation, on the other hand, is to reject non-
voluntary control for whatever purpose until the justification for it
has been established.1 38 Insofar as the basic approach to the need for
hospitalization is concerned, then, medically trained decision-makers
can be expected to be less sympathetic to the legal requirement that
justification for commitment be established as a matter of fact before
hospitalization is effected. Moreover, there may be other influences
that bear upon medical personnel that encourage them to be less solic-
itous of legally defined rights than a non-medical person might be. For
example, one psychiatric journal has taken the editorial position that
short-term hospitalization is undesirable because it interferes with the
hospitals' ability to maintain a large and stable patient population for
research and training purposes.1 39 Insofar as this influences admission
and retention, of course, it necessarily involves a blatant sacrifice of
the patients' legally defined substantive rights.
c. Effect Upon the System's Objectives. One objective of the public
psychiatric hospitalization system is the protection of the community
from disruptive influences by "treating" those who cause the disrup-
tions, although treatment of those experiencing discomfort for the
purpose of relieving the discomfort is also an objective in itself. Per-
haps the most appealing arguments against judicial involvement in
the process are those asserting that such involvement would impede
the system's ability to achieve these goals. For purposes of evaluation,
however, the dual objectives of the system must be carefully separated.
i. Protection of the community. An argument against judicial involve-
ment that apparently was heavily relied upon by the early judicial
138. This difference in the orientation of legal and medical decision-makers is developed
in T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL 105-27 (1966).
139. See Editorial Comment, Law's Labor Lost, 40 PSYCHTmxC Q. 150, 156-57 (1966),
criticizing the recently enacted New York statutory scheme:
Perhaps ... the most calamitous effect of the new law and procedures will fall on
research and training....
Research in psychiatry depends upon enough hospital population to provide sta-
tistical validity with matched subjects, controlled in a variety of ways, over a fully
adequate time of close follow-up. The new system will not allow this. Patients will
not be around long enough for . . . adequate research study .... The practical re-
search on tranquilizing and antidepressant drugs . . . was done at state hospitals
under the old system [of long term hospitalization].
All of this equally applies to the training of doctors in psychiatry. In order to learn
they need to see a representative selection of patients from a very large admission
group over a long enough time in which to verify diagnosis and to justify treatment
choice. This they cannot get in a . . . [facility] with selective admission rules, small
capacity and rapid turnover....
The argument was repeated in Editorial Comment, Mental Hygiene Law-1967, 41 Psy-
cHIATEc Q. 766, 768-69 (1967).
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decisions was the assertion that nonjudicial hospitalization is necessary
to safeguard both the community and the patient himself from his
violent acts. 140 The difficulty of predicting dangerousness lends some
support to this. Insofar as the dangerous "mentally ill" cannot be sepa-
rated on the basis of clinical examination from those who are not
dangerous,"' this suggests that immediate detention be used for all
"mentally ill" until a determination of "non-dangerousness" can be
made. But there is a clear lack of support for the underlying assump-
tion that the "mentally ill," as a group, contain a sufficiently high
percentage of dangerous individuals to justify the wholesale depriva-
tion of liberty this argument suggests.14 2 Nor does the argument ex-
plain why this justification can suffice for more than the brief non-
judicial hospitalization necessary to make presentation before a judi-
cial officer practicable.
There is a more basic problem with the "dangerousness" rationale,
however. Assuming that at some point a distinction can be made be-
tween those "mentally ill" persons who are "dangerous" and those
who are not, this criteria does not correspond to the reasons for which
the community demands hospitalization. Any attempt to limit imme-
diate hospitalization to those who are dangerous means that the facili-
ties would be unable to meet community demands. The result, as this
study shows, is that the legal criteria is ignored and the legal frame-
work has almost no function in determining who is subjected to non-
voluntary hospitalization and for how long.
ii. Therapeutic needs of the patient. Professor Kadish, in one of the
few attempts to develop a coherent theoretical foundation for non-
judicial hospitalization on more than an emergency basis, has asserted
that a requirement of judicial proceedings prior to hospitalization
would "undermine the important societal objective of therapeutic
140. See cases cited at note 108 supra.
141. See text at note 81 supra.
142. For obvious reasons, the dangerousness of the mentally ill as a group has not been
subjected to much study. Examinations of arrest and conviction records of formerly hos-
pitalized idiividuals have been carried out, however, and most of the studies suggest that
mental patients have been less involved in criminal activity than the general population.
Rappeport and Lassen, Dangerousness-Arrest Rate Comparisons of Discharged Patients
and the General Population, 121 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 776 (1965) summarizes the literature.
But the study conducted by Rappeport and Lassen themselves indicated that the former
psychiatric patients had been as involved as the general population in murder, negligent
manslaughter and aggrevated assault. More surprisingly, the study indicated that the
former patients were more frequently involved in robbery than the general population,
and probably more often involved in rape. In addition, this held true after hospitalization
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treatment."' 43 If this disruptive impact of judicial proceedings is
weighed against the relatively less significant impact of an improper
hospitalization (as compared to the impact of erroneous conviction of
a criminal offense), he concludes, the balance justifies modifying tra-
ditional due process rules to the extent of permitting nonjudicial
hospitalization for a limited period, if the patient has available after
hospitalization an opportunity to invoke the judicial process. Under-
lying this analysis, of course, is the factual conclusion that judicial
proceedings significantly impede effective treatment of the "mentally
ill." Each of the several ways in which Kadish asserted that judicial
involvement has this effect deserves specific attention.
First, Kadish asserted that judicial proceedings arouse a feeling of
"public shame" and constitute a "publically humiliating experience"
for the family. The result, he argued, is that the prospect of a hearing
discourages the family from seeking help for the patient during the
early stages of the "illness" when the patient's prognosis may be most
favorable.144 It might also be argued, that if the patient is in fact pub-
lically shamed, this may decrease his desire to return to the community
and thereby minimize his receptiveness to therapy. But this study sug-
gests that in neither way need the judicial process be detrimental.
Help is frequently not sought soon after symptoms are observed, but
this is for reasons bearing no relationship to the anticipated procedure
necessary for nonvoluntary hospitalization. When help is sought, it is
often not because of the degree of psychopathology but because of a
crisis situation precipitated by fortuitous circumstances. It is, then,
doubtful whether the prospect of a judicial hearing is a significant
factor in the decision to seek help. Even if it is a factor, however, it is
at most only one of numerous "nontherapeutic" factors that determine
time of presentation and it is doubtful whether minimizing this factor
would have any appreciable effect on the timing of presentation.
Kadish's argument also assumed that the hearing affects the status or
the "reputation" of the patient and the family in the community.
This is doubtful. The hearings are unlikely to be either publicized or
widely attended; thus a hearing is unlikely to publicize the fact of
as well as before, when arrest records for period before and after hospitalization were
examined. Id. at 779. Psychiatric patients are not only more dangerous in some ways than
"normal" individuals, this suggests, but formal therapy does little to lessen this danger-
ousness.
143. Kadish, A Case Study in the Significance of Procedural Due Process-Institutional.
izing the Mentally Ill, 9 W. POL. Q. 93 (1956).
144. Id. at 96.
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hospitalization or the details of family problems much more than does
the fact of hospitalization. Some family members who participated in
the hearings observed for this study, found the hearing a disturbing
and difficult experience; the prospect of undergoing such an experi-
ence might deter some individuals from taking action. But this does
not mean the hearing had an effect on the regard in which the com-
munity held the family. Kadish, it seems clear, exaggerated the extent
to which a hearing adversely affects the family. Finally, even if it were
true that the prospect of a hearing did in fact delay the decision to
present the patient, this would not be as serious as might be supposed.
There is little evidence that treatment of the sort administered by the
public hospitalization system is significantly less effective if delayed.
While delay in hospitalization may prolong the discomfort of the pa-
tient and his family, it is unlikely to have any significant effect on his
subsequent susceptibility to treatment.
Second, Kadish asserted that judicial proceedings create "an anti-
therapeutic condition of maximum excitement and confusion."'1 45 The
observations made during this study suggest that although judicial
proceedings may cause patients some discomfort both before and dur-
ing the actual hearing, this is of only a temporary nature and has no
effect upon the therapeutic objectives of the system. Closely related
is Kadish's third argument that the patient's attendance at the hearing
may be antitherapeutic. It may, Kadish asserted, feed a persecution
delusion "with objective evidence a therapist would be hard put to
refute."' 46 To this might be added the danger that hearing a detailed
analysis of his psychopathology might convince a patient that he is in
fact hopelessly ill and thereby minimize his motivation to take medi-
cation or engage in other forms of treatment. To the extent that these
assertions are offered to support nonjudicial hospitalization, they fall
somewhat short. If, in a specific case, a patient's attendance at a hear-
ing would be detrimental, his presence might be prevented; as is pro-
vided for by the statutes of many states. The danger, of course, is in
routine ex parte hearings even when there is no factual basis for con-
cluding that the patient's participation would have any long term
unfortunate effects.
But the basic arguments, in the public hospitalization context, are
open to significant challenge. If the patient's family was influential
in hospitalizing him, he is likely to know this and to be aware of the
145. Id,
146. Id.
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underlying crisis that precipitated admission. The hearing is likely to
add little to this. Nor is a patient hospitalized in a locked ward likely
to be unaware of the fact that he is regarded as seriously ill. More im-
portant, however, these arguments rest largely on questionable assump-
tions regarding the nature of the therapy administered in the public
hospitalization system. Kadish apparently assumed that the hearing
would decrease the patient's susceptibility to "insight therapy" de-
signed to gradually bring the patient to an awareness of the uncon-
scious conflicts underlying his symptomatic behavior. But this type of
treatment is a minimal part of public acute therapy. There is no evi-
dence that there would be any equivalent impact on the effectiveness
of drug or electroshock therapy, the methods of treatment almost ex-
clusively administered.
Another argument advanced in favor of administrative hospitaliza-
tion is that judicial involvement places a foreign agency between the
patient and the therapist with the result that the close relationship
essential to treatment is destroyed. A discussion of recent New York
legislation argued:
The primary effect ... has been to orient the patient away from
his doctor. Now he looks to the court ... for release rather than
to his doctor. After counting treatment in days rather than in
improvement, he ... can request a hearing ... and a judge will
determine whether his treatment shall end. This is antithera-
peutic.
... . [I]nstead of replacing legalistic machinery with a medical
approach to the problem of admission and retention, the ... new
law has . ., emphasize[d] the court and legal ritual.1 47
This again, however, assumes a much closer patient-physician relation-
ship than this study suggests actually exists in the acute treatment sys-
tem. In addition, there is little less logic in the alternative argument
that unless a nonvoluntary patient is convinced that he has been
treated fairly, he will not be susceptible to suggestions that he con-
form to the desires of his "captors" on other than a superficial basis.
As of yet, there is simply no reliable evidence as to the actual effect
of court procedures on the therapeutic relationship in those limited
situations where such a relationship can be said to exist.
d. Effectiveness of judicial participation. Camara makes clear that
in determining the constitutionally-necessary role of the judiciary, the
extent to which a judicial function can be performed effectively in the
147. Editorial Comment, Law's Labor Lost, 40 PSYcIUATRIc Q. 150 (1966).
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specific context is a necessary consideration. A strong case can be made
for the position that at the time admission is indicated, a psychiatric
facility cannot reasonably be expected to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the proposed patient meets the criteria for non-
voluntary hospitalization. For example, the patient's home situation
is extremely important in admission and retention, yet it may be
several days before a realistic evaluation can be made of this.
But Camara also leaves no doubt but that the function of the judi-
cial officer may be adjusted to the situation. The effectiveness of a
judicial decision-maker inserted at an early stage of the hospitalization
process may well depend on a realistic definition of his function. There
are two basic alternatives. The court may perform a "review" function,
assuring that no one not within the legal criteria is subjected to hos-
pitalization. Under this view, the task of selecting those within this
boundary who are to be subjected to the system is delegated primarily
to medical personnel. On the other hand, the court may be viewed as
having the function of determining in each case whether the individ-
ual before it is to be subjected to the system.148
As the system has developed in St. Louis, the actual role performed
by the court is that of review. Only where it appears to the court that
medical authorities have hospitalized a patient who falls without a
very broadly defined category, does the court consider denying the
commitment application. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has, however, taken the position that the District of Colum-
bia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act imposes on the courts of
that jurisdiction a much more active function. The Act authorizes the
148. Similar disputes over the role of the court have arisen in the juvenile court con-
text. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, STANDARDS FOR
JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 9-15 (1966). The analagous problem in the juvenile court
area is complicated by the fact that the "treatment" is frequently administered by agencies
which are themselves within the organizational control of the court. Decisions made by
workers in these agencies are sometimes considered "quasi-judicial." It has generally been
felt, however, that the basic dispositional decision must be made by the court itself al-
though the initial decision as to whether to detain the child prior to adjudication and
disposition may be made by a court-designated administrative official. Id. at 12, 61 (1967).
But there has been a great deal of emphasis on providing a standard procedure-essen-
tially an administrative hearing-at which the child or his parents have a right to "make
a case" for release and to have the legal criteria applied to the situation. E.g., NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT § 17, at 38-40 (1959).
Most ps)chiatric hospitalization statutes do not provide for this administrative due process
nor is there any evidence that the facilities have developed this themselves; the staffing,
described in the text at note 84 supra, served no purpose in the facility observed here
insofar as application of the legal criteria was concerned.
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court, if it finds that the pre-patient is "mentally ill and, because of
that illness, is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain
at liberty," to order whether commitment or "any other alternative
course of treatment which the court believes will be in the best in-
terests of the person or of the public."'149 In Lake v. Cameron,150 the
Court of Appeals remanded the habeas corpus appeal of an elderly
woman (with a proven tendency to "wander about the streets") for a
consideration of alternative courses of treatment. Before commitment
could be ordered, the court indicated, those seeking commitment
would have to carry the burden of proving to the court that alternative
courses of treatment would not in each specific case sufficiently pro-
tect the patient and the public.
To a significant extent the view of the court as having the function
in each case of initially determining the appropriate form of "treat-
ment" rests on the assumption that the court will be the first official
agency approached by those seeking hospitalization of an individual.
The statutory procedures for hospitalization by court order, for ex-
ample, almost uniformly assume that when the community decision
to seek medical attention is made, the court will be approached, the
procedure put into motion and the applicant and the prospective pa-
tient will remain in the community, awaiting the results of a judicial
inquiry. But, as this study illustrates, such a view does not correspond
to the actual dynamics of the community decision; hospitalization is
frequently not sought until a crisis situation develops, and when this
occurs a strong demand is made for rapid hospitalization. Immediate
help is sought directly from public psychiatric facilities. By the time
of judicial involvement in the process, a program of treatment has al-
ready been determined by the facility which has accepted the patient;
the existence of such a determination by a professional staff works
strongly against the court going again over the same ground. To the
extent that the court will make a de novo determination of the course
of treatment in each case assumes that it will be presented with some-
what equally balanced alternatives, it is an unrealistic expectation.
But early judicial involvement in the hospitalization process need
not require the court to perform the dispositional function. A limited
function, arguably more appropriate to the situation, has been given
the court in the Illinois statutory structure. Within five days of admis-
sion, each patient admitted pursuant to the certification of one physi-
149. D.C. Code § 21-545(b) (1967).
150. 864 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1967).
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cian must have an informal consultation with a judicial officer.151 At
this consultation, the judicial officer is directed to identify himself,
explain to the patient his legal rights and inquire whether the patient
desires a full judicial hearing.152 He is to determine at this time only
whether there is "reasonable doubt as to whether the patient should
be detained" as meeting the criteria for nonvoluntary hospitalization.5 3
"If the patient indicates in any manner that he desires such a hearing"
or if the judge entertains reasonable doubt as to the propriety of the
confinement, a full hearing is to be held within five days.15 4
Routine judicial participation, it has also been argued, will fre-
quently be ineffective because the proposed patients will often not
actively take part in the procedure. The St. Louis study lends some
support to this; less than one-third of the patients appeared to take
part in the commitment hearing. But it does not necessarily follow
from this that even in these cases the hearing must be functionless.
If the argument assumes that failure to participate in the hearing
means that the patient no longer opposes continued hospitalization
or that he accurately realizes he is properly hospitalized (and in either
case a hearing is consequently unnecessary), it can be effectively ques-
tioned. A number of patients observed in the court hearings took the
position that they did not desire hospitalization but had resigned
themselves to the fact that the "medical determination" of their need
for hospitalization would be carried out. It is reasonable to assume
that some of those who did not appear at the hearings failed to do so
because of the same belief in the futility of opposition. Moreover, the
court files suggested that there was often significant doubt whether
the nonresisters met the criteria for nonvoluntary hospitalization.
Family and medical pressure, it seems clear, can stifle opposition to
nonvoluntary hospitalization in cases where there is serious doubt that
the patient meets the legal criteria.
Insofar as the argument assumes that active participation by the
proposed patient is necessary to the effective functioning of the judi-
cial process, it is also open to challenge. But in these cases (as well as
in many where the patient actively opposes institutionalization), the
effectiveness of judicial participation will probably depend upon the
availability of an ancillary staff to assure that adequate factual in-
151. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 91, , § 7-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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formation is placed before the court. Pro forma representation by
counsel such as was observed in this study will not suffice. Probably
the only realistic answer is a professional staff assigned to hospitaliza-
tion matters. New York's Mental Health Information Service is the
best developed example.255 Only such a staff, with detailed knowledge
of technical medical matters and with time to investigate and prepare
cases, can make the hearing procedure an effective fact-finding process.
But perhaps most important is the need to recognize that judicial
involvement can be effective only if the judiciary enforces realistic
substantive criteria. Insofar as the legal framework, through the judi-
ciary, attempts to impose upon a psychiatric hospitalization system a
function that is significantly at variance with that demanded by the
community, the entire legal framework is unlikely to be an effective
determinant of the system's operation. This study suggests that the
substantive criteria must recognize that in practice, medical help is
frequently sought in a crisis situation after the family or community
has exhausted its patience with the symptomatic behavior of the pa-
tient. Those criteria that consider only what purport to be char-
acteristics of the patient-such as lack of insight or ability to make
responsible decisions-ignore the basic reality of "mental illness"; the
significance of a symptom is determined by factors external to the
patient, such as community or family resources or attitudes. Non-
voluntary hospitalization is demanded not because of the existence
of symptoms, but because of the effect which the patient's symptoms
have on others. Unless the legal criteria take into account the actual
dynamics of the underlying problem, the legal framework and the
judiciary are almost certain to be largely ignored and therefore in-
effective in practice.
155. New York's Mental Health Information Service is an exciting innovation made in
response to a recommendation by a Special Committee of the New York City Bar Associa-
tion in cooperation with Cornell Law School. See SPECIAL ConuTrEE To STUDY COMMIT-
MENT PROcEDuREs, Ass'N OF BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YoRK, MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE
PRocEss (1962). Note, The New York Mental Health Information Service: A New Approach
to Hospitalization of the Mentally 1ll, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 672 (1967), describes the opera-
tion of the Service. Composed of individuals with a variety of backgrounds (most are
either attorneys or social workers), the Service attempts to make hearing procedures mean-
ingful and, when no formal hearing is held, to assist the patient through the administra-
tive procedure. Members explain to admitted patients their legal rights, compile infor-
mation for adjudication and disposition in those cases in which a hearing is held and,
in some cases, even act as counsel for the patient. Although it is questionable whether
such an agency should-or constitutionally could-replace representation by counsel, the
existence of such an agency makes protection of the legal rights of patients a more
attainable goal.
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3. Waiver of Right to Initial Judicial Involvement
Even if the right to a prior or early judicial determination of the
justification for hospitalization is a constitutional right, it is never-
theless clear that it may be waived, not only by the individual himself
but also by someone acting for him. As the issue arises in the mental
hospitalization context, it raises the question of the extent to which
subsequent judicial involvement in the continued detention of an
individual admitted pursuant to a nonjudicial procedure may be made
to depend on continued and active assertion of objections to the hos-
pitalization or specific demand for judicial involvement. The issue is
essentially one of waiver; by failing to affirmatively and actively op-
pose hospitalization by demanding a judicial hearing, the individual
is considered to have waived his right to a judicial determination of
the justification for that hospitalization. There is no apparent reason
why the matter should not be tested by the Supreme Court's tradi-
tional definition of waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege"' 5 6 as this has been developed
in case law.
Henry v. State of Mississippil57 suggests that the constitutional
validity of a waiver procedure may depend in part upon whether the
procedure serves a "legitimate state interest" and upon the importance
of that interest. It seems realistic to say that effective judicial partici-
pation in the hospitalization process requires some preliminary screen-
ing of the cases that are brought before the court. If all cases, regardless
of the attitude of the hospitalized individual or the merits of his op-
position to hospitalization, are taken through the same procedure,
there is strong pressure for that procedure to become little more than
form. In addition, the strong time pressure on the court as well as
counsel and the psychiatric facilities suggests that the time and effort
necessary to the reliable resolution of the difficult issues posed by the
close cases may not be available if significant time and effort must be
spent on even the "clear" cases. The unavoidable impact of inertia
must also be considered; a patient with an arguably meritorious case
who is presented before a court immediately after the court has heard
twenty cases with no merit whatsoever probably has an initial task of
significant difficulty in directing the court's full and neutral attention
to his own situation. The state, then, has an identifiable and impor-
156. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
157. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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tant interest in providing for waiver by nonassertion of the right to a
judicial determination.
But existence of a state interest is not enough. The waiver must also
meet basic minimum standards, usually summarized by the statement
that waiver of a right requires knowledge and understanding of that
right in addition to a clear and voluntary intention to relinquish it."'8
In the criminal context, it has been suggested that to assure that the
waiver meets these requirements, a waiver of an important right must
be made before the court itself whenever feasible:
[W]here the defendant is available, "the serious and weighty re-
sponsibility" of determining whether he wants to waive a con-
stitutional right requires that he be brought before the court,
advised of that right and then permitted to make "an intelligent
and competent waiver."'u 9
The implementation of this position has been attempted by the hos-
pitalization procedure adopted in Illinois which requires that each
nonvoluntary patient be interviewed by the court and informed of
his right to a judicial determination of the justification of his deten-
tion; the patient's response in the presence of the court determines
whether the right has been waived.60
In the hospitalization context, as in the criminal context, without
the advice of someone trained and experienced in the law, most pa-
tients cannot have either the knowledge or intent that is required for
waiver of their right to a judicial proceeding. Nor would appointment
of routinely ineffective counsel fill the need. By far the most promising
answer seems to be the development of a professional staff devoted to
assuring that patients are aware of their rights. This is essentially the
task which has been undertaken in New York by the Mental Health
Information Service. Such a program, however, raises a difficult ques-
tion: to what extent may a legal advisor (such as a member of the
Mental Health Information Service) waive for a patient the right to
a judicial determination? Henry made clear that even in the criminal
area counsel could, by a choice of trial tactics, legitimately waive for
a defendant a constitutional right. But only one year later, in Brook-
hart v. Janis,""' the Court emphasized that this did not permit counsel
158. E.g., Dupes v. Johnson, 353 F.2d 103, 105 (6th Cir. 1965) ("Constitutional rights
cannot be waived without a knowledge and understanding of them and without a clear
and voluntary intention to waive them.'). See also Brookhart v. Janis, 384 US. 1 (1966).
159. Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
160. See text at notes 151-53 supra.
161. 384 US. 1 (1966).
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to override a defendant's expressed desire to assert a specific right. If
counsel is to perform a valuable screening function, it is inevitable
that he will be confronted with extremely difficult Henry-Brookhart
problems: to what extent should-and must-he assist a patient in
the presentation of opposition to hospitalization when the patient in-
sists on a full scale judicial hearing despite the lack of any merit what-
soever to his objections? To what extent should-and must-counsel
advise and assist a patient in obtaining a judicial determination where
the patient's resistance is very mild and it is likely that he does not
meet the criteria, yet his release would cause both the patient and his
family severe discomfort? These difficult problems of ethics and coun-
seling technique are beyond the scope of this discussion.1 2 But any
successful resolution of the issues which are of primary concern here
must anticipate that difficulties of this nature will arise in practice.0 3
162. The problem of waiver is one on which there is little helpful law. In Dooling v.
Overhosler, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957), the court, interpreting a statute extending to a
respondent in a commitment proceeding the "right to be represented by counsel" in all
hearings, invalidated a commitment because the respondent had not been represented by
counsel at a hearing before the Commission on Mental Health. An attorney had been
appointed but had been discharged at the specific request of the respondent. The court
carefully indicated, however, that its ruling did not require appointment of an attorney
but only the appointment of a responsible person to act as guardian ad litum. Appar-
ently this guardian ad litum would have been empowered to waive for the respondent
such rights as that to be represented by counsel as well as such procedural rights as put-
ting the state to its proof on the issue of whether the criteria for nonvoluntary hospitaliza-
tion were met. But cf. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966), remanding for a judicial
determination of the competency of a state prisoner under sentence of death who at-
tempted to withdraw his petition for certiorari in which he challenged the constitutional
validity of his conviction.
Even in the criminal context there is little consistency in the approaches taken by courts
to waiver questions. In Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (see text at
note 158 supra), for example, it was held that the defendant had not waived his right to
be present at this trial by telling his attorney specifically that he did not want to return
to the courtroom after a recess. But cf. Hatcher v. United States, 352 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966), in which the same court upheld a purported
waiver of jury trial despite the lack of any direct communication between the defendant
and the court because there was "no suggestion that [the] waiver was not intentional or
without actual knowledge of . . . [the] right." Id. at 365. There is even some suggestion
that defective counsel may increase the likelihood that a waiver will be found. In Kuhl
v. United States, 370 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1966), counsel's failure to demand exclusion of
evidence because he felt the basis for the exclusion was "arguable" was held to constitute
a waiver by the client of the right to have the evidence excluded. The court commented,
"The law does not . . . make the fact of waiver stand or fall upon such tenuous matters
as the extent or accuracy of the lawyer's knowledge of the facts or the law or the sufficiency
of the reasons for his actions." Id. at 26. Compare United States v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d
720 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 (1963).
163. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLYi
B. A Proposal
The Fourth-Fourteenth Amendment analysis strongly suggests that
it is constitutionally necessary that a "neutral and detached magis-
trate" be inserted at an early point in the psychiatric hospitalization
process. There is, however, room within the constitutional directive
to accommodate his function to the practical problems presented by
the process. Moreover, if care is taken to assure that the hospitalized
individual is provided with effective legal counseling, it is constitu-
tionally permissible to limit, on the basis of failure to demand a full
review of the situation, full judicial inquiry to those cases where it
can serve a valuable function.
The following proposal is geared to a large metropolitan area served
by acute psychiatric facilities offering emergency room services. It as-
sumes that community members will frequently approach the acute
facility rather than any other official agency when a crisis situation
develops. It also assumes that in many cases it would be mechanically
impracticable to obtain judicial authorization prior to the time of hos-
pitalization. This, together with the reliability of psychiatric facility
personnel, the proposal concludes, justifies postponing judicial inter-
vention in all cases to a limited extent. In defining the judicial func-
tion, it assumes that more flexibility must be granted to community
and facility medical personnel early in the process than is accorded
them after they have had an opportunity to investigate the situation.
Consequently, the function of the court develops from a screening
44 TEXAs L. RyV. 424 (1966), considers in detail the role of an attorney assigned to (or
engaged by) a patient. He concludes that if a patient desires to resist commitment, "the
attorney must seek to further that desire, attempt to convince the client that hospitaliza-
tion or some other treatment plan appears to be in his best interest, or withdraw." Id.
at 451-52. This oversimplifies the problem. No consideration is given to the difficult ques-
tion of the extent to which the attorney should attempt to convince a patient out of his
expressed desires. This is especially important given the inherently coercive atmosphere
surrounding a hospitalized individual. Nor does Cohen suggest the attitude counsel should
take towards the "nonprotesting" patient, the "nonresisters" of this study. Undoubtedly
counsel's general attitude, the manner in which various alternatives are described, and
the enthusiasm with which they are presented as well as counsel's own evaluation of their
desirability all influence the patient's actions. In approaching this, to what extent should
counsel be influenced by family desires or by his own evaluation of the family's best
interests? These are the real problems.
Nor does Cohen's analysis provide much help for the professional staff member of an
agency who does not have the option of withdrawal. It is almost certain that members
of staffs such as the New York Mental Health Information Service will have to allocate
their efforts among patients. To what extent should or may staff members effectuate this
allocation by waiving the rights of those patients whose invoking of the rights would
lead to what the staff believes are undesirable results?
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role at the initial stage to a de novo consideration of the merits of
alternative disposition at the indeterminate commitment stage. The
criteria for nonvoluntary hospitalization also become increasingly re-
strictive as the consequences of hospitalization become more serious.
The short-term criterion is broader than most existing statutory pro-
visions but it probably represents what is generally used in actual
practice; it recognizes that patients are presented for a variety of "non-
therapeutic" reasons and that relatively short-term hospitalization is
frequently effective in relieving the "nonmedical" crisis that precipi-
tated presentation. The criteria for indeterminate commitment is
much more restrictive. Family and community disruption, as well as
danger to property, may be a sufficient basis to demand that "some-
thing be done." But if the only recourse is indeterminate custodial
detention, the social objective does not justify the means required to
achieve it. Moreover, a broader criteria may run afoul of patients'
"right to treatment"; its constitutional validity may be saved if it is
used for the limited purpose of "crisis remission."' 64
164. Whether a "right to treatment" exists on a constitutional level is far from dear.
The leading case is undoubtedly Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), en-
forcing a statutory right to treatment of a patient hospitalized pursuant to a finding of
not guilty by reason of insanity in a criminal trial. See generally, Birnbaum, The Right
to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L.
Rv. 1134 (1967).
The rationale asserted for the right is simple: the justification for depriving the patient
of his liberty is that by requiring him to submit to treatment, his condition can be im-
proved. If, however, there is no reasonable expectation of improving the individual's
"illness," the rationale for his detention fails and he is entitled to release. This, of course,
ignores potential reliance upon social interests other than the patient's cure. Dangerous-
nes without regard to curability is a reasonable justification for continued detention, and
the danger of family disruption as well as the social interest in preserving the ability of
people to carry out their everyday affairs without serious inconvenience can be offered
to justify detention. But this creates additional problems. Insofar as interests other than
the patient's improvement for its own sake are relied upon to justify detention, less
relaxation of traditionally criminal procedural safeguards can be tolerated. And if some
individuals who commit antisocial acts are imprisoned while others are hospitalized for
longer periods after (and because) they committed the same acts, does this violate Equal
Protection? If the concept of "mental illness" is vague or unreliable, the answer must be
affirmative, Moreover, if the danger or disruption of affairs is small or its potentiality
low, long-term preventative detention may constitute a denial of substantive due process
or an imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. Cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 651
(1968), in which the Court held that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments did not require that the states forsake the criminal process as a
means of dealing with the chronic alcoholic. The Court was obviously influenced by its
conclusion that "medical" knowledge of the nature and treatment of alcoholism was scant
and that to restrict states to a "treatment" approach "might subject indigent alcoholics
to the risk that they may be locked up for an indefinite period . . . with no more hope
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1. Initial Admission
The acute facility should be authorized to admit upon the certifi-
cation of a staff physician of the acute facility that he believes an indi-
vidual meets the criteria for short-term hospitalization. The criteria
applied should be those set out in the next paragraph. Brief, informal
hearings should be conducted by a judicial officer at the facility on the
morning of each weekday, a patient, whether a voluntary or a non-
voluntary admission, should be required to appear at the first hearing
following his admission. The judicial officer should have available the
report of the admitting physician and should attempt to elicit from
the patient his understanding of the circumstances of his presentation
and admission. The patient should be informed by the judicial officer
of his legal status and of his right to a full judicial hearing. Release
should be ordered only if the judicial officer finds that there is not
substantial reason to believe that the patient meets the criteria for
nonvoluntary short-term hospitalization or (in the event that the pa-
tient is a voluntary admission) that the admission was not a free exer-
cise of the patient's will.
2. Short-term Treatment
The initial certification by the admitting physician should be a
sufficient basis for a thirty-day period of hospitalization unless a judi-
cial hearing is requested. If, either at the time of the initial informal
hearing or at any subsequent time, the patient or the legal service re-
than before of receiving effective treatment and no prospect of periodic 'freedom.'" 392
Us. at ,
Nor is the scope of the right, if it exists, at all clear. In Rouse, the court recognized
that "milieu therapy" would in some cases meet the requirement; 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). In Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court hinted that
full time hospitalization where a lesser degree of control would be adequate might violate
constitutional norms. Yet in Collins v. Cameron, 377 F.2d 945 D.C. Cir. 1967), the court
held that the right to treatment did not prohibit the full time hospitalization of the
petitioner while he was taking tranquilizing drugs for the purpose of denying him access
to alcohol. The testimony was that the petitioner was not dangerous while taking medica-
tion, but that if he discontinued his medication and resorted to alcohol (as he had done
in the past), he would become dangerous. Moreover, in Rouse the court apparently held
that "the hospital need not show that the treatment will cure or improve . . . [the pa-
tient] but only that there is a bona fide effort to do so." While expressly disclaiming con-
sideration of the "untreatable patient," the court quoted expert opinion that no patients
are untreatable. Cf. Nason *. Commissioner of Mental Health, 351 Mass. 94, 217 N.E.2d
733 (1966).
In any case, both a realistic evaluation of the reliability of the illness concept as well
as constitutional considerations indicate that use of the "convenience" justifications be
limited to relatively short term hospitalization.
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quests a hearing, such a proceeding should be held within three days.
At this hearing, the facility should have the burden of establishing
that the patient meets the criteria for nonvoluntary hospitalization.
The court should be directed to order hospitalization for thirty days
from the date of initial admission in all cases where it is found that
the patient is (1) "mentally ill," and (2) by reason of that "mental ill-
ness," (a) there is a significant danger that the patient will engage in
violent conduct and thereby create a serious danger of immediate
physical harm to himself or others, or will create a substantial danger
of serious damage to property belonging to others, or (b) the patient's
ability to function normally in the community is so impaired that
there is a substantial probability that he will be seriously harmed or
that he will repeatedly and seriously disrupt the ordinary affairs of
others, or (c) the patient's living situation has been so disrupted as to
create a significant threat to the family's stability or the emotional or
physical health of its members.
3. Authorization for Indeterminate Hospitalization
Since this is a much more significant deprivation of liberty, judicial
investigation of alternatives should occur in each case and the criteria
should be significantly more restrictive. A thirty-day short-term period
of hospitalization should precede the application for indeterminate
hospitalization. This would give the facility adequate opportunity to
diagnose and prepare the factual foundation for the application. In
each case, the court should be required to consider alternatives to full-
time hospitalization and should be directed to order hospitalization
only if no other disposition will prevent the adverse results anticipated
by the criteria. Commitment should be authorized only after a factual
finding that the patient is (1) "mentally ill," and (2) by reason of that
"mental illness" either (a) there is a significant danger that the patient
will engage in violent conduct and thereby create a serious danger of
immediate physical harm to himself or others, or (b) the ability of
the patient to function normally in the community is so impaired that
there is substantial probability that, if not hospitalized, he will be
subjected to serious physical harm.
This study concerned itself with only a few of the many problems
that arise in the relationship between nonvoluntary psychiatric treat-
ment and the law. Many others deserve far more attention than they
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receive in current literature. For example, few legal frameworks make
any attempt to accommodate nonvoluntary outpatient treatment, an
increasingly important part of public psychiatric care.1'6 The wide
variety of problems raised by hospitalization of those accused or con-
victed of criminal offenses is beginning to attract attention, but the
issues are far from resolved. 166
The proposal in Part III represents no more than a summary of
subjective conclusions regarding the issues raised throughout the
paper. Insofar as it is inconsistent with existing practices, there is no
assurance that it would be any more successful in changing those prac-
tices than was the Missouri legal framework in affecting the system
that was the subject of this study. The problem is not one of legal re-
search or draftsmanship. Oaks and Lehman were probably correct
when they concluded:
The surest way to solve systemic problems is the slowest: to advo-
cate ideals rather than to institute them. Ideals that are absorbed
by the participants in, and by the clients of, a system are likely to
find expression in the system .... 167
Insofar as many of the problems discussed here are caused by what are
probably misconceptions as to the nature and dynamics of the affliction
with which the psychiatric hospitalization system must deal, their solu-
tion depends more on a better understanding of the affliction than on
legal directives. Families who "solve" a crisis by labeling one member
"mentally ill" and securing his hospitalization and courts which op-
erate on the assumption that "need for hospitalization" is a medical
judgment based upon clinical observations will probably be little
affected by changes in the legal framework or will only find other
165. In Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the Court of Appeals ordered
the lower courts to consider in each case court-ordered outpatient treatment as an alter-
native to full time hospitalization. But see the problems raised by the lower court judge
who was faced with the Lake case on remand. Lake v. Cameron, 267 F. Supp. 155 (D.D.C.
1967). For a general discussion of the need for supervised treatment other than full time
hospitalization and a proposal for structuring such a program, see Bleicher, Compulsory
Community Care for the Mentally I1, 16 CLEv.-MA . L. REv. 93 (1967). For an encouraging
report on the possibilities of nonhospital care of even those seriously ill, see B. PASA-
MANIC, F. ScARPrrri & S. DiNrrz, SCHIZOPHRENICS IN THE COMMUNITY (1967).
166. See Lewin, Disposition of the Irresponsible: Protection Following Commitment, 66
MICH. L. REv. 721 (1968); Matthews, Mental Illness and the Criminal Law: Is Community
Mental Health an Answer?, 57 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1571 (1967); Hess & Thomas, Incom-
petency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results and Problems, 119 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 713
(1963).
167. D. OAKES & W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 195 (1968).
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equally effective methods of implementing their beliefs. The problems
raised by this study, like most problems raised by critical examination
of legal rules and systems of social control, are not legal ones. They
involve difficult factual questions and a variety of people acting in
accord with their own answers to these questions. Reform must take
into account not only the factual issues but also the resolutions of
these questions arrived at by the participants in the process.
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